Baltimore Ravens, Inc. v. Self-Insuring Emp. Evaluation Bd.Baltimore Ravens, Inc. v. Self-Insuring Emp. Evaluation Bd.
Workers’ compensation—Disciplinary orders issued by the Self-Insuring Employers Evaluation Board pursuant to
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
Disciplinary orders issued by the Self-Insuring Employers Evaluation Board pursuant to
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.
{¶ 1} Appellants Ricky Bolden, Paul Farren, Mark Harper, Lee Jones, and Stacey Hairston were formerly employed as professional football
{¶ 2} After conducting an informal hearing, the board issued a comprehensive decision on March 10, 1999, addressing all five complaints. The board found that the Ravens “consistently refused to pay workers’ compensation awards, acting in a manner inconsistent with its legal obligations.” Based on what it described as the Ravens’ “blatant and defiant behavior,” the board recommended a fine of $10,000 on each complaint for a total fine of $50,000 to be paid to the bureau.
{¶ 3} The Ravens appealed this decision to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas pursuant to
{¶ 4} On April 29, 1999, the board filed a motion to dismiss the Ravens’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The board argued that its March 10, 1999 decision is not appealable under
{¶ 5} On June 9, 1999, the trial court denied the board’s motion to dismiss. According to the trial court, “
{¶ 6} Nevertheless, the board proceeded to hold a new hearing on June 14, 1999, and followed with a new order issued July 8, 1999, which is substantially the same as its March 10 order. The Ravens then appealed the board’s July 8 order, and the board moved to dismiss this appeal as well. (Case No. 99CVF-07-5896.)
{¶ 7} On September 8, 1999, the trial court, under case No. 99CVF-07-5896, denied the board’s motion to dismiss the Ravens’ second appeal for the same reasons
{¶ 8} The board appealed both cases to the Court of Appeals for Franklin County. In a divided opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the judgments of the trial court. In so doing, the court found as follows:
“We agree with the Ravens that, although linked to the bureau of workers’ compensation for administrative purposes, SIEEB is an independent quasi-judicial agency created by statute and not under the control of the bureau of workers’ compensation for adjudicatory purposes. Although the administrator refers complaints to SIEEB, it is SIEEB, not the administrator or the bureau, that has jurisdiction to investigate, make findings, and order that corrective action or discipline be imposed by the administrator. Nothing in the statute permits the administrator to contravene any finding or determination that SIEEB makes. Even though discipline recommended by SIEEB is to be imposed by the administrator, the act of imposing such discipline is ministerial in nature because
R.C. 4123.35.2(C) precludes him from exercising any discretion in this regard. Therefore, we agree with the trial court that it had jurisdiction to hear the Ravens’ appeal from the March 10, 1999 order of SIEEB.”
{¶ 9} The court of appeals also found that “the actions taken by SIEEB at the June 14, 1999 hearing are of no effect.” The court explained, “When a notice of appeal from a decision of an administrative agency has been filed, the agency is divested of its inherent jurisdiction to reconsider, modify, or vacate the decision.” Accordingly, the appellate court remanded the cause to the board “for a new hearing conducted in accordance with
{¶ 10} Despite its disordered procedural history, this case presents two straightforward jurisdictional questions for our review. The first and primary issue involves the trial court’s jurisdiction over the Ravens’ appeals from the board’s March 10 and July 8, 1999 decisions. More precisely, we are asked to decide whether the board’s recommendations for disciplining a self-insured employer under
{¶ 11} The
I
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
{¶ 12} The asserted basis for the trial court’s jurisdiction is the residual clause in
{¶ 13}
“ ‘Agency’ means, except as limited by this division, [1] any * * * board * * * having authority to promulgate rules or make adjudications in * * * the bureau of workers’ compensation, [2] the functions of any administrative * * * board * * * of the government of the state specifically made subject to sections
119.01 to119.13 of the Revised Code, and [3] the licensing functions of any administrative * * * board * * * of the government of the state having the authority or responsibility of issuing, suspending, revoking, or canceling licenses.”
{¶ 14}
“Sections
119.01 to119.13 of the Revised Code do not apply to actions of * * * the bureau of workers’ compensation under sections4123.01 to4123.94 of the Revised Code with respect to all matters of adjudication * * *.”
{¶ 15} Thus, the board will be deemed an agency under
{¶ 16} First, we find that the board
{¶ 17} After creating the board and establishing the terms of its members,
“(A) * * *
“For administrative purposes, the board is a part of the bureau of workers’ compensation, and the bureau shall furnish the board with necessary office space, staff, and supplies. The board shall meet as required by the administrator of workers’ compensation.
“(B) In addition to the grounds listed in section
4123.35 of the Revised Code pertaining to criteria for being granted the status as a self-insuring employer, the grounds upon which the administrator may revoke or refuse to renew the status includes [sic] failure to comply with any rules or orders of the administrator or to pay contributions to the self-insuring employers’ guaranty fund established by section4123.351 of the Revised Code, continued failure to file medical reports bearing upon the injury of the claimant, and failure to pay compensation or benefits in accordance with law in a timely manner. A deficiency in any of the grounds listed in this division is sufficient to justify the administrator’s revocation or refusal to renew the employer’s status as a self-insuring employer. The administrator need not revoke or refuse to renew an employer’s status as a self-insuring employer if adequate corrective action is taken by the employer pursuant to division (C) of this section.“(C) The administrator shall refer to the board all complaints or allegations of misconduct against a self-insuring employer or questions as to whether a self-insuring employer continues to meet minimum standards. The board shall investigate and may order the employer to take corrective action in accordance with the schedule the board fixes. The board’s determination in this regard need not be made by formal hearing but shall be issued in written form and contain the signature of at least two board members. If the board determines, after a hearing conducted pursuant to
Chapter 119. of the Revised Code and the rules of the bureau, that the employer has failed to correct the deficiencies within thetime fixed by the board or is otherwise in violation of this chapter, the board shall recommend to the administrator revocation of an employer’s status as a self-insuring employer or such other penalty which may include, but is not limited to, probation, or a civil penalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars for each failure. A board recommendation to revoke an employer’s status as a self-insuring employer shall be by unanimous vote. A recommendation for any other penalty shall be by majority vote. Where the board makes recommendations to the administrator for disciplining a self-insuring employer, the administrator promptly and fully shall implement the recommendations.”
{¶ 18} As established under
{¶ 19} In addition,
{¶ 20} Of
{¶ 21} In Sec. & Exchange Comm. v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp. (1943), 320 U.S. 344, 350-351, 64 S.Ct. 120, 123, 88 L.Ed. 88, 93, the United States Supreme Court declined to invoke the canon, explaining as follows:
“Some rules of statutory construction come down to us from sources that were hostile toward the legislative process itself and thought it generally wise to restrict the operation of an act to its narrowest permissible compass. However well these rules may serve at times to aid in deciphering legislative intent, they long have been subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read text in the light of context and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally expressed legislative policy.” (Footnotes omitted.) See, also, Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston (1983), 459 U.S. 375, 387, 103 S.Ct. 683, 690, 74 L.Ed.2d 548, 558, fn. 23.
{¶ 22} Accordingly, we interpret the phrase “administrative purposes” in
{¶ 23} We conclude, therefore, that the board is a part of the bureau for purposes of
{¶ 24}
{¶ 25} The courts below carried their analyses only so far as to conclude that the board is not expressly excluded from the definition of agency set forth in
{¶ 26}
{¶ 27} On the other hand, the board argues that in providing for a hearing conducted pursuant to
{¶ 28}
{¶ 29} This is not the first time that the court has encountered legislation that incorporates
{¶ 30} In addition, former
“Until a transcript of the record in a case is filed in a court as provided in section
4112.06 of the Revised Code, the commission may, subject to the provisions ofChapter 119. of the Revised Code, * * * modify or set aside in whole or in part, any finding or order made by it.” 138 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2282.
{¶ 31} Yet despite these references to
“Reading
R.C. Chapters 119 and4112 together leads to an incongruous result. A literal reading of the statutory language reveals that the commission is an agency specifically subject toR.C. Chapter 119 for purposes ofR.C. 4112.05(G) and(I) . UnderR.C. 4112.06 , however, the commission is not an agency because judicial review of commission proceedings is not specifically made subject toR.C. Chapter 119 . We are constrained to hold that the commission’s administrative split personality represents the intent of the General Assembly. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the commission is an agency subject toR.C. Chapter 119 for purposes of judicial review.”
{¶ 32} A consideration of former
{¶ 33} In In re Seltzer (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 220, 616 N.E.2d 1108, the court held that the administrator’s orders under former “Under division (Q), the General Assembly specifically included a right to review and appeal in compliance with {¶ 34} These principles were also recognized by the federal district court in Lexington Supermarket, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Agriculture (S.D.Ohio 1999), 84 F.Supp.2d 886. The court held that the decisions of the Ohio Department of Health disqualifying or suspending a vendor from the Women, Infants and Children’s Program are not subject to judicial review under “Similar to {¶ 35} The dissent argues that “[n]one of the three cases the majority cites, however, supports its analysis because each concerned a dissimilar statutory scheme.” The dissent then attempts to distinguish each statute in accordance with its {¶ 36} The dissimilarities in the statutory schemes to which the dissent refers, however, are distinctions without a difference for purposes of the present analysis. The critical similarity between {¶ 37} On the other hand, it appears that where the General Assembly does intend to make an agency’s adjudications appealable under “In the exercise of any of its functions or powers, including the power to make rules and regulations and to prescribe minimum standards the department of education, and any officer or agency therein, shall be subject to Chapter 119. of the Revised Code.” (Emphasis added.) {¶ 38} Based on all of the foregoing, we hold that disciplinary orders issued by the Self-Insuring Employers Evaluation Board pursuant to {¶ 39} Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the Ravens’ appeals from the board’s March 10 and July 8, 1999 decisions, and the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed as to this issue. {¶ 40} It is well established that in the absence of express statutory authority to the contrary, once a decision of an administrative board is appealed to court, the board is divested of its inherent jurisdiction to reconsider, vacate, or modify that decision. See Lorain Edn. Assn. v. Lorain City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 12, 544 N.E.2d 687; Hal Artz Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 20, 28 OBR 83, 502 N.E.2d 590; State ex rel. Republic Steel Corp. v. Environmental Bd. of Rev. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 75, 80, 8 O.O.3d 79, 82, 374 N.E.2d 1355, 1358. Even if the court itself lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the cause, the board still has no power to relitigate the disputed issues during the pendency of the appeal. State ex rel. Borsuk v. Cleveland (1972), 28 Ohio St.2d 224, 227-228, 57 O.O.2d 464, 466, 277 N.E.2d 419, 421; Diltz v. Crouch (1962), 173 Ohio St. 367, 19 O.O.2d 312, 182 N.E.2d 315. {¶ 41} Once the Ravens filed its appeal from the board’s March 10, 1999 order, the board was divested of jurisdiction to vacate that order, hold a new formal hearing on June 14, 1999, and issue a second order on July 8, 1999. Since these actions took place while the Ravens’ appeal was pending, they are of no force or effect. Thus, the trial court correctly determined that the board’s postappeal actions are a nullity. {¶ 42} However, the trial court did not vacate the board’s postappeal actions solely to render them ineffective. Instead, the trial court found that because the board had no jurisdiction to take those actions, it failed to remedy the defect in its March 10 order. Having found the deficiency still remaining, the court ordered the board to vacate its March 10 order and conduct a new hearing pursuant to {¶ 43} For all of the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the trial court to enter the appropriate dismissal. Judgment reversed and cause remanded. MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. COOK, J., dissents. COOK, J., dissenting. {¶ 44} The majority holds that because the board is a part of the bureau, and because it is not an agency, there is no right to appeal board disciplinary recommendations to the Franklin County Common Pleas Court. But by analyzing the text of the statute creating the board and the text of the {¶ 45} The statute creating the board is the starting point for deciding the question regarding appealability of board orders. That statute, {¶ 46} “Sections {¶ 47} This case, then, turns on three interrelated questions. The first two questions target whether the {¶ 48} As the majority notes, {¶ 49} The board’s disciplinary recommendations thus meet the first of the two qualifiers for {¶ 50} The next question is whether a board disciplinary recommendation constitutes an “adjudication” as contemplated in the second qualifier of {¶ 51} {¶ 52} Board action satisfies the three foregoing requirements to constitute an {¶ 53} For these reasons, board disciplinary recommendations constitute agency adjudications within the meaning of {¶ 54} The remaining question is whether, even if the board is an agency making adjudications, the board is so intertwined with the bureau as to constitute a part of the bureau. If the board were part of the bureau so that board actions are “actions of the * * * bureau,” then the majority would be correct in concluding that the {¶ 55} But two basic reasons establish that, despite their interrelationship, the board is a separate entity from the bureau. {¶ 56} The first reason is that one cannot reconcile the statutory schemes of {¶ 57} The majority’s exegesis also runs afoul of the {¶ 58} Today’s majority concludes that {¶ 59} As support for its construction of the statutory scheme, the majority cites a number of cases as standing for the proposition that “[t]his is not the first time that the court has encountered legislation that incorporates {¶ 60} The majority first cites Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Commt. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 192, 20 O.O.3d 200, 421 N.E.2d 128, as supporting its holding. I agree that this case supports the proposition that the General Assembly can incorporate portions of {¶ 61} The majority’s reliance on Lexington Supermarket, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Agriculture (S.D.Ohio 1999), 84 F.Supp.2d 886, is equally unpersuasive. There, as the majority notes, the federal district court determined that vendors could not appeal decisions of the Ohio Department of Health under {¶ 62} The second reason compelling my dissent is that {¶ 63} I agree with this reasoning. In so doing, I join the majority in appreciating that while this maxim may inform the court’s decision, the legal canon is not always controlling. Here, however, I find the maxim applicable. The General Assembly has enacted legislation in which the statutory detail—the “administrative {¶ 64} There exists further support for this position in {¶ 65} The majority proffers an explanation for the statutory provision: that it serves “merely to designate the administrative agency to which the board belongs. It is simply an indication that the board is a part of the bureau rather than a part of the Industrial Commission.” Yet the majority’s theory insufficiently addresses the question of why the General Assembly specified this linkage for administrative purposes, when it supposedly intended that the board and bureau were linked for all purposes. Thus, while it is not itself dispositive, I find that the “administrative purposes” provision of {¶ 66} The statutory scheme set forth in {¶ 67} Dinn, Hochman, Potter & Levy, L.L.C., and Irwin J. Dinn, for appellee. Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and William J. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant Self-Insuring Employers Evaluation Board. Cornrich & Cornrich Co., L.P.A., and Neil Cornrich, for appellants Ricky Bolden, Paul Farren, Mark Harper, Lee Jones, and Stacey Hairston. Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., F. Daniel Balmert and Deron A. Cook, urging affirmance for amicus curiae General Motors Corp.
II
Jurisdiction of the Board
R.C. 4123.352 Incorporates R.C. Chapter 119
Board Action Constitutes an Adjudication
Board Action Is Not Bureau Action
Conclusion