104 F. 704 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Oregon | 1900
It is alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff is the owner of valuable mining property in Baker county, in this state, and that he has completed plans for the erection of a smelting and quartz milling plant, to cost §1,250,000, and that he was able and had the financial ability to carry out such plans, but that he has been damaged by reason of certain libelous and blackmailing articles published by the defendant in a newspaper called the “Baker City Herald,” owned by him, in Baker county. It is alleged that on the 29th day of September, 1900, and each week thereafter for four consecutive publications, the defendant falsely and maliciously caused to be published in his said paper an article of the character mentioned, one of which articles is set out in the complaint. The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant has
The decisions in this country are against the jurisdiction of the court to grant the relief prayed for. In Kidd v. Horry (C. C.) 28 Fed. 773, and in Car-Wheel Co. v. Bemis (C. C.) 29 Fed. 95, it is held that the court is without the power to issue an injunction to restrain a libel or slanderous words. Mr. Justice Bradley, in Kidd v. Horry, said:
“The application seems to be altogether a novel one, and Is urged principally upon a line of recent English authorities, such as Dixon v. Holden, L. R. 7 Eq. 488; Cattle-Food Co. v. Massam, 14 Ch. Div. 763; Thomas v. Williams, Id. 864; and Loog v. Bean, 26 Ch. Div. 306. An examination of these and other cases relied on convinces us that they depend on certain acts of the parliament of Great Britain, and not on the general principles of equity jurisprudence. * * * But neither the statute law of this country, nor any well-considered judgment of a court, lias introduced Otis new branch of equity into our jurisprudence. There may he a case or two looking that way. but none that we' deem of sufficient authority to justify ns in assuming the jurisdiction. * * * We do not think that the existence of malice in publishing a libel or uttering slanderous words can make any difference in the jurisdiction of the court. Malice Is charged in almost every case of libel, and no eases or authority can be found, we think, independent of statute, in which the powe.r to issue an injunction to restrain a libel or slanderous words has ever been maintained, whether malice was charged or not.”
That was a case where an application was made for an injunction restraining the defendant from publishing certain circular letters alleged to be injurious to the patent rights and business of the complainant, and from making and uttering libelous and slanderous statements concerning the business of complainant, or concerning the validity of their letters patent, or of their title thereto. There is nothing to distinguish it from the present case.
In Emack v. Kane (C. C.) 34 Fed. 47, jurisdiction was entertained to restrain an attempted intimidation by one issuing circulars threatening to bring suits for infringemenis against persons dealing in a competitor's patented article; the bill charging and the proofs