247 Pa. 40 | Pa. | 1915
Opinion by
From the record in this case it appears that the First National Bank of Mifflintown deposited funds in the First National Bank of New Kensington, upon an agreement that the latter was to pay interest at the rate of four per cent, per annum on daily balances. In its statement of claim, plaintiff avers that there was an agreement that “of the said moneys so deposited, the First National Bank of New Kensington might invest for plaintiff, in the purchase of bills of lading for grain, to be held by the First National Bank of New Kensington for the account of the plaintiff, upon the agreement that the same should be sold at the amount invested, plus interest at the rate of six per centum.” It is further averred that from May 10 to May 31, 1906, defendant advised plaintiff, that it had used its funds in the purchase of bills of lading aggregating $14,911.98; but the said bills of lading were not turned over to plaintiff, nor held for its account, nor were they sold and the proceeds
In plaintiff’s statement of the question here involved, but one matter is set forth, and that is whether the proposed amendment to the statement was permissible. The statement as filed sets forth a contract for the purchase of “bills of lading for grain,” while the proposed amendment would have averred a contract for the purchase of “sight drafts with bills .of lading for grain attached thereto.” It is conceded that at the time when the motion to amend was made, the statute of limitations had run against the entire claim. The trial judge therefore refused the motion, on the ground that the amendment would introduce a new cause of action, which was at the time, barred by the statute. It is very clear that a contract to purchase bills of lading differs essentially from an agreement to purchase sight drafts. A bill of lading represents the goods which are in transit, and its purchase would mean the purchase and control of the goods. The trial judge very properly held that under the terms of its charter, a national bank had no authority to engage in such a transaction. On the other hand the purchase of drafts would clearly fall within the limits of the bank’s authority. When in the presentation of its case as it was set forth in the statement, the plaintiff was met by the defense that a contract by a national bank to purchase bills of lading and guarantee a profit thereon to its customer, was ultra vires and void, it attempted to meet this objection by amending the statement, so as to aver that the actual contract was not for the purchase of bills of lading, but was for the purchase of sight drafts with bills of lading attached. Clearly this was setting up an entirely different contract, and the amendment if allowed would have operated to change the cause of action. Had this not been its effect, it would in this case, have been of no advantage to plaintiff. The trial judge was therefore clearly right in refusing the amendment, which proposed to introduce a