This was a suit upon a promissory note brought before a justice of the peace. In the circuit court the plaintiff had judgment and the defendant appealed. It appears from the record that the defendant executed the note sued on to Neville who assigned it by his indorsement thereon to J. T. Banister to secure the latter against a contingent liability, i. e. becoming the security of the former on a note to the bank. While these parties were thus related in respect to the transaction, Banister died, and the plaintiff was appointed his administrator. After the death of Banister, Neville paid his note to the bank.
The administrator, finding the note of Kenton amongst the assets of his decedent’s estate, brought this suit on it. The question which we are now to decide is, whether or not the defendant, who is the maker of the
While it is necessary to support the transfer of a promissory note that it should rest upon a sufficient consideration, the maker cannot interpose' the want of this as a defense at the suit of the indorsee against him. The reason upon which this rule is founded probably is, that such a defense would be unjust, since the maker concedes that there was a good consideration between the original parties to the note, and the attempt to defeat a just claim by setting up matter which does not tend to show either that the maker does not owe the amount, or that if he pays it to the indorsee he can be called upon to pay any part of the same debt again. This matter in no way concerns the maker of the note, and he cannot raise it to avoid its payment. Goldstein v. Winkelman, 28 Mo. App. 433 ; Saulsbury v. Corwin, 40 Mo. App. 373 ; Million b. Ohnsorg, 10 Mo. App. 432 ;