OPINION
After being terminated by appellant/cross-respondent Bally’s Grand Employees’ Federal Credit Union (Bally), respondent/ cross-appellаnt Delorse Wallen (Wallen) brought suit against
During trial, Todd was dismissed as a defendant upon the parties’ stipulation. At the close of Wallen’s case-in-chief, the district court dismissed thе defamation and slander claims against McDaniel pursuant to McDaniel’s NRCP 41(b) motion. The jury, by a vote of six to two, returned a general verdict in fаvor of Wallen and assessed compensatory damages of $21,000 and punitive damages of $25,000. After entry of judgment, Bally and McDaniel moved for judgmеnt notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, remittitur of punitive damages. The district court denied the JNOV motion, but reduced the punitive damages award to $15,000 and apportioned it at $10,000 against Bally’s and $5,000 against McDaniel.
Bally and McDaniel appeal separately from the judgment as аmended and allege numerous assignments of error. Wallen cross-appeals from the dismissal of her defamation claim and from the district court’s partial remittitur of punitive damages.
Preliminarily, we note that in order for the jury to have decided in Wallen’s favor on her employment сlaims it first was required to find that she was other than an at-will employee, i. e., it was required to find that Bally employed Wallen under either an express or an implied contract that she would be terminated only for just cause. See Sands Regent v. Valgardson,
Bally contends that nothing other than an “at-will” employment relation existed between it and Wallen and that the evidence does not support the jury’s verdict. In considering Bally’s contention, we must assume that the jury believed the evidеnce favorable to Wallen and made all reasonable inferences in her favor. Paulin v. Sutton,
From our review of the record we are convinced that the evidence upon which the jury could have found the existence of an implied-in-fact contract to terminatе only for just cause was not substantial. Regarding the purported terms of her employment with Bally, Wallen testified: “Well, I understood as far as a contract between Judy [McDaniel] and I that I — as long as I performed my duties, I would have a job.” (Emphasis supplied.) We recently indicated, however, that an еmployee’s subjective expectations are legally insufficient to transform an at-will employment relationship into a contraсt of termination only for just cause. Vancheri v. GNLV Corp.,
Wallen also testified that during a pre-employment polygraph examination she indicated that she was seeking permanent employment, that she believed she would be promoted to assistant manager and that she entered into all long-term employee benefit programs. This evidence, which is of dubious relevance regarding the еxistence of an implied-in-fact contract, established nothing more than Wallen’s subjective expectations of continued employment, and, as indicated above, is legally insufficient to rebut the presumption of at-will employment. Id. at 421, 777 P.2d at 369.
Wallen points to her husband’s testimony as further еvidence of an implied-in-fact contract between her and Bally, but Mr. Wallen’s testimony actually supports Bally’s position. Regarding his knowledgе of the terms of Wallen’s employment, Mr. Wallen testified:
Not that this is going to go on for the rest of your lives, but the two of them working together [Wallen and MсDaniel] would have a place to work together. . . . [T]he two of us working together, and everything is going to be rosy,*557 we ’ll be here for as long as wе ’re around, I guess for as long as you care to work.
(Emphasis supplied.) This testimony described nothing more than agfeement of employment for an indefinite term, and, contrary to Wallen’s position, such an agreement, is characteristic of an at-will relationship. See Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad,
Wallen also argues that McDaniel’s deposition testimony supports the jury’s finding of an implied-in-faсt contract to terminate only for just cause. We disagree.
Only through a strained interpretation of the word “substantial” could McDaniel’s deposition testimony be considered sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. The deposition testimony, which Wallen published at trial in an effort to impeach McDaniel, was not only contrary to McDaniel’s trial testimony, it was also .internally self-contradictory.
The record is devoid of any other evidence from which the jury could reasonably have inferred the existence of something other than an at-will relationship betweеn Wallen and Bally. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury’s verdict cannot stand and that the judgment against Bally and McDaniel must be reversed.
In her crоss-appeal, Wallen contends that the district court erred in dismissing her defamation claim. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that this contention is without merit. See Branda v. Sanford,
Q [Mr. Hall]: Is it correct that I asked you this question, “So is it the policy of the credit union that employees can only be terminated for just cause, in other words, some failure to perform?”
And you gave the answer, “Correct.”
A [McDaniel]: Can I answer that with an explanation, too?
Q: Sure. Just answer me, did you give that testimony at that time? A:' Yes.
Q: All right. Now, if you have an explanation, sure.
A: At that time I didn’t understand fully what that meant. Later on in the deposition I corrected it, because it means like a company policy, оr a signed contract, or employees manuals, and, no, we have none of that.
Substantial evidence is that which “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State, Emp. Security v. Hilton Hotels,
After McDaniel testified that Bally’s had no policy of termination for just cause, the following exchange occurred: