The Balmoral Condominium Association (“Balmoral”) appeals from an order that granted Grace Grimaldi’s (“Ms.Grimaldi”) motion to vacate a final judgment. Because the motion was nоt authorized by either rule 1.530 or 1.540 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, we reverse the order granting the motion to vacate and leave the final judgment intact. This case illustrates the danger of conflating the very different approaches to rehear or vacate final orders provided by rules 1.530 and 1.540.
I.
The litigation history between Balmoral and Ms. Grimaldi is somewhat convoluted and lengthy — spanning two lawsuits and five years. For our purposes, the pertinent procedural history begins with the trial court’s entry on September 8, 2011, of a final summary judgment in favor of Bal-moral against Ms. Grimaldi. Ms. Grimaldi failed to appear at the hearing or otherwise contest the entry of the judgment. Within the time allowed, however, Ms. Gri-maldi servеd a motion for rehearing (“the motion for rehearing”) pursuant to rule 1.530. The motion for rehearing sought to set aside the summary judgment on the basis that Ms. Grimaldi was too ill to contest the summаry judgment motion.
The motion for rehearing was duly set for hearing, argued by counsel, and denied by the trial judge on February 21, 2012. At that hearing, Ms. Grimaldi’s newly acquired counsel produced an additional motion which is the subject of this appeal. Titled “motion to vacate and/or for rehearing” (“the motion to vacate”), this additional motion contended that the summаry judgment was entered erroneously on the legal merits. Concerned about surprise to the opposing party, the trial court declined to consider the additional motion at the hearing. As mentioned above, the trial court denied the pending motion for rehearing. The trial court agreed, however,
On March 19, 2012, the trial court held a hearing on Ms. Grimaldi’s motion to vacate the summary judgment. Balmoral argued that the motion to vacate was a successive, and therefore unauthorized, motion for rehearing. The trial сourt acknowledged that it was without jurisdiction to entertain the portion of the motion to vacate requesting rehearing because it had already entered an ordеr denying rehearing. Nevertheless, the trial court maintained it had jurisdiction to consider Grimaldi’s motion to vacate pursuant to rule 1.540. During the hearing, the trial court orally granted the motion to vacate, reasoning that “the court should have never granted [summary judgment] on Count I and II. That was in error.” The trial court entered a written order granting the motion to vacate on September 8, 2011. This timely appeal follows. Although the order being appealed is non-final, we have jurisdiction. Fla. R.App. P. 9.180(5).
II.
The resolution of this matter turns on a trial judgе’s authority to reconsider and modify final orders under rules 1.530 and 1.540. The starting point for understanding these rules is the need for finality: “The importance of finality in any justice system ... cannot be undеrstated. It has long been recognized that, for several reasons, litigation must, at some point, come to an end.” Witt v. State,
Thе grounds for rehearing under rule 1.530 are broad. Under rule 1.530, a party may move for rehearing of final orders in order “to give the trial court an opportunity to consider matters whiсh it overlooked or failed to consider.” Carollo v. Carollo,
[ a] rehearing is a second consideration of a cause for the sole purpose of calling to the attention of the court any error, omission, or oversight that may have been committed in the first consideration. Upon the timely filing of a petition for rehеaring, the court may reopen the case and reconsider any or all of the provisions of its final decree.
Langer v. Aerovias, S.A.,
But the time limit for serving a motion for rehearing under rule 1.530 is short. Rule 1.530(b) provides that “[a] motion for new trial or for rehearing shall be served not later than 10 days after the return of the verdict in a jury action or the date of filing the judgment in a non-jury action.” Thus, whilе a timely motion for rehearing can be amended by leave of court before the motion is determined, id., “the trial court has no authority either to
In contrast to rule 1.530, the grounds to seek relief from a final judgment or order under rule 1.540 are narrow. In fact, the grounds for relief are strictly limited to an enumerated list. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Lane,
Significantly, the contention that the order wаs simply wrong as a matter of law on the merits is not one of the enumerated grounds for relief under rule 1.540. Paladin Props. v. Family Inv. Enters.,
While the grounds for a motion to vacate under rule 1.540 are narrow, the time limit for serving a motion for relief from judgment under rule 1.540 extends far beyond the ten days allowed under rule 1.530. Rule 1.540(b) рrovides that the “motion shall be filled within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than 1 year after the judgment, decree, order or proceeding was entеred.” Keeping in mind these characteristics of the different rules, we turn to an application of the law to the particular facts of this case.
III.
After summary judgment was entеred against her, Ms. Grimaldi filed her first motion, which we treat as a timely motion for rehearing pursuant to rule 1.530. As the trial court recognized, once it denied that motion, it was divested of jurisdiсtion to hear any additional motions for rehearing filed pursuant to rule 1.530. See Wilson,
Ms. Grimaldi urges us to treat her second motion, the motion to vacate, as а motion filed pursuant to rule 1.540 and, indeed, the trial judge treated it in that manner. The only arguments raised in that motion, however, are those asserting that the trial court had erred as a matter of law when it granted the summary judgment. As discussed above, the contention that a final order is wrong as a matter of law on the merits is not one of the enumerated grounds for relief under rule 1.540: “the law is well settled that a trial court is restricted in vacating a final judgment under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540 to the narrow grounds stated therein, and is not empowered to revisit a final judgment on the merits so as to correct errors of law as the trial court may do on a motion for rehearing under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530.” Herskowitz,
Thus, Ms. Grimaldi’s motion to vaсate was not authorized either by rule 1.530 or 1.540. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order that vacated the summary judgment in favor of Balmoral against Ms. Grimaldi. Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the final judgment, the September 8, 2011, final judgment stands.
Reversed and remanded with directions consistent herein.