193 F. 917 | 9th Cir. | 1912
(after stating the facts as above).
It is settled law that exempt property, under the policy and purpose of the bankruptcy act, does not pass to the trustee of the bankrupt, nor does it become, or is it to be considered, a part of the bankrupt’s estate for administration or distribution among the creditors thereof. Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U. S. 294, 23 Sup. Ct. 751, 47 L. Ed. 1061. This is said of the title to property generally. exempted by state laws, and it must hold true whether the property is in specie — that is, separable and segregated from other property of the estate — or commingled and undivided! or indivisible from such other property. There must not be confusion, however, between the title and the present right to possession, and the manner of its treatment while the precise property is being ascertained and determined to which the bankrupt is entitled as exempt. Perhaps in all cases where the exact specie or particular lot or parcel of property legally exempt is segregated and wholly distinct from the general mass of
As was said in the Kane Case:
“Courts of bankruptcy arc not controlled as to the time or the manner in which claims for exemptions may be preferred in bankruptcy. The exemptions provided by the law of the state are allowed by the bankruptcy act, but the manner of claiming such exemptions, and of setting apart and awarding them, is regulated by the bankruptcy act.”
Now, it appears in this case that, before the appraisers in the state court had made a satisfactory report touching the indivisibility of the land or as to its value, and before the court had directed a sale of the homstead1, the bankruptcy proceedings were begun and the adjudication in bankruptcy was had. By such proceedings the bankruptcy court acquired jurisdiction in the premises. It became and was its duty thereafter to determine the time and manner of setting aside the homestead to Mrs. Pindel, the claimant, and the matter was so adjusted, with the result above stated.
Now, it is claimed that under section 2680 of the Idaho Revised Codes, which reads as follows:
‘■All other property acquired alter marriage by either husband or wife, including the vents and profits of the separate property of the husband and wife, is community property,”
—the increase of ilie stock first purchased by Mrs. Pindel with her separate property became community property, and therefore was not exempt from execution and sale, and hence under the bankruptcy act is not exempt from administration by the trustee. This view overlooks section 4479, which reads:
“AH real and personal óslate belonging to any married woman at the time of her marriage, or to which she subsequently becomes cniitlcd in her own right, and all the rents, issues and profits thereof, and all compensation due or owing for her personal services, is exempt from execution against her husband.”
The Supreme Court of the state of Idaho has had the identical question under consideration in the case of Thorn v. Anderson, 7
It is further specified as error that the court did not find that the acts of the bankrupt precluded him from a discharge. We do not understand that the question of a discharge of the bankrupt was before the court for consideration at all, or in any way.
These considerations lead to an affirmation of the order and decree sought to be revised, and such will be the order of the court, with costs in favor of the respondent and cross-petitioner Norman J. Holgate as trustee of the estate of Frank M. Pindel, and against the petitioners and cross-respondents Frank M. Pindel and Sarah E. Pindel, his wife.