176 Iowa 110 | Iowa | 1915
Lead Opinion
Plaintiff alleges that her husband, now deceased, was, in his lifetime and at the date of his death, a member of the defendant association, which issued to him a benefit certificate of membership, and that, during the remainder of his life, he conformed to all the conditions of such membership, and was in good standing in the association when be died. She further alleges that, by the terms of said certificate, the defendant undertook, upon the death, accidentally occasioned, of a member in good standing, to pay the person properly designated by him for that purpose the proceeds of one assessment of $2 on each member of the association, not exceeding in the aggregate the sum of $5,000. The death of ber said husband, she alleges, was the result of bodily injury effected solely by external, violent and accidental means and without intervening cause, and such death occurred within less than six months from the date of the injury, and she further, alleges that said association has more than 2,500 members and that a single assessment at $2 each upon the membership will produce more than $5,000. For answer, the defendant admits its corporate capacity and its business as alleged, and that defendant’s husband was a member of the association in his lifetime, becoming such member in October, 1909, and continuing in good standing during the remainder of his life, and that plaintiff is his widow and duly appointed beneficiary. It also admits that proofs of death were fur
At the close of the testimony, the defendant moved for a directed verdict in its favor, on the ground that, under the terms of the contract and under the conceded facts, it conclusively appears that plaintiff was not entitled to recover.
No error is assigned upon the failure or refusal of the court to send the issues to the jury, and the sole question before us is the construction and effect of the contract, and whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that the death of plaintiff’s husband was a casualty, upon the happening of which defendant had undertaken to pay the full benefit of $5,000, mentioned in the certificate sued upon.
The testimony relating to- the death of the member is very brief and wholly undisputed. It is, in substance, as follows: The deceased and one Sterling were driving an automobile. During the trip, deceased had occasion to crank the engine, and in so doing said to his companion that he had hurt himself, and rubbed his knee several times. On arriving home, he told his wife that he had nearly broken his leg, and that in cranking the car he had hurt his left leg below the knee. This was on Thursday evening, August 20, 1914. The next morning, he continued to complain, rubbed the leg and said that it was sore. On Saturday, he was still suffering pain. On Sunday, he was worse, and a physician was called; but he continued to fail until his death on the following Thursday. So far as surface appearance was concerned, the marks of injury were slight, being chiefly indicated by a* red streak or scratch below the knee. The attending physician testifies that, when he was called.to treat the deceased, he found him suffering from a very virulent case of “streptococci poisoning,” commonly known as blood poisoning or septicaemia, and that there was an apparent abrasion of the skin upon the left leg just below the knee. In the opinion of the witness, the blood
‘ ‘ The cause of his death was undoubtedly streptococci poisoning, and I am sure there was no other cause which contributed to his death, nor was he diseased in any other way at the time. I am unable to give an opinion as to when he got the poisoning, except that it must have been at least 48 hours prior to the time I was called to see him. Streptococci germs may get into the system from the open air and it is impossible for them to get into the system except through an abrasion of the skin, thus permitting the bacteria to get into the blood. It is possible the germs got into his system through exposure of the wound to the open air or' from touching an article or in almost any way; there is no way to tell how it happened. ’ ’
As stating the terms and conditions of the contract sued upon, the plaintiff relies upon the following provision of the defendant’s articles of incorporation, which is substantially embodied in the certificate:
“Article Y. Section 10. — The association shall pay to the beneficiary designated in writing by any member of the accident department, who must be either the surviving wife or an heir of such member, the proceeds of one assessment of two dollars on each member of the accident department in good standing at the time of the accident to an amount not exceeding $5,000 on account of the death of any member of the accident department occurring within 90 days from the happening of the accident and resulting directly and without intervening cause from a bodily injury sustained by the member while in good standing and affected solely by external, violent and accidental means, subject only to the conditions, provisions and limitations of the by-laws.”
And, as limiting and modifying the effect of such provision, the defendant relies upon certain of its by-laws, reading as follows:
“Article IY. Section 2. — This association shall not be*115 liable to any member of the accident department, nor to any person claiming by, through or under any certificate issued to a member, for the payment of any certificate issued to a member, for the payment of any benefits or indemnity on account of disability or death resulting from poison, voluntarily or involuntarily taken, administered, absorbed or inhaled or from contact with poisonous ivy or other poisonous animal, mineral or vegetable substance, or resulting from the inhalation, voluntary or involuntary, of illuminating or other gas; or resulting from infection, except as provided in Section 3 of Article YI of these by-laws.
“Article YI. Section 3. — Whenever, as the direct result of an injury occurring solely by external, violent and accidental means, the skin or the outer covering of the eye shall be abraded, cut or punctured, and there shall be introduced into the system through said abrasion, cut or puncture, and by the very instrument or means causing said abrasion, cut or puncture, any specific bacteria, which shall, within a period of 10 days after said injury, produce septicaemia, pyaemia or tetanus, or any other kind of blood poisoning or infection, the liability of the association for the payment of the benefits or indemnity on account of disability, loss or death resulting therefrom shall in no ease exceed the amount of $500.”
“The proof established only that a bodily injury insignificant in itself furnished a portal of entry for the streptococci which poisoned the blood stream and produced death.*116 It was not even in the most technical legal sense a cause of death. It was merely a passive condition.”
Counsel candidly admit that, in Delaney v. Modern Accident Club, 121 Iowa 528, this court reached a conclusion which is directly opposed to the proposition for which he here contends, and asks that we now overrule it as unsound. To that end, he takes up and reviews the several authorities cited in that opinion, criticises its reasoning, and undertakes to demonstrate that the holding is indefensible upon the principle.
We are not prepared to thus introduce confusion into our cases. The precedent thus established has stood the test of time unchallenged for the last 12 years or more; there is nothing intrinsically unjust in the doctrine there affirmed; and the opinion has the support of the weight of authority. It takes up and considers the very proposition which counsel now urges us to affirm, and, upon both principle and precedent, rejects it as unsound. Upon such consideration, the conclusion was reached that:
“It is wholly immaterial when or how the specific bacilli which caused the disease known as blood poisoning which resulted in the death of Delaney were introduced into the wound, whether at the time it was inflicted or subsequently. Blood poisoning is a disease, just as many other pathological conditions of the human system resulting from the introduction therein of other specific bacilli are diseases. ... It is wholly immaterial whether the pathological condition which resulted in - death was due to bacilli or not. The simple question is whether the death of Delaney resulted through natural causes, without the interposition of a new and independent cause, from the cut on his finger. Disease brought about as the result of a wound, even though not the necessary or probable result, yet if it is the natural result of the wound, and not of an independent cause, is properly attributed to the wound; and death resulting from the disease is a death resulting from the wound, even though the wound was not, in its nature, mortal or even dangerous.”
That the cases cited by the author of that opinion may not all present an exact parallel with the one there being considered is not particularly important. They do deal with the interpretation of contracts of the same general character, and affirm rules and principles in point with the position there taken. For example, the opinion in Omberg v. United States M. A. Assn., 101 Ky. 303, dealing with a case of blood poisoning from the bite of an insect, says:
‘ ‘ The blood poisoning was consequent on the wound; the bite would, therefore, be the proximate cause of death.”
In Freeman v. Mercantile M. A. Assn., 156 Mass. 351, it is said:
“An injury which might naturally produce death in a person of a certain temperament or state of health is the cause of his death, if he dies by reason of it, even if he would not have died if his temperament or previous health had been different; and this is so> as well when death comes-through the medium of a disease directly induced by the injury as when the injury immediately interrupts the vital processes. ’ ’
Thus we might go again over the precedents, cited by the author of that opinion and note where each, in some of its features, is fairly in point in the matter then under.discussion, but we think it unnecessary. The cases so mentioned are but few of the very many holding to the principié of the Delaney case, and we suggest with all due deference that even the savage assault thereon which counsel indulges in cannot disturb its standing as respectable authority.
To hold as counsel contend for would tend to but one result, and that is that the defendant association could be held to liability upon its contracts for no death loss whatever except
“If the death was caused by bodily injuries effected by external, violent and accidental means alone, the association was liable to pay the promised indemnity. If the death was caused by a disease which was not the result of any bodily infirmity or disease in existence at the time of the accident, but which was itself caused by the external, violent and accidental means which produced the bodily injury, the association was equally liable to pay the indemnity. In such a case, the.disease is an effect of the accident, the incidental means produced and used by the original moving cause to bring-about its fatal effect, a mere link in the chain of causation between the accident and the death, and the death is attributable, not to the disease, but to the causa causans — to the accident alone.”
To the same effect is Cary v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 127 Wis. 67. This also was a case of blood poisoning, not materially unlike the case at bar, and the court there says:
“The bacterial infection and the' resultant septicaemia •*119 were in the natural course of events dependent upon and set in motion by the abrasion of the skin caused by the fall. The entry of bacteria into the system cannot be considered as an independent cause and as having intervened between the accidental fall and the death because of the fact that it was conditioned on the existence of the abrasion of the skin and was wholly incidental to and set in motion by it, thus making it one of the events in the chain of causation. ’ ’
The list of authorities affirming this rule is very great, but enough has been mentioned to show the trend of judicial thought upon the subject. It is true that cases may be found giving some support to the views advanced on the part of appellant, but they are not in harmony with the course of our own decisions and are opposed to the weight of authority-in other jurisdictions.
“The proximate cause ... is the dominant cause, not the one which is incidental to that cause, its mere instrument. . . . ‘The inquiry must always be whether there was any intermediate cause disconnected from the primary fault and self-operating, which produced the injury.’ ” Insurance Co. v. Boon, 95 U. S. 117, 133.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the district court is — Affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
I do not wish to dissent from the conclusion: reached in this ease, because of the nature of the issues tendered by the defendant; but, to avoid any misapprehension, as to the effect of defendant’s by-laws, Article 4, Section 2,- and Article 6, Section 3, I wish to emphasize the thought that, if the issue had been properly tendered, I think the case should, at least have gone to the jury, for it to determine, whether or not the death of the assured resulted directly from an abrasion or cut of the skin, through which there was introduced into the system, by the instruments or by the means causing the abrasion or cut, specific bacteria, which, within a period of 10 days after the injury, produced blood poisoning or infection, and that, had the jury so found, the limit of plaintiff’s, recovery would have been $500. We must give these two-by-laws some effect, and the most that can be said for them, is, that, if the pleader had properly tendered the issue, defendant is liable for the death of assured, due to blood poisoning or, infection, to the full amount of the policy, in the event that, the germ which was brought into the system was not introduced through an abrasion or cut, but in some other way, and that the abrasion or cut was the direct result of an accident. I am not prepared to say, in view of the issues tendered and the motion filed by defendant, that the question is now before-us as to whether the matter should have gone to the jury at all. What I wish to be clear about is this: In my opinion,.
For these reasons, I am impelled to file this separate opinion.