| Mo. | Jun 23, 1921
This is a suit in equity to have the transfer of the assets of the Missouri Pacific Railway Company to the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company declared a fraud upon the plaintiffs, who allege that they are overcharge claimants of the Railway Company, and for an accounting, and to impress upon the assets and capital stock of the Railway Company in the possession of the Railroad Company an equitable lien until the amount found to be due plaintiffs and all intervenors upon an accounting, shall have been paid, and for a receiver. The petition is based upon the theory that overcharges by a carrier belong in equity to the shipper, and that the assets of an insolvent carrier constitute a trust fund for the benefit of its creditors, although they have been diverted to a reorganization company in which the stockholders of the insolvent carrier have their rights preserved. The defendants demurred on the ground of (1) a lack of jurisdiction; (2) incapacity of the plaintiffs to sue; (3) pendency of a like suit in a Federal court; (4) defect of parties; (5) improper joinder of causes of action; (6) no cause of action stated. The trial court sustained the demurrer, the plaintiffs declined to plead further, whereupon their petition was dismissed and there was a judgment for the defendants, from which an appeal was perfected to this court. *478
I. In support of the demurrer, it is averred among other things that the court was without jurisdiction. To render this contention tenable it is necessary that the petition disclose the defect which precludes the court's action. We may concede that the obligations of the contracts made by theJurisdiction. Railway Company with the plaintiffs survive and that they may in appropriate actions, based upon their respective claims, enforce same against any property belonging to the Railway Company which it may be shown has passed into the hands of another than a bona-fide purchaser for value, and is, therefore, held in trust for the company and its stockholders. [K.C. So. Ry. Co. v. Guardian Tr. Co.,
The general jurisdiction of the circuit court in cases presenting the facts stated, is, as shown by the authorities cited, well established. But more than a general jurisdiction of a class is necessary to authorize the court to hear and determine the case. By this we mean that while a court may have jurisdiction of the subject-matter of a class of suits, it does not necessarily follow that it may hear and determine the particular case submitted for its consideration. This right may be and is often-times dependent upon other matters, the determination of which is necessary before the court's right to adjudicate the issues involved can be definitely ascertained. [St. Louis v. Waterman, 277 Mo. l.c. 226.] Conceding, therefore, the court's general authority to entertain and adjudicate cases belonging to the class of that at bar, it is pertinent to consider whether any other facts disclosed by the allegations of the petition preclude the court from hearing and disposing of the case, or in short, if the allegations made impose that duty.
II. This is an equitable proceeding and the general rule applicable thereto as concerns the parties, is *479
that all persons materially interested, whether legally or beneficially, in the outcome of the action, shouldMisjoinder. be joined therein in that all those necessary to a final determination of the issues should be before the court. [Norton v. Reed,
Our code gives express approval to this rule as applied to all classes of cases, as follows: "All persons having an interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded, may be joined as plaintiffs, except as otherwise provided in this article." [Sec. 1157, R.S. 1919.]
An interpretation of the rule in other jurisdictions and of the statute which may be measured by a like canon of construction, is that the joinder of parties is permitted when the cause of action is common to all of the plaintiffs and the right under which they claim is the same as to each, and the complaint of all is against the same defendant for the doing of acts which effect all alike. [Rafferty v. Cent. Tr. Co.,
This question has been exhaustively considered by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in Tribette v. Ill. Cent. Ry. Co.,
From this general discussion of the subject in the Tribette case, the following general rule may be deduced: That equity will not interfere to prevent a multiplicity of suits unless the questions involved are of equitable cognizance. The mere fact that there is a community of interest in the questions of law and fact presented by a given controversy, or in the kind and form of relief demanded by or against each of several individuals, will not warrant such interposition. In addition to cases cited in the Tribette case, the curious will find a like doctrine announced in an extended note to Woodward v. Seely,
As we said in State ex rel. Barker v. C. A.R.R. Co., 265 Mo. l.c. 686, each claim for overcharges is a suit within itself. We have here, as in that case, separate and distinct causes of action in a single proceeding, the establishment of each of which will require different proof. Although in the Barker case, the facts are in many respects not parallel with those at bar, the general equitable rule there invoked is applicable here to the effect that, although persons similarly situated may sue in the name of a class, the rule has no application where the establishment of their respective claims is dependent upon different proof.
III. In holding against the plaintiffs' collective right to sue, there is involved an affirmative ruling as to the misjoinder and defect of parties which are characteristics of plaintiffs' incapacity, as sought to be maintained in this proceeding. *482
The pendency of a like suit in the Federal court is also urged as a ground of demurrer. This contention would be entitled to consideration so far as such priority of jurisdiction is disclosed by the petition, provided our holding as toPending the incapacity of the plaintiffs to sue in the mannerSuit. herein, did not, as it does, result in an affirmance of the ruling of the circuit court. This contention, therefore, as well as others urged in the briefs in support of and against the demurrer, does not demand a review.
The judgment of the circuit court is, therefore, affirmed. All concur.