66 Pa. Super. 403 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1917
Opinion by
Before entering upon a discussion of the exacti questions presented for our consideration by this appeal, it may not be amiss to describe briefly the situation exhibited by the record.
In the spring of 1915 several railroad companies operating lines in Western Pennsylvania filed with The Public Service Commission schedules of proposed changes in their rates affecting the transportation of milk. Among these was the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, the present appellant, and it is the appeal of that company alone we have before us. No complaint having been made from any source against the tariff filed by this appellant within the statutory period of thirty days, its proposed rates became effective rates. The law so provides.
Of course, even after the rates filed by this appellant became effective it was still competent for any one affected by them to complain to the Public Service Commission that the rates in force were unreasonable. But in such case the law casts upon the complainant the burden of proving that the effective rates attacked are unreasonable. This provision of the law is not a mere matter of form but carries with it a substantial right to the public service company whose legally effective yates are challenged. In other words, under such circumstances, the public service company is placed by the law in the position of a defendant in an ordinary action at law. He is not required to produce any evidence until the plaintiff has, prima facie at least, offered proof which, if unanswered, would warrant a judgment in Ms favor. We
As to the railroad companies, other than this appellant, whose proposed rates were complained of before they became effective, the burden of proof to establish the reasonableness of the prdspective change of .rates is placed on the carrier, thus putting it in the attitude of a plaintiff who must make out his case. The Public Service Commission, doubtless in an effort to save time,, heard together all of the complaints including that against the effective rates theretofore lawfully established by this appellant. We cannot say, as matter of law, this of itself took away any substantial right of this appellant because, legally speaking, what is called “the burden of proof” is one thing; the order of the production of evidence is another. Cross actions have often been sue-' cessfully tried together and verdicts and judgments rendered just to both of the parties interested. But that, some confusion at least, if not some real difficulty, arose in this instance will become apparent upon a more critical examination of the record as it afféets this appellant. To this we now turn our attention.
On April 24,1915, R. W. Wilson, intervenor in this appeal, filed with the Public Service Commission his petition. Its material averments were these, to wit: (a) That he resided in Washington County, Pennsylvania, and was a shipper of milk on the railroad system of respondent; (b) that in 1911 respondent had established certain rates for the transportation of milk on its Pittsburgh division between Pittsburgh and Wheeling; (c) that on or about March 15, 1915, respondent filed new tariff schedules which, since April 15, 1915, had gone
The report incorporates two schedules of rates pertaining to this appellant. The first exhibits the rates or tariffs in effect before April 15, 1915; the second those that became effective after that date, and these were the rates charged in the complaint as being unreasonable. As the commission also finds that 90 per cent, of the intrastate milk carried into Pittsburgh is produced within a radius of thirty-five miles of said city and is generally shipped in five-gallon cans, we . print only the portions of the schedules necessary to show the actual increase of rates established by this appellant in the zone of activity referred to.
Zones. 5 gallons. 10 gallons.
1 to 25 miles, .............. 10c 20c
Over 25 to 30 miles, .............. 10c 20c
Over 30 to' 35 miles, ........ 10c 20c
Bates complained of for the Baltimore and Ohio Bail-road Company, in effect after April 15,1915:
In cents per can.
Zones. Milk.
Size of can in gals.
Miles. 8 10 5
Cents. Cents. Cents.
17 20 1 to 25 inc., ..... 11
18 21 Over 25 to 30 inc., ..... 11
19 22 Over 30 to 35 inc., ..... 12
What do they conclusively show? As to five-gallon cans the increase within a thirty-mile zone was from ten to eleven cents per can, or ten per cent. Pushing back the zone boundary to thirty-five miles, the increase was two cents per can, or twenty per cent. As to ten-gallon cans, up to twenty-five miles there was no increase. From twenty-five to thirty miles, one cent per can, or a five per cent, increase. From thirty to thirty-five miles, an increase of two cents, or ten per cent. These figures, adopted by the commission in its report, do not furnish any warrant for the finding as against this appellant “that the rates complained of are an increase of practically 100 per cent.”
Did the complainant produce evidence that would support the conclusion the increase in rates shown by the schedules just considered resulted in “an unreasonable rate”? The decisions of our Supreme Court, by which the Public Service Commission, as well as this court, must be bound, have marked some boundary lines beyond Avhich we cannot go in ansAvering the question now under consideration. In Brymer v. Butler Water Co., 179 Pa. at page 231, we read: “Fixed charges and
But another question arises, not free from difficulty. The Public Service Commission, under the act creating it, is empowered not only to hear and determine complaints as to rates, etc., made by shippers or others interested, but “the commission may also, upon its own motion, and upon such notice as it may deem reasonable under the circumstances, institute any similar inquiry or investigation and fix a time and place for a hearing, etc.” Did the Public Service Commission determine to conduct an investigation into the broad question of ascertaining what Avould be reasonable rates for the intrastate transportation of milk? Did it give proper notice to those who would be affected by the results of such an investigation? Was it the object of the proceeding to determine whether the complainant and those associated with him, shippers of milk on the. Pittsburgh division of the appellant railroad company, had shown just cause for action by the commission concerning the rates complained of? The record does not clearly answer. The hearing appears to have been conducted by counsel for the complainant. The lengthy printed discussion between the acting commissioner and counsel for complainant and the several carriers apparently had for its object the discovery of an order of procedure that would get on the record, in the quickest and most convenient way, the testimony called for in the subpoena served on the officials of the several carriers. With the record as it now is before us, it would be difficult to answer the assignment of error alleging that the order by the commission goes far beyond the relief prayed for in the petition which apparently was the foundation of the proceeding.
The order of the commission complained of fixed
The functions of this court upon appeals from orders of The Public Service Commission have been plainly stated in Borough of Mount Union v. Mount Union Water Co., 63 Pa. Superior Ct. 337, and in West Virginia Pulp Co., v. The Public Service Commission, not yet reported. We have declared in those decisions that the statute exhibited no legislative intent to convert the Superior Court of Pennsylvania into a second administrative tribunal or to place upon the shoulders of the judges of that court the duty of examining and weighing all of the evidence and determining for itself what would be a reasonable rate for the transportation of any commodity.
Establishing a schedule of the rates or tolls that a public service company may lawfully demand is one of the most complicated and important of all of the many important tasks imposed by the legislature on the Public Service Commission. The proper determination of such questions necessarily involves the consideration of many matters and things far removed from the atmosphere of an appellate court of law. After a patient and careful examination of the record in this case, recognizing as we do that the controlling question was peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission, we have determined to send hack this record with a direction for a further consideration of the
The order of the Public Service Commission, in so far as it affects this appellant, is reversed and set aside and the record is remitted to the commission with direction to reconsider the order as it relates to this appellant and make such further report as will be warranted by the law and the evidence, the costs of this appeal to be paid by the intervenor.