In this аppeal we must resolve a seemingly irreconcilable clash between two statutes. One vests the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) with the power to remove “any action, suit, or proceeding” to federal court. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B). The other commands that the district court “shall not” grant relief in cases involving issues of state tax law. 28 U.S.C. § 1341. In this case, the FDIC removed a Rhode Island tax dispute to the district court, and the district court remanded the case to the state court under § 1341, finding that the statute required abstention. Becаuse we concur with the district court’s result, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant bank claimed a refund of $419,025 on its 1987 Rhode Island Bank Institution Excise Tax Return. The Rhode Island Tax Division, however, issued only a partial refund of $285,347. The bank filed an administrative appeal for the balance, but the partial refund was upheld. The bank then resorted to the Rhode Island state court for relief, alleging only state law grounds for relief.
In 1991, while that action was pending, the bank was declared insolvent. The Comptroller of the Currency appointed the FDIC as receiver аnd created a “bridge bank” to provide continued service to the bank’s former customers. The bridge bank assumed the tax refund claim from the insolvent bank. When the Comptroller later declared the bridge bank insolvent, the FDIC as receiver took possession of the bridge bank’s assets, including the pending tax refund suit.
Pursuant to § 1819(b)(2)(B),
1
the FDIC removed the pending state court suit to the federal district court in Rhode Island.
2
The state moved to remand or dismiss, arguing that § 1341, otherwise known as the Tax Injunction Act (“the Act”), required the federal court to remand the case tо the Rhode Island state court.
3
The FDIC, in response, claimed that it was exempt from the operation of the Act under the judicially-created “federal instrumentalities” exception, which establishes that the Act does not bar access to the federal сourts by the United States or its instrumentalities. A magistrate agreed that the FDIC was a federal instrumentality exempt from the Act. On review, however, the district court determined that (1) the FDIC was not entitled to claim the federal instrumentality exemption; (2) section 1819 vested the court with jurisdiction over the matter; and (3) the Act nonetheless required the court to abstain from deciding the case. The district court therefore remanded the case to the Rhode Island state court,
LEGAL ANALYSIS
I.
We begin by addressing the district court’s determination that the Act is an abstention statute, as opposed to a jurisdictional statute. If the district court is cor *602 rect in this ruling, then the apparent conflict between the two statutes is resolved by the workable solution that the district court proposed. Unfortunately, we must conclude that the district cоurt erred in characterizing the Act as an abstention statute.
The Supreme Court has instructed us, and we have held, that the Act is “jurisdictional” in nature, and therefore serves to oust the federal courts of jurisdiction in those cases which fall within its reach.
California v. Grace Brethren Church,
The policies behind the Act explain the need for a strong limitation on federal jurisdiction in state tax cases. With the Act, Congress sought "to protect tax collection as an `imрerative need' of government."
Trailer Marine,
Given this authority, the district court was wrong to abstain. The distinction between abstention and jurisdiction is important. When a court lacks jurisdiction, it has no authority to grant relief; when a court abstains, it has authority to grant relief but does not exercise it. The fact that the Act negates jurisdiction creates an apparent conflict with the FDIC removal statute, which grants jurisdiction.
II.
Before directing our attention to this conflict, we must first determine whether the Act applies in this cаse. Specifically, we must address whether the FDIC is a federal instrumentality entitled to an exemption under the Act. 4 On this issue, we agree with the district court that the FDIC cannot escape from the requirements of the Act due to its status as a federal agency exempt frоm state taxation.
Though written in absolute terms, the Act does not apply to every state tax case. The courts have recognized a significant exception, the federal instrumentality exception, which allows the United States and its instrumentalities to bring suits on state tax issues in federal court in spite of the Act.
Department of Employment v. United States,
Courts differ on whether the FDIC qualifies for the exception.
Compare Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. New York,
In this circuit, we have outlined no “bright line” rule for whether a particular agеncy is entitled to claim the exception.
Federal Reserve Bank v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation,
The FDIC’s governmental role in this case is minimal. Rhode Island taxed a private bank, not the federal government. The FDIC only became involved when the bank was declared insolvent. As suсh, no issues of intergovernmental tax immunity exist in the case. Furthermore, if successful, the benefits from the refund claim will flow principally to the bank’s creditors and depositors, not to the federal treasury.
The relevant legislation does not indicate that Congress intended tо accord the FDIC federal instrumentality status for the purposes of the Act. We note that § 1819(b)(1), titled "Status," only grants the FDIC agency status for the purposes of § 1345, not for all purposes. Section 1345, in turn, creates "agency jurisdiction," a different statutory grant of jurisdiction than the rеmoval statute in question here.
See Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. v. Ticktin,
It is apparent that Congress knew how to make an agency a federal instrumentality in the present context. We therefore must assume that Congress chose not to do so with the FDIC, as the pertinent language is missing from the statute. Bеcause the FDIC cannot claim to be a federal instrumentality in this case, the Act applies.
III.
Having determined that the Act applies in this situation, we come to the apparent conflict between § 1819(b)(2)(B) and the Act. 5 For the FDIC to prove that the § 1819(b)(2)(B) removal statute trumps the Act, it must show that Congress clearly and manifestly intended the statute to be an exception to the Act. 6 This substantial burden arises out of two sources.
First, in
Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,
Second, the Court’s statements in
Franchise Tax Board
are consistent with the well-settled canon of statutory interpretаtion disfavoring the repeal of a statute by implication, especially if that statute is a long-standing one.
Andrus v. Glover Construction Co.,
two well-settled categories of repeals by implication—(1) where provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict ...; and (2) if the latеr act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute____ But, in ei *604 ther case, the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest____
United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
We turn first to the language of the removal statute to determine what Congress intended. The mere fact that § 1819(b)(2)(B) states that the FDIC may remove “аll” actions does not in itself demonstrate the clear and manifest intent of Congress to trump the Act.
See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation,
The structure of § 1819(b) does not demonstrate a clear and manifest intent to override the Act. This lack of clear intent is underscored by the contrast between the FDIC removal statute, and the removal statute applicable to its predecessor, the FSLIC. The FSLIC statute began by stating “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law ...,” manifesting a clear intent to override any conflicting statutes in existence. The FDIC statute contains no such clause. As we stated above, it is obvious that Congress knew how to exempt the FSLIC from the operation of the Act when it so desired. The absence of similar language in the revisited statute indicates to us that Congress did not intend to override the Act.
Congress has limited the FDIC’s jurisdiction in other ways. Agency jurisdiction, pursuant to § 1345, is expressly subject to the provisiоns of “other law.” Assuming that the federal instrumentality exception to the Act does not apply, the Act would be such “other law” limiting the FDIC’s access to the federal courts. The structure of § 1819(b) thus does not demonstrate a clear and manifest intent to override the Act.
We turn now to the legislative history of the removal statute for whatever light it may shed on the issue. In this regard, the parties have directed us to, and we have found, no reference in the relevant legislative history on how the removal statute affects the operatiоn of the Act. Indeed, there is no reference to the Act in the extensive history of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (“FIRREA”), of which the removal statute forms a part.
In support of its position that Congress intended the removal statute as аn exception to the Act, the FDIC directs us to portions of the legislative history stating that the statute expanded the scope of federal jurisdiction for the FDIC. Indeed, we have already acknowledged this purpose in another context.
Capizzi v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,
Given the uncertainties we have found in the language, structure and legislative history of § 1819(b), we cannot say that the statute clеarly and manifestly evinces an intent to trump the Act. We thus construe § 1819(b) as subject to the limitation on federal jurisdiction in the Act. As the district court was correct in determining that this case belongs in state court, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Notes
.Section 1819(b) provides in relevant part:
(1) Status
The Corporation, in any capacity, shall be an аgency of the United States for purposes of section 1345 of Title 28, without regard to whether the Corporation commenced the action.
(2) Federal court jurisdiction
(A) In general
Except as provided in subparagraph (D), all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity to which the Corporation, in any capacity, is a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States.
(B) Removal
Except as provided in subparagraph (D), the Corporation may, without bond or security, remove any action, suit, or proceeding from a State court to thе appropriate United States district court.
It is undisputed that subparagraph (D) does not apply here.
. Apparently the FDIC took this action one day before 'a discovery hearing and three days before trial. The case was to be heard together with a related case involving another Rhode Island bank аnd the same counsel.
. The Act states that federal courts "shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
. The parties agree that only state tax issues are involved in this case, and do not seriously argue that Rhode Island courts are inadequate under the Act. See Keating v. Rhode Island, 785 F.Supp. 1094, 1097 (D.R.I.1992).
. As stated previously, § 1819(b)(2)(B) allows the FDIC to "remove any action, suit, or proceeding,” while the Act commands that the district court "shall not” adjudicate state tax issues. See supra notes 1 and 3 for the full text of these statutes.
. Alternatively it must show that the Rhode Island does not provide a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy,” as required under § 1341. See supra note 4.