183 Ind. 323 | Ind. | 1915
— Appellee sued appellant for benefits alleged to be due him as a member of appellant’s relief department. An answer in four paragraphs was filed, the first
The complaint alleges that appellant is a railway corporation engaged in interstate commerce; that in 1889 it organized a department of its service called its relief department; that it promulgated written regulations for the government and administration of such department, copies of which are filed with the complaint as exhibits; that in 1886 appellee' was employed as locomotive fireman, and in 1891 applied for membership in the relief department, and his application was accepted; that afterwards in 1892 appellee was promoted to the position of locomotive engineer, and thereupon he was admitted to "full membership” in said department and became entitled to all the benefits secured to members of a named class of the department; that pursuant to the regulations appellee has paid to the department $48 per annum since 1895, and became entitled to certain benefits in event of injury or sickness; that he has performed all conditions required of him by the regulations; that in March, 1909, while running one of appellant’s locomotives from Chicago, Illinois, east through Indiana, to Baltimore, Maryland, because of appellant’s negligence, he suffered injuries which resulted in his permanent disability, which, under the regulations, entitled him to benefits from the relief department of $2 per day for one year after the accident, and to $1 per day thereafter so long as the disability might continue; that appellee was paid the bene
The second paragraph of appellant’s answer avers that appellee, in 1895, applied for membership in the relief department, and sets out a copy of the application; that the application was accepted and a certificate was issued to him, a copy of which is exhibited; that in the application for membership, and in the regulations of the relief department, a copy of which is filed as an exhibit, it is provided that if suit should be brought by appellee against appellant for damages for personal injuries sustained, no further benefits on account of such injury should be paid, but that all right thereto should be forfeited unless such suit should be dismissed; that in March, 1911, appellee sued appellant for damages for the same injury for which he is claiming benefits from the relief department, and afterwards, in May, 1912, recovered judgment for $5,000, which was paid, and that appellee is thereby precluded from recovering further benefits. The third paragraph of answer avers the same facts as the second, and contains also other averments, which we do not set out.
The regulations exhibited are very long. Prom them, and the evidence, it appears that the relief department was organized in 1889; that appellant assumed general charge of the department, furnished office room and furniture, gave the services of its accountants and other officers and employes in the administration of the trust, became custodian of the relief funds and paid interest thereon and guaranteed the faithful performance of the obligations of the relief department; that by §4 of the .regulations, appellant promised to contribute $6,000 annually for the support of the
“In the event of disability or death from accidental injuries, the benefits herein promised shall not be payable or paid until there be first filed with the superintendent of the relief department, releases satisfactory to him, releasing the company * * *, from all claims for damages by reason of such injury or death, * *
Section 53 of the regulations reads as follows:
“Should suit be brought by a member, * * * for damages on account of injury * * * of such member, no benefits on account of such injury * * * shall be paid, but all claims to such benefits under these regulations shall be forfeited, unless such suit be discontinued and all costs incurred by the defendant therein paid by the plaintiff before any hearing or trial on demurrer or otherwise. * *
It was manifestly the intention of the parties, when appellee became a member of the relief association, that the pursuit of one remedy should operate as an abandonment of the other. Appellee had his choice of one of the two methods of relief, but could not resort to both. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Moore, supra. The two remedies were interdependent. If appellee should be indemnified by the payment of a judgment in tort, the satisfai-^-vr -j^^ment would, under the contract, operate as an acquittance of all benefit obligations on the part of the relief association, and on the other
Note. — Reported in 107 N. E. 545.- As to when contracts are deemed to be impaired by statute, see 79 Am. Dec. 495. As to the