43 U.S. 711 | SCOTUS | 1844
THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
THE UNITED STATES.
Supreme Court of United States.
*718 The case came up to this court upon the exception just recited, and was argued by Cadwallader and Sergeant, for the plaintiffs in error, and Nelson, (attorney-general) for the defendant in error.
Cadwallader, for the plaintiffs in error.
*733 Mr. Justice McLEAN delivered the opinion of the court.
A writ of error brings this case before the court, from the Circuit Court for the eastern district of Pennsylvania.
On the 7th of February, 1833, the secretary of the treasury of the United States drew the following bill on the minister and secretary of state for the department of finance of the French government:
"Sir: I have the honour to request that at the sight of this my first bill of exchange (the second and third of the same tenor and date unpaid) you will be pleased to pay to the order of Samuel Jaudon, cashier of the Bank of the United States, the sum of 4,856,666 francs and 66 centimes; which includes the sum of $3,916,666 66, being the amount of the first instalment to be paid to the United States under the convention concluded between the United States and France, on the 4th of July, 1831, (after deducting the amount of the first instalment to be reserved to France under the said convention,) and the additional sum of 940,000 francs, being one year's interest at four per cent. on all the instalments payable to the United States, from the day of the exchange of the ratification to the 2d of February, 1833."
This bill was purchased by the bank, and endorsed by it to Messrs. Baring, Brothers & Co., of London, and by them for value was endorsed, pay the order of N.M. Rothschild, Esq.; and by him it was directed to be paid to Messieurs De Rothschild, Brothers, or order, of Paris, for value in account.
*734 This bill on presentation not being paid, was protested, and was afterwards taken up on account of the first endorser by Hottinguer & Co., who also paid the costs, &c., and charged the whole sum to the Bank of the United States. Notice of the non-payment of this bill was given, in due time, to the drawer; and also that the bank claimed of the government interest, costs, and fifteen per cent. damages on the bill. The government accounted to and paid the bank the principal of the bill and the costs, but refused to pay the damages.
Sometime after the protest, a dividend on the stock held by the United States having been declared by the bank, it retained a part of the dividend to cover the above damages. A suit being brought against the bank, by the government, to recover the dividend thus withheld, the bank set up as an offset the fifteen per cent. damages claimed on the above bill
On the trial, the court held, and so instructed the jury, that the action was maintainable. That the set-off or credit claimed by the defendants was governed by the statute of Maryland. That if the bank had been the holder of the bill, at the time of the protest, it would, under the statute, be entitled to the damages claimed; but that it must be viewed as endorser, and consequently could not recover such damages, unless upon proof that they had been actually paid by the bank. To this charge the defendant's counsel excepted, and this brings before the court the questions for consideration.
Before we consider the rulings of the court excepted to, it may not be improper to notice the structure of the bill, which has been much commented on by the counsel; though not having been excepted to by the government, it is not a matter for decision.
It is supposed not to be a bill of exchange, as it was drawn payable out of a particular fund. This seems not to be the character of the bill. It was drawn for a certain sum, and the drawer then states on what account such sum was due from the French government. But there was no restriction as to what moneys or appropriation out of which the bill should be paid. This could in no sense restrain the negotiability of the instrument. It has the frame, character, and effect, of a bill of exchange. It was so called and treated by the secretary of the treasury who drew it; by his successor who had some correspondence in regard to it; by the attorney-general to whom it was submitted for his opinion, by Congress; and by the *735 eminent bankers in Europe through whom it was negotiated and paid.
That the United States can sustain an action against the bank, to recover a dividend declared in their favour, is undoubted. This seems to have been doubted by the counsel for the bank in the Circuit Court, but the objection has been abandoned in this court. Nor can there be any question of the right of the bank to set up, in this case, by way of offset, the damages in controversy, if the claim for damages be sustainable. This right is not contested by the attorney-general.
The main point in the case depends upon the construction of the Maryland statute, which applies to this district. It is singular that this statute, which was enacted in 1795, in regard to the question now before us, has never been construed by the local courts. And the same may be said of other and prior statutes of Maryland, containing similar provisions.
The first section of the act provides, "that upon all bills of exchange hereafter drawn in this state, on any person, corporation, company, or society, in any foreign country, and regularly protested, the owner or holder of such bill, or the person or persons, company, society, or corporation, entitled to the same, shall have a right to receive and recover so much current money as will purchase a good bill of exchange of the same time of payment, and upon the same place, at the current exchange of such bills, and also fifteen per cent. damages upon the value of the principal sum mentioned in such bill, and costs of protest, together with legal interest upon the value of the principal sum mentioned in such bill from the time of protest, until the principal and damages are paid and satisfied: and if any endorser of such bill shall pay to the holder, or the person or persons, company, society, or corporation, entitled to the same, the value of the principal, and the damages and interest as aforesaid, such endorser shall have a right to receive and recover the sum paid, with legal interest upon the same, from the drawer, or any other person or persons, company, society, or corporation, liable to such endorser upon such bill of exchange."
That the holder of a foreign bill, or other person entitled to it, may recover, under this statute, from the drawer, in case of protest, a sum that will purchase a similar bill of the same amount, together with fifteen per cent. damages on the principal sum, is admitted. *736 But it is insisted that the bank paid the bill as endorser, and that as there is no proof that it paid the fifteen per cent. damages, they are not recoverable under the statute. The first part of the section gives to the holder of a protested bill its value at the place drawn, the fifteen per cent. damages, and interest upon the value of the principal sum. The latter part of the section gives to the endorser, who has paid to the holder the value of the principal, the damages and interest on the entire sum paid, with legal interest. So that while the holder of the bill recovers only interest upon the principal sum, the endorser is entitled to interest on the whole sum paid by him. And to give interest on this sum seems to have been the object of the latter clause of this section.
Had the bank retained the bill until its presentation and protest, there could be no question of its right, as holder, to the damages claimed. It endorsed the bill to Baring, Brothers and Co., and they to Rothschild, who endorsed it to De Rothschild and Brothers. These last were the holders, and had not the bill been paid, supra protest, on account of the bank, as first endorser, they would have been entitled to the damages. Hottinguer and Co., having paid the bill for the honour of the bank, became the holders, and could recover the damages from it or the drawer. But they being the depositories of the bank, charged it with the amount they paid, by which the bank was remitted to its original character as payee and holder of the bill. In this light the bank was viewed and treated by the government, for it paid not only the principal sum and interest to the bank, but also the costs of protest and other expenses chargeable under the laws of France. But the damages allowed by the statute were refused.
It has been intimated that these damages must be considered as a penalty, and not as a part of the bill. This is a mistaken view of the subject.
Had there been no statute, the bank, as the holder of the bill, would have been equally entitled to damages. They would have been claimed on a different principle, and might have been of a greater or less amount according to circumstances. The origin and character of a bill of exchange are found in the law-merchant: that law which pervades the commercial world, and which, though founded on usage, has become as fixed and definite as any other branch of the law. Under this law the drawer of a bill in this country payable in *737 a foreign country is liable, should such bill be protested, not only for the costs of protest and other incidental charges, but also to re-exchange on the bill. The exchange is sometimes direct, at other times circuitous, depending in some degree upon the commercial intercourse between the countries where the bill is drawn, and where it is made payable. Between this country and France, the exchange is often, if not generally, by the way of London.
The bill under consideration having been protested at Paris for non-payment, the holder under the general commercial law was entitled to a bill drawn at that place, payable in this city, for such sum as would pay the original bill at Paris, including costs of protest and other legal charges. This is re-exchange, and it varies, as must be seen, with the fluctuations of commercial intercourse, influenced somewhat by local circumstances and the general state of the money market. In some instances, owing to peculiar circumstances, re-exchange has been found to exceed forty or even fifty per cent. To avoid so ruinous a charge, so uncertain a rule of damages, and one so difficult to establish by evidence, the state of Maryland, and almost all the other states of the Union, have fixed, by legislation, a certain amount of damages on protested foreign bills, in lieu of re-exchange. Experience has shown that this is a judicious regulation. It relieves the parties to the bill from great uncertainty, and promotes punctuality by showing the drawer what damages he must pay on the dishonour of his bill. Fifteen per cent. on the principal sum, which the statute adopts, may be greater than the actual re-exchange in the present case. But, whether this be so or not is not open for inquiry. It is believed that if this per cent. excluded the re-exchange, at the time this bill was protested, there are many other cases in which it would fall short of that charge. The statute has, probably, fixed an amount which would be an average charge for re-exchange. This being the basis of the act, the damages cannot be considered as a penalty. The damages given by the statute are as much a part of the contract as the interest. On this point there is believed to be no difference of opinion among enlightened courts or commercial men.
The doctrine of re-exchange is founded upon equitable principles. A bill is drawn in this country, payable at Paris, in France. The payee gives a premium for it under the expectation of receiving the amount at the time and place where the bill is made payable. It is *738 protested for non-payment. Now the payee and holder is entitled to the amount of the bill in Paris. The same sum paid in this country, including costs of protest and other charges, is not an indemnity. The holder can only be remunerated by paying to him, at Paris, the principal, with costs and charges; or by paying to him in this country those sums, together with the difference in value between the whole sum at Paris, and the same amount in this country. And this difference in value is ascertained by the premium on a bill drawn in Paris and payable in this country, which should sell at Paris for the sum claimed. The statute of Maryland then is founded on equitable considerations, although the rule of damages may be considered arbitrary, as it does not yield to circumstances.
In this case the bank purchased the bill from the government and paid for it. It was sold and transferred by the bank. But the bill not being paid to the holder, the bank paid the amount of it, including the costs of protest and other charges, to Hottinguer and Co., at Paris, who had taken it up supra protest, for the honour of the first endorser. The bank, in this manner, came again into possession of the bill, the endorsements, in effect, being stricken out. In a commercial and legal sense, then, the bank is the holder of the bill, and has the same claim for damages as if it had never been endorsed. Had the government been suable by the bank, it must have declared and recovered as payee and holder, and not as endorser of the bill.
No objection is taken, in the bill of exceptions, as to the liability of the government to damages, on a protested bill of exchange drawn by it, the same as an individual. No such question, therefore, arises in this case. As the holder of a protested bill, the government exacts damages; it would seem to be equitable, therefore, that as drawer under like circumstances, it should pay them.
Upon the whole, we think, that in view of the circumstances of this case, the bank is entitled to the fifteen per cent. damages, under the Maryland statute, and that, consequently, the instructions of the Circuit Court were erroneous. The judgment of that court is, therefore, reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court, and a venire de novo is awarded, &c.
Mr. Justice CATRON.
By the instructions given by the Circuit Court, the controversy is made to turn on the construction of the statute of Maryland; nor does *739 the record raise any question on the transaction growing out of the fact, that it was one between governments, to obtain a sum of money due from the one to the other; in which the corporation acted as an instrument and agent, in a form suggested by itself, to obtain the money. For instance: if it be true, that the United States, in fact, received no money from the bank for the bill, it not having been charged to the bank; this being found, with the additional fact, that the parties intended to await the event of payment, or refusal, on the part of France, and let the bank hold and use the money awaiting the event; then the question on the equity of the case may arise. But the jury did not pass on any such facts, the instruction given rendering the inquiry unnecessary; and so it cut off every other question the plaintiff might have raised in opposition to the offset claimed.
The foregoing is given merely as an instance, to show that no question arises on the record, but on the construction of the act of 1785.
The statute provides for two classes of cases: 1st, "the owner or holder of the protested bill, or the person or persons, company, society, or corporation entitled to the same;" and 2dly, "any endorser of the bill who should pay to the holder, or the person or persons, company, society, or corporation entitled to the same, the value of the principal and the damages and interest."
In the first class, the "owner or holder," &c., shall have a right to receive and recover so much current money as will purchase a good bill of exchange of the same time of payment, and upon the same place, at the current exchange of such bills, and also fifteen per cent. damages upon the value of the principal sum mentioned in such bill, and costs of protest, together with legal interest upon the value of the principal sum mentioned in such bill, from the time of protest, until the principal and damages are paid and satisfied.
In the second class, the endorser who has paid the principal, damages, and interest, shall have a right to receive and recover the sum paid, with legal interest upon the same, from the drawer or any other person or persons, company, society, or corporation, liable to such endorser upon such bill of exchange.
It is not necessary to inquire whether this statute includes all possible cases, and if it does not, by what law the cases so unprovided for would be governed, because the bank is seeking, in this instance, *740 to bring itself within the statute; unless it does so, the precise claim of fifteen per cent. cannot be sustained. The charge of the court below was twofold.
1. That the case was governed by the law of Maryland, and
2. Construing that law.
The bill of exceptions includes both points; but this court has proceeded to examine and decide the cause on the second only, passing over the first.
The bank must then bring itself within one of the two classes above described; let us examine them in order.
Was the bank at the time when its present rights accrued, the "owner or holder of the bill." I say at the time its present rights accrued, because this general proposition includes the rights acquired at the time of protest, or acquired subsequently each of which branches must be separately examined.
The bill was endorsed to Messrs. Baring, Brothers and Co., of London, on some day which the record does not state: that it was sold to the Barings, and not sent over for collection, is not controverted, nor open to question.
It was then passed by endorsement to N.M. Rothschild, and from him to the Messrs. Rothschild in Paris, in whose possession it is found on the day that it became due. It was at their request that a demand was made, by the notary, for payment, and upon refusal, that the bill was protested. So far, they appear to have been, and no doubt were, both the "owners and holders of the bill," and the only "persons entitled to the same at the time of the protest."
Hottinguer and Co. intervened immediately after protest, and paid the bill for the honour of the bank. What rights were then acquired?
It will not be necessary to examine and decide whether they acquired a right to fifteen per cent. damages or not; or to comment upon the want of harmony in the law, if it were to allow to a volunteer, who had no right to complain of anybody, the same damages which it gives to a disappointed and suffering party expressly because he has been put to great inconvenience and to hazard of discredit, by the omission of the drawer to provide the necessary funds to meet the bill. The books and cases all recognize the right of such a volunteer to principal, interest, and costs. If Hottinguer and Co. were the parties to this suit, it would become necessary to examine *741 the question of their claim to damages; but we are now investigating the rights of the bank.
Granting that the Messrs. Rothschild, immediately upon protest, became vested with the right, under the statute, to "receive and recover" from the drawer fifteen per cent. damages in addition to the other sum pointed out in the law; and granting also, for the sake of the argument, that all these rights passed to M. Hottinguer, with the delivery of the bill, it is clear that he was vested with a right that he could exercise or not at his pleasure. If he forbore to claim the damages, he mutilated the rights attached to the bill, supposing all the rights of the parties to be transferred with the bill from one to another. His right to relinquish the damages cannot well be disputed. It was property, and could be given away. It is not our province to inquire into his reasons; we can deal only with facts. It appears from the record, that instead of charging fifteen per cent. damages, he contended himself with charging a commission of one-half per cent., amounting to 24,283 francs and 33 centimes; less than 5000 dollars. This commission may have been paid to him by the bank, and it appears from a report from the first auditor's office, dated July 29, 1837, that this commission would be paid by the United States to the bank upon presentation of a proper voucher.
There is nothing in the record to show that Hottinguer and Co., even up to this time, sanction this claim of fifteen per cent., or that the bank intends to pay it over to Hottinguer and Co., if it shall succeed in compelling the United States to pay it. On the contrary, the claim of the bank appears to be prosecuted for its own benefit; and the result will be that the bank, if it succeeds in this suit, will pay to Hottinguer and Co. less than $5000, and keep $165,000 for itself.
At the time of the protest, and immediately afterwards, comprehending the payment supra protest, and protest itself, either Rothschild or Hottinguer and Co. were the "owners or holders" of the bill, as described in the first class of the statute, and of course no rights whatever accrued to the bank. Did it subsequently acquire any?
In what particular manner the bill was transferred by Hottinguer and Co. to the bank after protest and payment whether by general or special endorsement, or by a receipt upon the bill the record does not show. It only says that "the bill of exchange and protest *742 were transmitted to the bank, which thereby, and by reason of the premises, became and were again holders and owners of the same." But the claim for fifteen per cent. damages had been voluntarily waived, as we have seen, by Hottinguer and Co., and it is not easy to see how any person claiming under them could have any more rights than those which the assignors chose to insist upon. The mere possession of the bill is not sufficient, because that possession was accompanied by a contemporaneous declaration that Hottinguer and Co. intended to claim nothing more than one-half per cent. commission.
It is not perceived, then, how the bank can bring itself within the class of cases provided for in the first branch of the statute. Is it within the second?
This depends entirely upon the answer to the question, has it, as endorser, paid the damages to the owner or holder of the bill, or to any one? If it has, the record does not show it. On the contrary, all that it has paid was the commission of a half per cent. to Hottinguer and Co., if indeed it has paid that, for there is no evidence of it. The propriety of the statute is not the subject of examination; but it may be remarked that it appears to be founded on reason and justice. Every successive endorser, as he transfers a bill of exchange, receives from the endorsee its full value; and being thus reimbursed for his outlay in the purchase of the bill, the inconvenience which falls upon somebody when the bill is protested does not touch him. His account is already balanced. The reason therefore for allowing damages utterly ceases as to him. He has no fresh bill to purchase, either by re-exchange or in any other manner. But when he is made responsible, as he may be, to the holder, for the amount of the bill and damages, it is fair and reasonable that the same liability should travel upward until it is ultimately fastened upon the drawer; each endorser being obliged to refund to the one below him exactly what that one has been compelled to pay. But the bank has not paid these damages, and consequently is not within the second class of cases.
Being not within the statute at all, the claim for damages cannot be sustained.
The argument that the fifteen per cent. is not damages, but exchange, is entirely unsound, as I conceive, in this case. The statute gives exchange from the place of drawing interest, costs of protest, *743 and fifteen per cent. damages, in addition. The first is indemnity; the second a penalty. By commercial men the first is construed liberally, as within the general rule governing bills of exchange, with the difference of estimating the exchange from the place of drawing, instead of re-exchange; the right to the penalty is strictly construed, according to the words of the statute. Its plain meaning must govern the merchant and business man; for him it was made. He is told that the owner of a bill, at the time of its protest, shall be entitled to fifteen per cent. damages from the drawer, or endorser, in every case; and that the endorser shall be entitled to the same, (from the drawer, or a prior endorser,) provided the owner makes him pay the fifteen per cent.; not otherwise. And this I understand to have been the uniform mode of proceeding under the statute by the merchants of Maryland, under the 1st and 3d sections of the act; nor does it appear by the books of reports of that state, that this interpretation by business men has ever been questioned in the courts of justice there. For the reasons stated, I think the instruction given to the jury in the Circuit Court was proper, and that the judgment ought to be affirmed.
Mr. Justice WAYNE.
I concur in the opinion that the judgment of the court below ought to be reversed, but not for the reasons given in the opinion of the court.
ORDER.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States, for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, It is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby reversed; and that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said Circuit Court, to award a venire facias de novo.
Note by the Reporter. The Chief Justice did not sit in this case, and his opinion is therefore placed in an appendix.