Rаymond and Claudette Ballard filed suit against Amana Society, Inc. seeking direct and economic damages associated with injuries to their swine herd. The Ballards alleged their swine herd was injured after ingesting toxic corn purchased from Anana. The jury rеturned a verdict finding Amana eighty percent at fault and awarding damages of $87,000, including $75,000 in lost profits. Amana appealed, claiming the court erred in denying its motion for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict because: (1) the Ballards were not entitled to lоst-profit damages; (2) the Ballards’ expert based his lost-profits calculation upon a four-year business interruption, which is unreasonable as a matter of law; and (3) the Ballards’ evidence of lost profits was overly speculative. Amana also claimed the court erred in submitting both strict-liability and breach-of-warranty theories to the jury.
The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding the Ballards were entitled to lost-profit damages but that the Ballards’ evidence оf lost profits was overly speculative. It also determined the court erred in submitting both strict-liability and breach-of-warranty theories to the jury. We granted the Ballards’ application for further review.
I. Background.
The Ballards run a farrow-to-finish hog operation, involving breeding sows and raising their litters for slaughter. In 1989 Ama-na delivered corn to the Ballards’ farm to be fed to the swine herd. The Ballards later discovered the corn contained toxins, causing the death of several hogs and a reduction or elimination оf the sows’ reproductive abilities.
The district court submitted the issues of strict liability, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose and breаch of implied warranty of merchantability. It also submitted special interrogatories, requesting, in part, that the jury respond “yes” or “no” to each of the plaintiffs’ theories.
The jury returned a verdict in the Bal-lards’ favor. It responded “yes” to the interrogatory concerning breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. It did not specifically indicate whether it was accepting or rejecting the plaintiffs’ other theories. It awarded the Ballards $87,000, including $75,000 for lost profits.
The court denied Amana’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial. Amana appealed.
The court of appeals majority affirmed the judgment as to the damages associated with the replacement cost of the herd but rеversed the award for lost profits. It determined the Ballards’ evidence related to lost profits was overly speculative. It also determined the district court erred in submitting both strict-liability and breach-of-warranty theories to the jury. We granted the Bal-lаrds’ application for further review and now address all issues properly presented on direct appeal.
See Bokhoven v. Klinker,
II. Recovery of Lost Profits.
Amana initially claims the Ballards cannot recover lost profits as a matter of law. Citing
Miller v. Economy Hog & Cattle Powder Co.,
This issue has been decided adversely to Amana in
Mills v. Guthrie County Rural Electric,
While recovery of the market value of the hogs that were destroyed precludes plaintiffs from also recovering profits based on their inability to sell those hogs, this circumstance should not preclude additional damages based on interruption in the production of additional litters during the period of time reasonably required to replace the destroyed farrowing facility.
Id.
In this case, the Ballards also seek to recover damages based on an interruption in their farrow-to-finish operation’s ability to produce litters. Based upon Mills, we believe the Ballards may recover lost profits associated with the reestablishment of their hog operation.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Establish Lost Profits.
Amana сlaims the Ballards’ evidence regarding lost profits was overly speculative, precluding them from recovering such damages.
See Hoefer v. Wisconsin Educ. Ass’n Ins. Trust,
Dr. Behr is a forensic economist with substantial experience in agribusiness. He received Bachelor of Science and Master of Science degrees from the University of Minnesota in 1957. He received minors in plant industry and animal husbandry. He later received Master of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy degrees from the University of Wisconsin with majors in agricultural economics and a minor in economics. Additionally, following the receipt of his first Master’s degree, he spent six years running a farm.
Dr. Behr projected a level of revenue associated with 104 breeding sows, the number of sows the Ballards were utilizing at the time their herd ingested the toxic corn. He then subtracted the vаriable expenses to arrive at expected profits.
See King Feature Syndicate v. Courier,
We believe Dr. Behr’s testimony provided a reasonable basis upon which the jury could determine lost profits. The jury apparently recognized some weaknesses in Dr. Behr’s testimony, as it awarded only $75,000 in lost profits compared to Dr. Behr’s estimation of $220,400.
See Mercy Hosp. v. Hansen, Lind & Meyer,
IV. Reasonableness of Length of Business Interruption.
Amana claims the Ballards’ attempt to obtain lost profit damages for a four-year business interruption is unreasonable as a mattеr of law.
See Mills,
The Ballards claim Dr. Behr’s economic model reasonably calculated it took four years for the Ballards to achieve the level of production they would have experienced but for the toxic corn. They claim Amana should be responsible for the full four-year business interruption regardless of whether it was prolonged by diseased hogs used for repopu-lation.
We believe the Ballards presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to base its damage award upon a four-year business interruption, notwithstanding the fact the interruption was prolonged by the acquisition of diseased hogs. Repopulation of the Bal-lards’ swine herd was necessitated by Ama-na’s actions. The possibility that some of the hogs used for repopulation would be diseased, thereby increasing the businеss interruption, was reasonably foreseeable. If an intervening act is reasonably foreseeable, it will not relieve the original wrongdoer of liability.
Haumersen,
V. Submission of Strict Liability Theory.
Amana also claims the trial cоurt erred in submitting both strict-liability and breach-of-warranty theories. Citing
Nelson v. Todd’s Ltd.,
In
Nelson,
the owners of a butcher shop suffered damages when a meat curing agent failed to work as designed and prevent treated meat from spoiling.
Tort theory, on the other hand, is generally appropriate when the harm is a sudden or dangerous occurrence, frequently involving some violence or collision with external objects, resulting from a genuine hazard in the nature of the prоduct defect. For example, had [the curing agent] caused chemical burns to the [butchers’] hands or damaged their meat processing equipment, an action would lie in strict tort liability. That sort of harm could not have been reasonably antiсipated by the contracting parties, and would be a hazard peripheral to the sale.
Id. Thus, we held the trial court erred in submitting both strict-liability and breach-of-warranty theories to the jury. Id.
Unlike the damages suffered by the plaintiffs in Nelson, we believe the injuries to the Ballards’ swine herd support damages in tort. We believe the existence of toxins in the feed corn was a genuine hazard peripheral to the sale and a serious product defect, causing the death of swine and a significant business interruption. Consequently, we hold the trial сourt did not err in submitting both strict-liability and breach-of-warranty theories to the jury.
VI. Summary.
We believe the Ballards were entitled to lost-profit damages and that they presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s damage award. We do not believe that, under the facts of this case, awarding damages for a four-year business interruption is unreasonable as a matter of law. We also do not believe the trial court erred in submitting both strict-liability and breach-of-warranty theories to the jury. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the district court.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
