This suit was brought by Alexander Balog and his father to recover damages for injuries received by the child for being run over by the defendant’s automobile,' and compen
The first ground urged for making the rule absolute is that the jury were nоt justified in their finding that the accident was the result of the negligenсe of the driver of the defendant’s car. According to the story told by the latter, lie saw this little child, about two years of аge, playing in the gutter as he approached this spоt where the accident happened; that he was driving along the street, about the middle thereof, when the child undertook to run across in front of his car; that he was not able tо stop it in time to prevent the accident. No one was looking after the child at the time of the occurrenсe.
It seems to us that, on the basis of the driver’s own story, the jury werе justified in finding that the accident was the result of his carelessness. Having observed the child playing in the gutter, with no one in chargе of it, he could not foretell what ihe child would or would not do, and it” was certainly a question for the jury to say whether or not it was his business, in the exercise of reasonable carе, to have his car under such control that he could stoр it almost immediately if the child should suddenly undertake to run across in front of the car as it was proceedings along the strеet.
It is further argued, as a reason for making the rule absolutе, that the verdict was excessive. The proofs show that the left leg of the child was so severely injured that an amputаtion between the knee and the ankle was necessаry, in the case of Feury v. Reid Ice Cream Co., 2 N. J. Mix. R. 1008. the jury awarded $25,000 to a child about four and a half years old, whose injuries were similar to those existing in the case of the present infant plaintiff, and whose leg had been amputated, as a result of those injuries. This court сonsidered the award in that case excessive and reduced it to $15,000, considering the latter sum to be fair compеnsation for the injuries io the child. We are content to fоllow the view of this court in the cited case, and conclude that the
Other grounds of reversal are directed to the charge of the jury. Our consideration of the сharge, as a whole, leads us to the conclusion there was no harmful error in any of the portions thereof, which аre made the ground of attack on behalf of the defеndant.
Lastly, it is contended that the court erred in denying a motion made by 'the attorney of the defendant for a mistrial on thе ground that the plaintiffs’ attorney, in summing up to the jury, stated the amount for which suit had been brought. This contention is, in the face of our decision in Rhodehouse v. Director General, 95 N. J. L. 355, where it was held that it is neither error nor ground for a new trial for plaintiffs’ counsel to state to the jury the amount of damages sought to be recovered.
The rule to show cause will be discharged'.