159 Ind. 688 | Ind. | 1903
— Appellee commenced this suit before the judge of the city court of Seymour to recover for services
It is not necessary to set out the proceedings of said Kentucky court in detail, farther than to state that appellee had personal notice of said suit. No question is raised as to the jurisdiction of the Kentucky court over the res, or as to its jurisdiction over the parties litigant in this action. See, upon the subject of jurisdiction, Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, 19 Sup. Ct. 797, 43 L. Ed. 1144. If the judgment is valid, there has been a sequestration of the original debt; and if it can be said that the appellant has been compelled to pay the same to a third person, it should now be credited with the payment.
It was declared by Professor Kent that “It has become a settled principle in the English courts, that where a debt has been recovered of a debtor, under the process of foreign attachment, fairly and not collusively, the recovery is a protection to the garnishee against his original creditor, and he may plead it' in bar.” 2 Kent’s Comm., 119. As said by Shaw, C. J., speaking for the supreme court of
It has been pointed out by Mr. Wade that attachment laws are purely statutory, and so loosely fitted into the general body of the law that it is difficult' to formulate rules as to the duty of the garnishee. Wade, Attachment, §398. The governing principle of the garnishee’s exemption from a second liability is the injustice of compelling him to pay, at the suit of his creditor, that which a court, having authority so to do, has compelled him to' pay to another. It is obvious, therefore, that he must act fairly and without collusion. See cases last cited. Where the principal debtor
We need not here undertake to state the measure of the garnishee’s duty in all cases, but it may be said, so far as the main action is concerned, that where the principal defendant has personal knowledge of the suit the former is not bound in any event to go further than to look to the jurisdiction, act fairly, and make a full disclosure. In Wigwall v. Union Coal, etc., Co., 37 Iowa 129, a case much like this, it was said: “The defendant in this case has once paid the amount due plaintiff to a creditor of his, whereby plaintiff has had the full benefit of it. The defendant ought not to be required to pay the amount a second time unless guilty of some negligence or wrong toward plaintiff. ’ The finding
In Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Meyer, 117 Ind. 563, 567, where the garnishee procured and 'filed the affidavit of the principal defendant, stating that the debt was exempt, but where no further steps were taken by way of defense, it was said by this court: “There were no facts found by the trial court which could justify an inference even that at the time of the institution of such proceeding in garnishment, and at all times since, Blazius Meyer was not and had not been a man of sound mind and mature years, and fully capable of interposing or causing to be interposed, at the proper time and place, every defense he had, or thought he had, legal or equitable, to such proceedings. Nor were any facts found by the court which would authorize the conclusion, whether of law or fact, that it was the duty of the defendant or of its attorneys, as such, to make any defense whatever for or oh behalf of plaintiff Meyer to the proceeding
The case of Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Baker, 122 Ind. 433, rests on the ground that there was a lack of jurisdiction over the res, because the claim was exempt from garnishment under the laws of Missouri, where the proceeding was instituted. The failure to make disclosure of such a known defense might, even apart from the matter of jurisdiction, where the principal defendant had no notice, subject the garnishee to such an imputation of fraud or laches that he might be compelled to pay the debt again, but it cannot be held that the existence of the exemption laws of this State could be pleaded. It has often been held that exemption laws relate to the remedy, and have no extraterritorial effect. Bolton v. Pennsylvania Co., 88 Pa. St. 261; Leiber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 49 Iowa 688; Mineral Point R. Co. v. Barron, 83 Ill. 365; Wade, Attachment, §§373, 395. This point has been expressly ruled, in a case much like this, by the Supreme Court of the United States. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Sturm,, 174 U. S. 710, 19 Sup. Ct. 797, 43 L. Ed. 1144.
In this case appellant caused appellee to be personally notified of the pendency of the suit in Kentucky, — aside from the judicial notice that he received, — and disclosed to the court the nature of the demand, and sought to claim the exemption of appellee under the laws of Indiana.
The burden was on appellee, the judgment being shown to be valid on it's face, to show facts that would render it equitable and just to require appellant to pay again. As
The evidence in this case tends to show that the original creditor violated our statutes in sending the claim without' the State for the purpose of garnishment (§§2283, 2284 Burns 1901); but it does not appear that appellant failed to disclose any defense within its knowledge. A wrong has been done the appellee, but its consequences ought not to be visited upon the appellant in the absence of any showing that it was a party to or responsible for such wrong.
Counsel for appellee wholly misapprehend the effect of the fact that appellee obtained a judgment on his claim in this State before judgment was rendered in the Kentucky court. It is to be remembered that the action in Kentucky was commenced, and service was there had upon appellant, before the institution of this suit. To quote from the language of the court in Embree v. Hanna, 5 Johns. 101, 103: “The attachment of the debt in the hands of the defendant, fixed it there, in favor of the attaching creditors; the defendant could not afterwards lawfully pay it over to the plaintiff. The attaching creditors acquired a lien upon the debt, binding upon the defendant; and which the courts of all government's, if they recognize such proceedings at all,
We think it clear that the court below did not give the judgment' of the Kentucky court, duly certified as it was, the full faith and credit that it was entitled to under the federal Constitution. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 110, 19 Sup. Ct. 797, 43 L. Ed. 1144.
A motion has been made t'o dismiss the appeal in this ease, but, in view of the question involved, the motion is overruled.
Judgment reversed, with an instruction to the circuit court to grant appellant’s motion for a new trial.