In this employment termination case, we must decide whether constructive discharge, standing alone, is an actionable tort in Iowa. The district court concluded it was not and sustained a motion for directed verdict as to an at-will employee’s claim of wrongful termination. We agree and affirm.
Priscilla Balmer worked at Hawkeye Steel in Haughton, Iowa, from February 1994 to April 1996. She was an employee at will.
In July 1996 Balmer sued Hawkeye. She alleged that while employed she was subjected to verbal and mental harassment and abuse and that Hawkeye did nothing to stop the conduct. She further alleged that her employment conditions became so intolerable that she had to quit, resulting in what she claimed was a constructive discharge. However, she did not allege that Hawkeye breached an employment contract, or violated any state or federal civil rights laws or public policies of this state. Hawkeye denied it had constructively discharged Balmer.
The parties tried the case to a jury. At the close of Balmer’s case in chief, Hawk-eye moved for a directed verdict. Hawk-eye contended, among other things, that Balmer had failed to show that Hawkeye’s actions violated public policy. Balmer responded that she did not need to prove violation of public policy because constructive discharge could stand alone as a tort with no reference to underlying illegal activities by the employer.
The district court granted Hawkeye’s motion for directed verdict. The court rejected Balmer’s contention that, notwithstanding her status as an employee at will, she could nevertheless maintain her suit on the theory of constructive discharge alone.
Balmer appealed, challenging the district court’s ruling that constructive discharge standing alone is not an actionable tort in Iowa.
I. We review rulings granting motions for directed verdict for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 4;
Lawrence v. Grinde,
II. Balmer argues the district court erred when it concluded constructive discharge alone is not an actionable tort. Before addressing her argument, we think it would be helpful to briefly review our law regarding employment at will, a status Balmer had until April 1996, at which time she claims she was forced to quit.
In Iowa an employer may discharge an at-will employee at any time, “for any
lawful
reason, that is, a reason that is not contrary to public policy.”
Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist.,
III. In general, employment relationships are terminated by resignation or discharge.
Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
As one court aptly explained, [ajctual discharge carries significant legal consequences for employers, including possible liability for wrongful discharge. In an attempt to avoid liability, an employer may refrain from actually firing an employee, preferring instead to engage in conduct causing him or her to quit. The doctrine of constructive discharge addresses such employer-attempted “end runs” around wrongful discharge and other claims requiring employer-initiated terminations of employment.
Id. Simply put, courts over the years have attempted to prevent employers’ “end runs” around the law by casting an employee’s quitting as involuntary:
Although the employee may say, “I quit,” the employment relationship is actually severed involuntarily by the employer’s acts, against the employee’s will. As a result, a constructive discharge is legally regarded as a firing rather than a resignation.
Turner,
Constructive discharge was first recognized by the federal courts.
See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,
Constructive discharge arises “when the employer deliberately makes an employee’s working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation.”
First Judicial Dist Dep’t of Correctional Servs. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n,
We have considered the concept of constructive discharge in the context of statutory claims of wrongful discharge.
See Sievers v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co.,
IV. We have never addressed the issue whether constructive discharge, standing alone, is an actionable tort. Other courts, however, that have addressed the issue have rejected this notion. For example, in Turner, the court noted:
Standing alone, constructive discharge is neither a tort nor a breach of contract, but a doctrine that transforms what is ostensibly a resignation into a firing. Even after establishing constructive discharge, an employee must independently prove a breach of contract or tort in connection with employment termination in order to obtain damages for wrongful discharge.
Similarly in Vagts v. Perry Drug Stores, Inc., the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a
constructive discharge is not itself a cause of action, although it is routinely alleged as a separate count in complaints for wrongful discharge. Rather, constructive discharge is a defense against the argument that no suit should lie in a specific case because the plaintiff left the job voluntarily. Thus, an underlying cause of action is needed where it is asserted that a plaintiff did not voluntarily resign but was instead constructively discharged.
Other courts have reached similar conclusions.
See, e.g., Seery v. Yale-New Haven Hosp.,
We agree with the reasoning of these courts. Implicit in this reasoning is that a constructive discharge is actionable only when an express discharge would be actionable in the same circumstances. Therefore, the mere allegation that a discharge is constructive does not convert a nonactionable discharge of an at-will employee into an actionable tort. Something more is needed. What is needed additionally is an accompanying claim that the discharge was the result of illegal conduct such as the violation of public policy or statutory law or breach of a unilateral contract of employment created through an employer’s handbook or policy manual.
Here, the district court did not err when it concluded that, without such an accompanying claim, it made no difference whether Hawkeye expressly fired Balmer or coerced her into resigning. In neither circumstance — express or constructive discharge — did she have a cognizable cause of action. Her claim of constructive discharge, standing alone, is not an actionable tort.
Although we have not addressed all of Balmer’s contentions, we have considered them. Those we have not addressed either lack merit or were not preserved for our review.
AFFIRMED.