WILLIE BANDY v. JUDGE JOSE A. VILLANUEVA
No. 98133
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
August 7, 2012
2012-Ohio-3581
JAMES J. SWEENEY, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION; Writ of Mandamus; Motion No. 454168; Order No. 457070
Willie Bandy
Inmate No. 431465
Grafton Correctional Institution
2500 S. Avon Belden Road
Grafton, Ohio 44044
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT
William D. Mason, Esq.
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: James E. Moss, Esq.
Assistant County Prosecutor
8th Floor, Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
JAMES J. SWEENEY, J.:
{¶1} Relator, Willie Bandy, is the defendant in State v. Bandy, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-417888, which has been assigned to respondent judge. Bandy was originally sentenced in 2002. In 2008, Bandy appealed the sentencing entry issued on June 7, 2002. This court denied his motion for delayed appeal as well as his motion for appointment of counsel and dismissed his appeal. State v. Bandy, 8th Dist. No. 91322. Bandy contends that the June 7, 2002 entry is not a final appealable order because the signature of respondent judge is not legible. Bandy requests that this court issue a writ of mandamus compelling respondent to issue a sentencing entry that “complies with
{¶2} Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss, which Bandy has opposed. For the reasons stated below, we hold that Bandy‘s complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted and grant respondent‘s motion to dismiss.
{¶3} “A judgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under
Crim.R. 32(C) provides that the judge who presides over the proceedings which culminated in the judgment must sign the judgment. In re Mitchell (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 153, 154, 637 N.E.2d 989 (rubber stamp may not be used in lieu of original signature); see State v. Ginocchio (1987), 38 Ohio App.3d 105, 526 N.E.2d 1366 (setting forth the form of a final order in a criminal case). Therefore, the judgment entry is not a final appealable order.
Id. That is, the Anderson court held that the sentencing entry was not final because the sentencing judge did not sign the sentencing entry. Obviously, the signature was sufficiently legible for this court to determine that the signer was not the sentencing judge. Anderson does not, therefore, support Bandy‘s argument that an illegible judge‘s signature prevents an entry from being a final appealable order.
{¶5} Bandy also relies on Mitchell and Ginocchio, supra. Yet, the appeal in Mitchell was dismissed because the order being appealed did not bear a judge‘s signature. This court held that a rubber stamp could not be used in the place of a judge‘s signature. Similarly, in Ginocchio, the trial court did not issue a judgment entry meeting all of the requirements of
{¶6} Respondent argues that none of these three cases supports Bandy‘s claim that relief in mandamus lies to compel respondent to issue a new sentencing entry. We agree. Bandy has not provided this court with any controlling authority for the
{¶7} As a consequence, Bandy has not established that he has a clear legal right to relief or that respondent has a clear legal duty to act. Additionally, we note that each of the three cases discussed above was considered on appeal. Bandy had, therefore, an adequate remedy by way of appeal to challenge the propriety and sufficiency of the June 7, 2002 sentencing entry.
{¶8} Furthermore, the complaint is defective. The action is not on relation of the state as required by
{¶9} Accordingly, respondent‘s motion to dismiss is granted. Relator to pay costs. The court directs the clerk of court to serve all parties with notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal as required by
{¶10} Complaint dismissed.
JAMES J. SWEENEY, JUDGE
MELODY J. STEWART, P.J., and
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR