76 W. Va. 332 | W. Va. | 1915
Lead Opinion
The decrees complained of on this appeal were made and entered in a suit brought by the executor of the will of J. W. Dudley, for the sale of the real estate of which he diecl seized and possessed and settlement and distribution of his estate among the devisees and legatees, after the payment of his debts, the personal property being insufficient to pay the indebtedness, and the will having ordered the sale of part of the real estate. The widow of the testator is the appellant and she complains of the refusal of the court to permit assignment to her, of her dower in kind, in a tract of about ten acres of land in the city of Parkersburg, known as the home place, on which the mansion house of the testator is situated, ' apportionment to her out of the proceeds of the sale of said
No provision for the widow was made in the will by Dudley, Avherefore she renounced the provisions thereof, in so far as they affect her, and claimed her dower in the real estate of which he died seized. This consisted of a tract of land in Wirt County, some parcels of land in Wood County, the home place in the city of Parkersburg and another piece of city property. Knowing himself to be heavily indebted, the testator directed his executor to sell all of his real and personal property, except the home place, and convert the same into cash, which, so far as necessary, was to be applied to the discharge of his indebtedness. Part of the home place, about three and one-half acres, was used for the purposes of a partnership business conducted by the testator and one of his sons, C. P. Dudley, the firm name being J. W. Dudley and Son. They were florists and their greenhouses were located on that portion of the home place. 'The whole of the home place was incumbered by a debt of $10,000.00, secured by a deed of trust in which the wife had joined. This debt, with its interest, was ascertained in this cause to be $11,823.33, and the unsecured personal debts of Dudley were found to be $13,589.30, making his entire indebtedness $25,412.62. The stipulation filed for the purpose of the appeal shows the existence of a firm debt amounting to $3,064.58, which, added to the personal indebtedness of J. W. Dudley, makes' $28,477.21, as the aggregfffte of personal and firm indebtedness for which the estate is liable.
As to all the real estate except the home place, the widow elected to take her dower in money, but asserted her right to have dower in kind in the home place, so assigned as to include the mansion house, if it should be possible, in view of the indebtedness of the estate, so to allow it to her.
The real estate other than the home place was sold separately for the following amounts, respectively: The Wirt County land $2,218.83, the First Street property in Parkers-burg $915.00, and parcels in Wood County, other than the "
In view of these facts and upon the assumption of nonexistence of firm indebtedness, other than the $3,064.58 to which reference has been made, the widow filed a petition in which she again prayed assignment of her dower in kind in the home place. In it, she set forth a calculation, based upon the facts herein stated and others claimed, by which she endeavors to show sufficient assets, exclusive of the proceeds of the six and one-half acres, to pay all of the indebtedness and thus make possible the assignment of her dower. The proceeds of the firm assets, less the firm debt of $3,064.58, amount to $19,785.32, one-half of which, $9,897.76, would be available for the purpose, provided there are no other firm debts. To this must be added the proceeds of the three and one-half acres, $9,500.00 and the $3,850.00, derived from the sale of other real estate, after deduction of the dower interest therein. This would make something over $23,000.00 and leave for expenses of the suit the fund in the hands of the executor, derived from the personal estate, amounting to about $1,700.00. The petition further claims two of the debts amounting to $1,215.59 had been paid, that L. Dudley is liable for nearly $900.00, part of two of the other debts,
In a later decree, the basis of ascertainment of the gross sum to be paid to the widow, on account of her dower in the home place, was stated as follows: “The costs of suit and expenses of sale shall be first provided for and paid and the residue of the proceeds of the real and personal estate of J. W. Dudley except from said home place, shall be paid pro rata on all the debts of J. W. Dudley including the mortgage debt aforesaid herein before decreed a lien on said 10 acres. The residue of said mortgage debt shall be paid out of the proceeds from the sale of said 10 acres and the widow shall have her dower in cash in the residue of the proceeds arising from sale of said 10 acres after said mortgage debt has ' been fully paid.”
The delay incident to a full and complete settlement of 'the firm business and distribution of its assets is urged as justification of the action of the court in ordering the sale of the real estate, without having previously caused the dower to be assigned.
Sale" of all of the real estate except the home place, whether the personal estate was sufficient to pay the indebtedness or not, was proper, because the will directed it to be sold. The
As to the widow’s right in land incumbered by mortgage or deed of trust, by the joint action of the husband and herself, the decisions of this court and of the Virginia court, before the separation of the state, are somewhat indefinite. The exact question presented here seems never to have been passed upon. In Heth v. Cocke and Wife, 1 Rand. 344, the mortgaged land had been sold, the debt satisfied out of the proceeds and the residue paid to the guardian of the infant children of the deceased mortgagor, before the widow made any attempt to assert her claim to dower in the land. Having ascertained and determined that her dower right had attached to the equity of redemption only, the court denied her relief, on the ground of waiver by delay and non-assertion of her claim, which was declared to be merely an equitable one. The opinion of the court delivered by Coalter, Judge, concludes as follows: ‘ ‘ On the whole, therefore, although her right to dower in this case is given to her by law, and so far may be considered a legal right, yet it is a right of such a nature, that, as to the appellant, it could only be asserted in a court of equity, under the power thus to permit redemption, after the forfeiture of the legal estate at law; and this right to an equitable interposition, she may waive or abandon, as I think she has done in this case.” In Wilson et al. v. Davisson, 2 Rob. 384, the widow claimed, against the purchaser, dower in the land which had been sold to satisfy a vendor’s lien for purchase money, and the court denied her right to dower and
A purchase money lien is readily distinguishable from one created to secure an ordinary debt, and the courts do not hesitate to emphasize the grounds of distinction. To allow a wife dower in land that has not been paid for to the exclusion of the lien for purchase money would be flagrantly inequitable and unjust. Therefore the law denies her participation except as to the surplus of the proceeds of sale, when the land has been sold or is about to be sold. The purchase money debt directly and obviously represents the land, or a portion ■ of it, and stands in the place of the land. To the extent thereof, the vendee lacks beneficial ownership. This doctrine exists independently of the statute and was asserted before it was passed. But, as to other debts, the rule differs in conformity with the altered circumstances.
In the interest of perspicuity, the purpose and effect of this statute will be defined, before the inquiry here involved proceeds further. Its own terms import inapplicability under the circumstances here disclosed. It creates and defines the right of the widow in land sold in the lifetime of her husband, while her dower is contingent and her right inchoate and un-vested. Not a word in it suggests intent to make it apply to a right of dower, vested and consummated by the death of the husband. The two situations are redically and vitally
The statute had its origin in legislative opinion as to what is equitable and just between the widow of husband whose land was sold in his life time, to satisfy a lien paramount to her right, and the purchaser at such sale, and was passed only to effectuate that view, not to determine or define her right of consummate dower, in the case of a sale made, among other things, to satisfy such lien, after his death. The decision in Wilson et al. v. Davisson, 2 Rob. 384, denied the widow any right at all against the purchaser of the husband’s lands sold in his life time to satisfy a vendor’s lien. Then the Yirginia General Assembly passed the statute, declaring that, in such case as well as anyAther in which a sale should be made in the lifetime of the husband, to satisfy any lien paramount to the right of dower, the widow should have dower in the surplus, the excess of the proceeds of the sale over the lien debt. This was the object of the statute and, under a well settled rule of construction, a statute does not extend or operate beyond the accomplishment of the purpose which gave it birth, in this instance, remedy of the defect in then existing law, working out inequitable results under given circumstances. Such was the view thus expressed by Judge Staples, in Robinson v. Shacklett, 29 Gratt., 99: “The object of the statute seems to be- to provide for a case in which the
Laying this statute out'of view as being inapplicable and .returning to the principal inquiry, the difference between a purchase money lien and a lien for a debt upon a consideration foreign to the purchase of the land on which it is secured must be observed. In the former case dower is deemed never to have attached to anything except the excess of the value of the land above the unpaid purchase money debt. Wilson et al. v. Davisson, 2 Rob. 384; Hunter v. Hunter, 10 W. Va. 321; Martin v. Smith, 25 W. Va. 580.
Money borrowed by the husband, for general purposes and secured upon the land, does not in any sense represent the land or stand in its place. Neither he nor the creditor expects the money to be paid out of the land. The lien, in such case, is no more than a security. In such case, the inchoate right of dower attaches to the land in its entirety and is later conditionally released. Of such a debt, the court said in Heth v. Cocke and wife, cited: “If she parts with her dower by joining in a mortgage after marriage, leaving only an equity in her husband, and which enures, to her under the act, it cannot be said that it enures to her as a legal estate, which she is entitled to assert without redeeming; otherwise, her joining in the mortgage would pass nothing. Surely in such case, she only has a right to redeem.” Again the court said: “It is not alleged in the original bill, that she was ignorant of her rights, or of the proceedings under the mortgage, or that she was able to redeem the mortgage, or that it could have been redeemed out of the personal estate.” The land had been sold and the widow-was proceeding against the purchaser. She had not set up any of her equities in the suit. These observations tentatively indicate opinion on the part of the court, that the widow is entitled to her dower in the mortgaged land, if the personal estate of the husband is sufficient to pay the debt.
Nothing inconsistent with this intimation is found in Land v. Shipp, 100 Va. 337, Wilson v. Branch, 77 Va. 65, or Hoy v. Varner, 100 Va. 600, disposing of questions somewhat related
All of the decisions of this court anc| of the Virginia court concede to the widow the right to dower in kind in land encumbered by deeds in which she has united, when -it is practicable to assign it to her, and a decree denying it is erroneous. Is it legally practicable when the mortgage debt can be fully paid out of the personal estate of the husband and the proceeds of the sale of the land subject to dower? To this question, our decisions seem to give no definite answer. An affirmative answer seems to accord with an inference aris
Authorities in other jurisdictions in which the question now under consideration and others more or less similar have arisen, disclose general principles eontroling the inquiry in some of its bearings. The widow is dowable in land subject to a mortgage superior to her right, against all persons except the mortgagee and persons claiming under him. This proposition is accepted everywhere as being fundamental and basic. Hastings v. Stevens, 9 Foster, 29 N. H., 564; Cass v. Martin, 6 N. H. 25; Rossiter v. Cosset, 15 N. H. 38; Barker v. Barker, 17 Mass. 504; Snow v. Stevens, 15 Mass. 278; Bolton v. Bullard, 13 Mass. 227; Wheeler v. Morris, 2 Bosworth (N. Y.) 524; Titus v. Neilson, 5 Johns, C. R. 452; Hatch v. Palmer, 58 Me. 271. It is easy to perceive that the heir may obtain the benefit of the mortgage by purchase thereof, or, what amounts to the same thing, payment of the debt and taking an assignment of the mortgage, or by virtue of the doctrine of sub-rogation, and thus hold under it. In such cases, his right would prevail over the widow’s dower, but it would be derived from the mortgage, not from his relation to the estate as heir. To obtain her dower in the land, as contradistinguished from a gross sum in lieu of dower, she would have to redeem wholly or partially as the equity of the case might be. Copp v. Hersey, 31 N. N. 317; Swaine v. Perine, 5 Johns C. R. 482; Titus v. Neilson, Id. 452; Mills v. Vav Vorhis, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 125; Woods v. Wallace, 30 N. H. 348; Pynchon v. Lester, 6 Gray, 314; Niles v. Nye, 13 Met. (Mass.) 135. Similarly the widow may herself become owner of the mortgage and so bring about an anomalous situation giving rise to equities.
■ Bearing this in mind, the requirement or suggestion of redemption by the widow, as a condition precedent to the right of dower, found in some of the reported eases, is to be regarded as indicative of a burden in favor of the mortgagee or some person holding under the mortgage, not as one in favor of the heir. In Heth v. Cocke, 1 Rand. 344, the purchaser held under or by virtue of the mortgage, the land having been sold under it, wherefore the court suggested a duty to redeem.
In most of the cases, the question settled upon these general principles arose, not in the judicial ascertainment of rights in the course 'of administration, but out of claims to dower in land, set up against the purchasers after sales, or against the heirs after they had paid the mortgage debts out of their own funds, not money derived from the estates of the decedents. In all of them, the lands had actually been sold or sales thereof free of dower, to satisfy the mortgage debts, were necessary. Here the estate will pay practically, if not quite, all of the debts and may be sufficient to pay all, without depriving the widow of any of her dower in the home place.
The general rule, giving the widow dower against everybody except the mortgagee and those holding under him, literally applied, would require the mortgage debt to be paid out of the husband’s estate, even though to do so would exhaust the other estate real and personal, and leave nothing for either heirs or creditors. But it does not seem to have been carried to that extent. An important qualification is the limitation of the rule to the subject matter of the mortgage, the land on which it is. The widow’s right prevails over all claims against that land, except those founded on the mortgage, but not over debts against other lands of the husband. If he owes other debts and owns other land, the dower right does not go so far as to withdraw from the reach of the other creditors the other property to which the law gives them resort for payment. Thus in Sargeant v. Fuller, 105 Mass. 119, the general creditors of the insolvent debtor had rights respecting his property other than that under mortgage, by virtue of -the deed of assignment, which the court upheld against the claim for dower. Payment of all the debts, including the one secured by the mortgage, out of the proceeds of all of the debtor’s property, including that under
Conversely, the mortgage debt is a charge against the estate generally. As to the personal property, it is a debt equal in dignity with the unsecured debts. The widow’s equity respecting the mortgaged land is as strong as the equities of general creditors, wherefore they cannot require payment of the whole mortgage debt out of the mortgaged property, so as to make the personal property, or a larger part thereof than would otherwise come to them, applicable to the payment of their debts. It is applicable to all debts alike, the mortgage debt along with the others. Laidley v. Kline, 8 W. Va. 218. No ground upon which this order of distribution of the personal estate can be varied to the prejudice of the widow has been suggested, nor is any perceived.
Assets will not be marshaled to the detriment of any person. The marshaling of assets is a purely equitable doctrine. Under it, the rights of parties are limited and varied only so far as is practicable without injury in a material sense. Only technical, legal rights are required to yield. McCrurn v. Lee, 38 W. Va. 583; Ball v. Setzer, 33 W. Va. 444; Bank v. Wilson, 25 W. Va. 242; Wiley v. Mahood, 10 W. Va. 207.
The general principles here adverted to were applied in Creecy v. Pearce, 69 N. C. 67; the syllabus in which reads: The widow of a mortgagor, as against the legatees and next
The widow is entitled to dower in kind in the ten acre tract of land, called the home place, to be assigned out of the six and one half acres thereof, herein described, so as to include the mansion house, if practicable, if, after the application of the proceeds of the personal estate pro rata upon all of the debts including the debt constituting a trust deed lien thereon, said lien debt can be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of said ten acre lot, subject to the dower so assigned. If not, it should be sold free of the dower and the lien debt so reduced paid out of the proceeds thereof, if sufficient, and dower allowed the widow in the surplus, if any.
Unless it was apparent that the home place could not be sold subject to dower for a sum sufficient to pay the lien debt so reduced, or that unreasonable delay would be occasioned by the settlement of the personal estate, the dower should have been assigned, as above indicated, before the sale was ordered, and the decree should have provided for a test by the offer of sale as to the possibility of realizing a sufficient sum by a sale subject to dowér. This was not done and it did not other
As no complaint is made of the sale of the three and one-half acres, part of the home place, it will not be disturbed, and the proceeds thereof, $9,500.00, will be applicable to the lien debt thereon, after distribution of the proceeds of the personal estate among the creditors. If it should be more than sufficient to pay the balance of that debt, the surplus will go to the other creditors or heirs or both, according to their legal rights.
It is unlikely, in view of the condition of the estate, as revealed by the statement of the case, that any further questions will arise. But it is merely suggested here, not decided, that the principles stated may lead to the following results, under conditions different from those disclosed by the record: If, after distribution of the personal estate among the creditors, the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged land, subject to dower, are insufficient to pay the mortgage debt, the widow might elect to redeem as to the balance, so as to save her dower in full; and, having done so, might stand in the creditor’s shoes, to the extent of the money paid by her, in redemption of her dower right, and be entitled to share pro rata with general creditors, on the basis of the amount so paid by her, in the. distribution of the proceeds of any other real estate of her husband. All authorities^ say she may redeem and also that, by redemption, she does not make the. debt her own. The statute makes the real estate of a decedent assets for the payment of his debts. Why is not the widow a creditor to the extent of the amount she has paid on the mortgage debt?
On reversal of the decrees of sale and confirmation, in so far as they relate to or affect the six and one-half acre tract, the title of the purchasers thereof will fall, since they were parties to the suit and vitally interested. Dunfee v. Childs,
The conclusions stated make the error in the appointment of the receiver clearly manifest.
The error in the decree of sale, in so far as it relates to the three and one-half acre lot on which the green houses are, has been expressly waived, since it brought a larger price than was anticipated and will likely not be included in the portion to be conditionally assigned to the widow for dower. Hence the decree of sale and the 'decree confirming the sales made, in so far as they affect the 6y2 acre lot and the right of dower in the home place, the decree of re-sale of said lot, the decree of Oct. 13, 1913, confirming the sale thereof, the decree of Oct. 11, 1913, adopting an erroneous basis for computation of dower in money, and the decree appointing the receiver will be reversed, the sale of the 6% acre lot set aside and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
Concurrence in Part
(concurring in the decree, but dissenting, in part, to the opinion. :
I concur in the reversal of the decree because of the error in ordering a sale of all the land, before settlement of the partnership and ascertainment of the’ amount of assets that testator’s estate will receive therefrom, and application thereof to the relief of the incumbered land. The widow’s dower and the inheritance of the heirs, in the equity of redemption, entitled them to that relief. I do not concur in that part of the opinion which holds that the widow is entitled to have the land incumbered by trust deed in which she joined her husband, sold subject to dower, and, in the event enough •money is thereby realized to pay the balance of the indebtedness, to have dower in kind, as if no such lien existed. That excludes the heirs whose equity in the incumbered land is of equal dignity with her own. She is only entitled to dower in the equity of redemption, or surplus, not in the land itself. True her right is superior to all creditors, except vendor’s lien creditors, and creditors whose liens existed before marriage or were created thereafter by mortgage or trust deed in which she joined, and is, of course, superior to the rights of
The wife was not dowable.at common law in an equitable estate, and is now dowable therein only by virtue of statute. See. 17, Ch. 71, Code 1913; Rowton v. Rowton, 1 H. & M. 92; and Claiborne and wife v. Henderson, 3 H. & M. 322. Notwithstanding that statute, passed in Virginia in 1785, conferring right of curtesy and dower upon husband and wife, respectively, in trust lands, wherein they are the respective owners of a beneficial estate of inheritance, it was, nevertheless, thereafter held by the court of appeals of that state, that the widow was not dowable in the surplus remaining after satisfaction of a lien for the purchase money. Wilson v. Davisson, 2 Rob. 384. That decision was rendered by a divided court composed of three judges; and, in order to settle the question, the revisors of the code recommended to the legislature the passage of an act conforming the law to
To sell land subject to dower, to satisfy a trust deed lien in which the wife had joined, is equivalent to assigning dower in the whole of the land, as if it had not been released. By joining in a mortgage or trust deed on her husband’s land, the wife releases dower in all but the equity of redemption. The value of that equity is the surplus remaining after satisfying the lien. If a sale is not made in the husband’s life time, the equity of redemption, being an established inheritance, passes to the heirs, subject of course to dower, and entitles the heirs to redeem. In case they do so, equity requires the widow to contribute ratably before she can have dower in the land. 4 Kent’s Com., p. 39; Gibson v. Crehore, 5 Pick. 146; Swain v. Perine, 5 John’s Chan. (N. Y.) 482;
Approving Heth v. Cook, supra, this court, in Martin v. Smith, 25 W. Va. 579, held that: “A widow is not entitled to dower in real estate subject'to a vendor’s lien except as to the residue after satisfying such lien. ’ ’ So far as they affect dower, a vendor’s lien and a mortgage or trust deed in which the wife has joined, stand on the same footing. In Barbour v. Thompkins, 31 W. Va. 410, a case in which land of the husband was sold to satisfy a trust deed in which the wife had joined, and also other liens not affecting her dower, some of which were prior, and some subsequent, to the trust deed, this court held that: “the wife has no contingent right to