33 Conn. App. 78 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1993
The plaintiffs Jacqueline S. Ballato, Donna B. Smith, Candace B. Wood and Celia H. Landon appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their appeal from the actions of the defendant Stonington board of education terminating their employment contracts.
The following facts form the basis of this appeal. All four plaintiffs were employed by the board as nurse-teachers.
Pursuant to § 10-151 (d), each plaintiff then requested a hearing regarding the board’s consideration of the termination of her contract. On July 30, 1991, an
On the basis of the classroom duties that the plaintiffs performed, they sought in the spring of 1989 to become members of the Stonington education association (association), which negotiated contracts for the teachers bargaining unit. The association and the board had previously negotiated a collective bargaining agreement for 1986-1989, with a provision that the agreement would continue in force until a new collective bargaining agreement was negotiated.
A memorandum of agreement filed with the town clerk on July 14, 1989, stated in part that “seniority for the purposes of time as a Nurse-Teacher within the
The hearing officer found, in addition, that the plaintiffs did not dispute the continuing application of the provisions of the memorandum of agreement beyond August 31, 1990, until the issue of contract terminations arose in 1991. When preparing for the 1991-1992 school year, the board received a budget that equalled that of the 1990-1991 school year, despite nondiscretionary increases in expenses such as an 8 percent increase in teachers’ salaries and a 30 percent increase in health insurance costs. As a result of these expenses without a corresponding increase in the school budget, the board had to reduce its expenses in many ways, including a staff reduction equal to twenty full-time teaching positions.
To determine which teachers would have their contracts terminated pursuant to § 10-151 (d), a seniority list agreed upon by the association and the board became important.
Ballato was listed as having zero years of service, and she objected. The hearing officer found, however, that in order to enhance other pension rights, Ballato had waived the opportunity to be included in the association bargaining unit for one year. No evidence was presented concerning the verification cards of Landon, Smith or Wood. On June 27,1991, the president of the association met with the superintendent regarding the seniority list and made no objection to the final list as of that date. The final seniority list had Landon, Smith and Wood each with one year of service, and Ballato with zero years.
On the basis of these findings, the hearing officer recommended to the board that it terminate the contracts of the plaintiffs in accord with the seniority list developed by the board and the association. On August 22,1991, the board adopted this recommendation and terminated the contracts of the plaintiffs. The clinical duties that the plaintiffs had performed would then be performed by nurses. The teaching duties that
Pursuant to General Statutes § 10-151 (f), the plaintiffs appealed the decision of the board to the Superior Court, claiming that the plaintiffs’ positions had not been “eliminated” under § 10-151 (d) (5), and that, even if the court found that they had been eliminated, the contracts were terminated on the basis of an invalid seniority list. The function of the trial court “in reviewing the action of the board pursuant to General Statutes § 10-151 (f) . . . 'is to determine whether the board has acted illegally and not to substitute [its] judgment for that of the board.’ ” Tomlinson v. Board of Education, 226 Conn. 704, 713-14, 629 A.2d 333 (1993), quoting Rodo v. Board of Education, 216 Conn. 541, 555, 483 A.2d 102 (1990); see Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 492, 123 A.2d 747 (1956). Applying this standard, the court upheld the board’s determinations, and dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal. The plaintiffs now appeal from the trial court’s judgment dismissing their appeal.
I
Elimination of Positions
The plaintiffs contend that the termination of their contracts under General Statues § 10-151 (d) (5) was illegal. Under that section, the contracts of tenured teachers can be terminated due to “elimination of the position to which the teacher was appointed or loss of a position to another teacher . . . .” The plaintiffs argue that their positions as nurse-teachers have not been eliminated because the functions of clinical nursing and health education teaching that comprised the
The phrase “elimination of the position” has not been defined by our legislature or our courts. To determine the meaning of this phrase, “the court must construe it in accordance with the statute’s background and purpose, as well as with common sense.” Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Winters, 225 Conn. 146, 158, 622 A.2d 536 (1993); In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 512-13, 613 A.2d 748 (1992); Warkentin v. Burns, 223 Conn. 14, 20, 610 A.2d 1287 (1992).
The language at issue became part of an existing body of law concerning teacher tenure in 1955. See General Statutes (1955 Rev.) § 938d. Legislative history of this amendment is sparse, and fails to address the phrase “elimination of the position.” The intent of the amendment is, however, clear. The provisions regarding the termination of teachers’ contracts were enacted to prevent terminations made in bad faith, such as terminations due to political motives or mere whimsy.
The plaintiffs suggest that, in order for a “position” to be “eliminated,” others cannot perform the functions that comprised that position. In other words, clinical nursing could not be provided and health education
“Position” is defined as “an employment for which one has been hired: job,” while “eliminate” is defined as to “get rid of.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed. 1993). A reasonable, common sense interpretation of the word “position” in this statute is that it applies to the specific job that the person has contracted to undertake rather than to an entire department or program. If a person is hired as a math teacher and the board chooses, pursuant to § 10-151 (d) (5), to “eliminat[e] . . . the position to which the teacher was appointed,” the decision is specific to that person’s job, rather than encompassing the entire department of math teachers. (Emphasis added.) In this case, the facts are less complex. No employee of the board currently has a job that involves both clinical nursing duties and health education instruction. The jobs or positions held by the nurse-teachers, for the purposes of the statute, have been eliminated. While the functions performed by those nurse-teachers are now performed by other personnel, a dispersement of duties after the board has determined in good faith that some positions need to be eliminated is appropriate.
II
Seniority List
The plaintiffs contend that the provision of the memorandum of agreement filed on July 14,1989, regarding the plaintiffs’ seniority in the association did not govern their seniority rights under the 1990-1993 collective bargaining agreement between the board and the association. Article twenty-three, subsection B, of the 1990-1993 collective bargaining agreement states in part that “[t]his agreement contains the full and complete agreement between the board and the Association on all negotiable matters for the duration of this contract only.” Article thirty-eight, subsection D, states that “[seniority will be determined using the total years of service in the Stonington Public Schools . . .’’and that “a seniority list will be developed and agreed to by both parties.” There is no mention of the July, 1989 memorandum of agreement regarding the plaintiffs’ seniority. The plaintiffs argue, therefore, that the July, 1989 memorandum of agreement no longer controls the plaintiffs’ seniority.
Although the term “seniority” is clearly defined in article thirty-eight, subsection D, of the 1990-1993 collective bargaining agreement, suggesting that the definition provided there should govern, this term is latently ambiguous. A latent ambiguity arises when language “is clear and intelligible and suggests but a single meaning, but some extrinsic fact or some extraneous evidence creates a necessity for interpretation or a choice between two or more possible meanings . . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). Here, evidence outside the 1990-1993 collective bargaining agreement creates a choice of meanings for the term as either total years of service or total years of service pursuant to the July, 1989 memorandum of agreement. When an ambiguous term is at issue, the trial court can examine the extrinsic evidence to resolve the question of the parties’ intent. Kronholm v. Kronholm, 16 Conn. App. 124, 131, 547 A.2d 61 (1988).
In this case, the trial court relied on several factors in determining that the parties intended the provisions of the July, 1989 memorandum of agreement to continue in force. First, the plaintiffs never questioned the seniority list through the grievance procedures set forth
In reviewing the trial court’s factual determination of the intentions of the parties, we will apply a clearly erroneous standard. “ ‘The trial court’s findings are binding upon this court unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ Groton v. Yankee Gas Ser
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Heather M. Kiss, another plaintiff, is not a party to this appeal. The term plaintiffs hereinafter refers solely to Ballato, Smith, Wood and Landon.
Ballato was hired by the board in September, 1973, and certified as a nurse-teacher in August, 1975; Landon was hired in April, 1985, and certified in February, 1989; Wood was hired in April, 1985, and certified in June, 1985; Smith held certification when hired in June, 1988.
Although titled nurse-teachers, the plaintiffs apparently spent most of their time performing clinical nursing duties. For example, during the 1990-1991 school year, Landon spent only 14 percent of her time teaching health education.
The term “tenure” is defined in General Statutes § 10-151 (a) (6) (A) as “[t]he completion of thirty school months of full-time continuous employment for the same board of education.”
These reasons are contained in the letters sent by the board to the plaintiffs, pursuant to the plaintiffs’ requests. The letters can be found in the administrative record and state the following:
“Dear [Plaintiff]:
“The purposes of this letter are to inform you that your request for a statement of reasons concerning the Board of Education’s decision to consider the termination of your employment contract was received on [date] and, in accordance with the Board’s responsibility under Section 10-151 of the Connecticut General Statutes, to provide you with a response to your request.
“Consequently, please be advised that the Board of Education is considering the termination of your contract of employment for the following reasons: [reasons set forth in text]
“If you have any questions concerning your status or the above statement of reasons, please feel free to contact my office at your convenience. “Respectfully,
[signature]
Thomas P. Reale, Jr. Superintendent of Schools”
A new collective bargaining agreement for the years 1990-1993 was not reached until January 31, 1991.
In addition to this provision regarding seniority, the memorandum of agreement altered several other provisions from the 1986-1989 collective bargaining agreement with regard to the plaintiffs.
General Statutes § 10-151 (d) provides in pertinent part: “The contract of employment of a teacher who has attained tenure shall be continued from school year to school year, except that it may be terminated at any time for . . . (5) elimination of the position to which the teacher was appointed or loss of a position to another teacher if no other position exists to which such teacher may be appointed if qualified . . . and provided further that determination of the individual contract or contracts of employment to be terminated shall be made in accordance with ... (A) a provision for a layoff procedure agreed upon by the board of education and the exclusive employees’ representative organization . . . .”
The plaintiffs Ballato, Landon and Smith were later rehired as full-time nurses. The plaintiff Wood was rehired in the position of a 0.7 teacher for the 1991-1992 year.
The legislative history for the house and senate regarding this amendment, formerly House Bill No. 1900, notes a favorable reception to the amendment and the desire to provide teachers with more job security. 21 H.R. Proc., Pt. 1, 1955 Sess., pp. 550-53; 12 S. Proc., Pt. 3, 1955 Sess., pp. 678-80. Legislative history regarding House Bill No. 591 is more abundant, as the joint committee on education recorded various sessions regarding this bill. House Bill No. 591 contained an identical listing of the reasons for termination of teachers' contracts. In public discussion on this bill, many members of the teaching community praised it as providing security and removing the arbitrariness that apparently had surrounded teacher terminations. Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Education, Pt. 1,1955 Sess., pp. 129-32, 138, 140-54.
Similarly, in the example where the six math teachers’ positions are reduced to five, with no reduction in the number of students, the position of one math teacher has been eliminated, it no longer exists. Such elimination and consolidation is appropriate if undertaken in good faith. Views similar to this have been expressed in other jurisdictions. In California, the Court of Appeals stated that the “particular kind of service of the employee may be eliminated even though a service continues to be performed or provided in a different manner by the district.” Campbell Elementary Teachers Assn., Inc. v. Abbott, 76 Cal. App. 3d 796, 812, 143 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1978). The court cited approvingly a case where the school board discontinued
The plaintiffs raise the issue in their brief that since they performed some teaching duties, they were entitled by law to be members of the teachers bargaining unit pursuant to General Statutes § 10-153b. It is unclear that the plaintiffs’ limited teaching duties, coupled with their largely clinical nursing function, would have qualified them as members of the bargaining unit absent the July, 1989 agreement, as the unit clarification proceeding was never completed. On the basis of the limited information and evidence regarding this issue before this court, it is inappropriate to decide whether the plaintiffs were legally entitled to be members of the unit.