*1 556 Goldenstein, v. United States 456 fugitive mine if the had an airline ticket (8th Cir.1972), cert. denied sub and was

F.2d 1006 preparing to flee the state. States, Ray nom. v. United 943, 416 U.S. Affirmed. 1951, (1974), S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 295 that, court held where an officer entered a

hotel room without a warrant search of a

registered guest allegedly had shot guest

another in the hotel minutes before himself,

and had been wounded it was the duty determining

officer’s after no one was NORTH, present to make no further North search. The BANK f.k.a. Star The Minnesota, Crystal suppressed money evidence of f.k.a. State found Bank, Appellant, in a sealed suitcase. present analogous case is not v. police cases good where the officer made a al., SOULE, Greg et Gerald executing faith mistake while a search war Respondents. — Garrison, rant, Maryland v. U.S. -, No. C1-87-144. 1018, (1987); S.Ct. 94 L.Ed.2d 72 or police where the had a reasonable basis for Minnesota. Appeals Court suspecting that defendant person was a 28, probable arrest, whom cause existed to Sanders, State v. (Minn. 339 N.W.2d 557 Review Sept. 30, 1987. Granted 1983); or the police good where made a statute, faith mistake in reliance on a Illi — Krull, nois v. U.S. -, 1160, 107 S.Ct. (1987);

94 L.Ed.2d 364 police where the good

made a faith arresting mistake in

wrong person, California, Hill v. 401 U.S. 1106, S.Ct. 28 L.Ed.2d 484

This case involves a pursuant search to an

arrest warrant. This case is further distin

guishable because, even if deputies mistaken,

were not the search was unrea

sonable. apparently State concedes if the invalid,

initial search of room 226 was

subsequent tainted; search warrant was

and, of Wong principles under Sun Unit States,

ed 371 U.S. 83 S.Ct. (1963),

L.Ed.2d 441 resulting evidence suppressed.

must be

DECISION

The trial court clearly did not err in

ruling police officers justifica- lacked conducting

tion for an exploratory search

of the hotel room when armed with a valid

arrest Despite warrant. police officers’

good faith mistakenly entering the

wrong room, they authority room,

search the ostensibly verify even

identification fugitive or to deter- *2 friends and Tabata had been

ments. Soule high did not transact a since school and formalized, simply documented sale. Soule coupon and he gave his GMAC book Tabata monthly payments. assumed the in name and GMAC loan remained party notified that the Cor- neither GMAC Although had sold. Tabata vette been manager of Auto Truck Ser- an officer and personal Supply he used his vice monthly payments; GMAC funds for the however, paid for the Auto Truck Service pay any did not car insurance. Tabata re- sales tax on the Corvette and did not quest trans- that the certificate of ferred to his name. pay

In 1983 asked Tabata to Soule loan. The loan balance due on the GMAC in Soule’s name and it had to be was still he additional satisfied before could borrow 2,1988, funds from Bank. On March Taba- $4,208.23 gave to cover ta Soule a check loan. At due on the GMAC the balance subsequent and on several occa- this time sions, requested provide Soule title. re- him with the certificate of Soule requests by stating he sponded to these Minneapolis, for Marofsky, F. Lawrence during re- misplaced the certificate had appellant Bank North. party attempted to cent move. Neither Antrim, re- George Minneapolis, for E. replacement certificate. secure a spondent Tabata. 1988, months after Tabata August In six Zwart, Jackson, J. John S. William full, loan Soule paid had the GMAC Ass’n, Minneapolis, for Bankers Minnesota $6,000 loan from applied for and received Minnesota Bankers Ass’n. amicus curiae loan, collateral for the Soule Bank. As posses- in Tabata’s pledged the Corvette Heard, by and decided considered interest, Bank obtained To secure its sion. RANDALL, P.J., and WOZNIAK and and filed its inter- NIERENGARTEN, JJ. est. Ta- application, Soule listed the loan On OPINION personal reference. Bank his first bata as WOZNIAK, Judge. any refer- did not contact Tabata appellant, application. The Bank North It also did appeal, In this listed on the ences by (Bank), court erred or not there was insur- verify contends the trial whether security unaware that failing recognize its interest the Corvette and was ance on disagree for the insurance. paying and affirm. Corvette. We Tabata had been

Furthermore, regard- inquiries no it made note and did ing payoff of the GMAC FACTS inspect the Cor- look at or physically Greg respondent September vette. to re- Corvette sold his Chevrolet Soule payments to his loan maintained he could spondent Bryan because agreed to July until 1984 when Mo- Bank monthly General longer make the him addition- provide (GMAC) his loan to revise Corporation Acceptance tors for a On his can’t I al funds divorce settlement. find the certificate of but 24, 1984, application for revision dated I you will deliver it find it.” again personal he listed Tabata as his first The trial concluded place employment, reference. Tabata's equitable title to the Corvette from at least Company,” “Auto Truck Service followed 2,1983. recog- The court refused his name which is followed the notation security nize Bank’s after because revision, time “car stored.” At the of this *3 2, 1983, did an Soule not have own- Bank knew the Corvette was stored ership interest to collateralize. Tabata was Although loan application Tabata. the also granted physical possession control and number, telephone Tabata’s Bank lists appeal the Corvette. This followed. regard- no efforts made to contact Tabata ing interest in Corvette. his the ISSUE 1984, In Bank November notified Soule appel- Did the trial err in denying court delinquent was on that he his loan security lant’s interest? rewriting It proposed ments. the loan whereby only responsible Soule would be ANALYSIS payments spring for interest until the findings princi- Trial court must set satisfy Corvette could be sold to the not be aside owing. erroneous, pal agreed arrange- upon clearly Soule to review this unless and corresponding regard given ment but failed to the opportuni- make due shall to the payments. interest Bank sent Soule a re- ty judge the to credibility trial court the possession April letter and in 1985 notified 52.01; of witnesses. Minn.R.Civ.P. Peter- being repos- that the Tabata Corvette was Johnston, 360, son v. 254 N.W.2d 362 Tabata informed sessed. then Bank that (Minn.1977). contrast, appellate an Corvette, merely storing he was the owes no deference to the trial court’s purchased but was owner since he had Millhouse, conclusions of Yost v. law. 373 it from Soule. had no con- Bank further 826, (Minn.Ct.App.1985). 829 N.W.2d proceeded tacts with Tabata and to seek present The record does not indicate counsel. advice of clearly the trial court made erroneous find dispute The came trial in 1986. to June ings establishing ownership Tabata’s inter and representatives testified. appeal est. The crux of this is whether or appearance. Soule did make an correctly applied not the trial court the law findings, including: trial court made several deciding that Tabata was the true owner 1. that sometime in mid-1980 of- Soule despite of the Corvette his failure to obtain Tabata; fered to sell the Corvette to According of title. Soule’s certificate possession 2. that Tabata of the took the Certificate of Title Act: in exchange assuming for car Soule’s If an owner transfers his a payments; GMAC by vehicle other than the creation of a 3. Soule Certif- that never delivered the interest, security he shall at the time of despite icate of Title to Tabata re- delivery of the vehicle execute an demands; peated assignment warranty and of title to the [appellant] 4. did that not inform Taba- space provided transferee in the therefor of its security ta interest until some department or as on certificate years three after Tabata had satis- prescribes. loan; fied the GMAC 168A.10, (1984). subd. Al parties stipulated if 5. that the that though places respon the certificate jury presented were with the issue sibility effectuating for of in transfer ownership they find own- would vehicle, posses on of the terest the seller ership had from been transferred merely sion of the of title cre 1983; 2, on Tabata March of owner ates rebuttable and, justifiably ship. Integrity on See Arneson v. Mut. Ins. relied (Minn.1984); the false statement of Soule that “I 344 N.W.2d BLC Vivent, ownership on why 359 N.W.2d 317 than is at issue. Ins. Co. See 170, 175, (Minn.Ct.App.1984). Mayo, Gibeau v. 280 Minn. proper forum presump has rebutted appellant’s and the amicus curiae’s ar- ownership pos tion of created gument legislature. Applica- before the session of the certificate title. Pursuant tion of the “rebuttable rule” agreement, passed when Tabata depend upon does not whether or not a Corvette, physical possession took of the financial institution is involved. payments, satisfied the assumed GMAC prior months loan some six The dissent relies on the trial court’s Bank, possession transactions with and had legal equitable distinction between ti- during peri the whole time Corvette adopted tle. We have not that rationale od. supreme since the court has not utilized distinction, this has stated “title but has Although compliance with the title passed,” “ownership changed,” has “facts requirements transfer establishes a conclu sale,” establishing interest,” “transfer of *4 presumption sive that a sale has taken (cases supra). etc. cited place, noncompliance pro with the transfer of 168A.10 does not If passed, visions Minn.Stat. title as facts herein conclusive- § preclude presenting show, from ex ly split the titleholder ownership we refuse to the establishing despite trinsic evidence a sale concepts lending to accommodate institu- registration Further, the fact that remained (as attorneys tion. Bank’s well as Prozinski, unchanged. See Welle employees) are well aware of the rebut- (Minn.1977). N.W.2d presumption Accordingly, table rule. we complete note here the Bank’s failure to sup Bank and the Brief Amicus Curiae transaction, inquire any about facet of the plied by the Minnesota Bankers Association notably its failure to contact Tabata when argue that the “rebuttable it the car at knew was stored Tabata’s of is limit rule” of the Certificate Title Act place employment of and that Tabata was espousing ed to the facts of the cases the primary personal reference. A sim- presumption rule” rule. The “rebuttable ple inquiry prob- would have obviated the through involving developed has been cases lem and the lawsuit. liability the of under avoidance vicarious Act, Safety Responsibility the Minn.Stat. DECISION (1984), of the 170.54 and the avoidance § correctly refused to rec- trial court compulsory provisions insurance of Minn. ognize appellant’s security interest and Arneson, Stat. 65B.48 See § 912; properly granted respondent Bryan 617; Welle, at 258 N.W.2d at possession title to the Inc., of and Corvette. 249 N.W.2d at 315. BLC argue Affirmed. Bank and the Brief Amicus Curiae by failing to rec- that the trial court erred RANDALL, Judge, dissenting. ognize a distinction between vic- accident lending regard to tims and institutions with respectfully majority I con- dissent. presumption rule.” Ac- the “rebuttable finding centrates on the trial court’s that cording theory, to Bank’s an accident vic- equitable of the Tabata was the owner only ownership of the tim’s concern about brought the certif- vehicle at the time Soule recovery for his vehicle is the source of purposes. loan icate of title to his bank for injuries, lending spe- institutions whereas agree I that Tabata could claim to be at cifically rely upon of title as a certificate equitable of the vehicle as least the owner making ownership in their cred- evidence date, attorney 1983. His of that it decisions. 17, 1986, hearing stipulated the at June that: However, underlying basis of the testify jury on Mr. would for the

the rule” invali “rebuttable supreme questions that he had made since our those dates this distinction 1980 and that on the vehicle from the rule focuses on when ments court has stated some- paid in fact off the vehicle parties pass, the title to rather he had intended prior rely in ’82 full vehicle loans must be able to on the time in late or Mr. pledge coming They pawn the bank to the certificate of title. are not vehicle; facts, upon that based those it is shops the collateral is held stor- where stipulate my and I would that the belief age only then released the and debt finding back that jury come Mr. would paid. They commonly make loans on himself to the owner Tabata believed be miles, may collateral which be mobile vehicle, that would they of that and find states, apart even from countries the equitable that at least trans- lender. ferred. Supreme Until Minnesota Court or However, disagree majority I with the legislature specifically extends the re- “equitable” conclusion that Tabata’s claim presumption rule formulated in buttable enough ownership to defeat was lending liability vicarious cases institu- interest. bank’s secured Minn.Stat. tions, provision I would apply strict 168A.10, (1984) spe- subd. 3 sets out the § 168A.10, subd. and hold complied statutory cific sections physical delivery car to ownership of to transfer a motor vehicle. unaccompanied by the owner’s cer- agree equitable I fact deprive appellant do of title tificate did may passed have March of 1983 its bank of first lien. Soule, affects the transaction between bank, held the certificate possession

which relied on Soule’s legal

certificate as evidence of title.

Here, presented *5 a certificate of obtaining bank purposes to a of a JONSSON, Respondent, Alice Marie bank, faith, good loan. The relied on the v. of ownership. title as evidence of CONSTRUCTION, INC., AMES Appellant presump The cases cited to show how the (C1 -86-2014) Respondent ownership, tion of as evidenced a certifi (C7-86-2020). rebutted, may cate of do not ad Prozinski, dress the situation. Welle v. ENTERPRISES, INC., F & P Defendant (Minn.1977) and BLC In Plaintiff, Party and Third Respondent Vivent, surance Co. v. 869 N.W.2d 815 (C1-86-2014) Appellant (C7-86-2020), (Minn.Ct.App.1984) good allowed a faith v. of seller to rebut the owner ship liability avoid JONSSON, by under Minnesota’s Sharon her father and nat responsibility governing vicarious rule1 guardian, ural Harold JONSSON and transfer motor Jonsson, effective vehicles.2 individually, Harold Third Integrity Ameson Mutual Insurance Defendants, Party Respondents. (Minn.1984)(Expanded 844 N.W.2d 617 C1-86-2014, Nos. C7-86-2020. compulsory the rule avoidance of Appeals Court of Minnesota. provisions of insurance 65B.48 Minn.Stat. § (1982). 1987. giving fide rationale bona sellers 30, 1987. Sept. Review Denied lawsuit, if they prove

a defense to a can sale, legitimate application has to these Lending making

facts. institutions motor presumption, 170.54 accident. Without this rebuttable liability Minnesota's vicarious rule could hold purpose 2. The for this rebuttable previous liable owner a vehicle who no per- to benefit sellers is basic fairness. Once a it, longer any knowledge driving has vehicle, son has made a bona fide sale of a buyer completed but is unaware that the has not longer seller no has control over who drives it necessary paper work to transfer title to position "permissi- and is not in a establish himself. Thus, ble seller driver." is not accountable permissive if driver new owner has an