VICTORIA BALENTINE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF EDWIN OMAR MEDINA-FLORES, DECEASED v. CHESTER WATER AUTHORITY, WYATT A. ROLAND, MICHAEL W. ROLAND AND CHARLES MATTHEWS
No. 119 MAP 2016
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT
August 21, 2018
SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.
ARGUED: September 13, 2017
OPINION
JUSTICE MUNDY
DECIDED: August 21, 2018
We granted allowance of appeal in this matter to consider whether the Commonwealth Court erred in holding that the involuntary movement of a vehicle does not constitute operation of a motor vehicle for purposes of the vehicle liability exception to governmental immunity under
Mathues activated the four-way flashers and the amber strobe light on the roof of the vehicle, which he then exited. He walked to the front of the vehicle where he laid some blueprints on the hood. Mathues Dep., 11/11/14, at 64. Approximately five minutes later, a vehicle owned by Michael Roland and driven by Wyatt Roland struck the rear of the CWA vehicle, causing it to move forward. Mathues was rolled up onto the hood and thrown into the roadway. The right front bumper of the CWA vehicle then struck Medina-Flores as he stood in the ditch. The undercarriage dragged him out of the ditch, pinning Medina-Flores under the vehicle when it came to a stop. See
On November 8, 2013, Balentine, individually and as administratrix of the Estate of Medina-Flores, filed a complaint against CWA, Mathues, Wyatt Roland and Michael Roland. CWA and Mathues filed a timely answer thereto, and on December 16, 2014, they filed a motion for summary judgment. On February 5, 2015, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed all claims against CWA and Mathues, having determined that neither the motor vehicle exception nor the traffic control device exception to governmental immunity set forth in the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act),
On September 2, 2015, Balentine dismissed the action against Michael Roland and Wyatt Roland, thereby making the February 5, 2015 order granting summary judgment appealable.2 See
On appeal, a divided panel of the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court. Balentine v. Chester Water Authority, 140 A.3d 69 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). The majority recognized that “[b]ecause no Pennsylvania case law addresses whether involuntary movement of a vehicle constitutes operation for purposes of the governmental immunity exception, this is a matter of first impression.” Id. at 72. Relying on the fact that the CWA vehicle was parked at the time of the accident, the majority considered itself
Senior Judge Friedman filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. Although Judge Friedman agreed that the traffic device exception did not apply, she concluded that the CWA vehicle was in operation at the time it struck and killed Medina-Flores. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Friedman distinguished the cases relied upon by the majority. Judge Friedman maintained that the majority erred by distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary movement of a vehicle because “the statute does not qualify the word ‘operation.‘” Id. at 77.
We granted discretionary review to consider whether the Commonwealth Court erred in affirming the grant of summary judgment and holding that the involuntary movement of a vehicle does not constitute operation of a motor vehicle for purposes of the vehicle liability exception to governmental immunity.3 Because this presents a pure question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 441 (Pa. 2017).
Section 8541 of the Tort Claims Act sets forth the following general principle: “Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local
§ 8542. Exceptions to governmental immunity
(a) Liability imposed.--A local agency shall be liable for damages on account of an injury to a person or property within the limits set forth in this subchapter if both of the following conditions are satisfied and the injury occurs as a result of one of the acts set forth in subsection (b):
- The damages would be recoverable under common law or a statute creating a cause of action if the injury were caused by a person not having available a defense under section 8541 (relating to governmental immunity generally) or section 8546 (relating to defense of official immunity); and
- The injury was caused by the negligent acts of the local agency or an employee thereof acting within the scope of his office or duties with respect to one of the categories listed in subsection (b). As used in this paragraph, “negligent acts” shall not include acts or conduct which constitutes a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.
(b) Acts which may impose liability.--The following acts by a local agency or any of its employees may result in the imposition of liability on a local agency:
- Vehicle liability.--The operation of any motor vehicle in the possession or control of the local agency, provided that the local agency shall not be liable to any plaintiff that claims liability under this subsection if the plaintiff was, during the course of the alleged negligence, in flight or fleeing apprehension or resisting arrest by a police officer or knowingly aided a group, one or more of whose members were in flight or fleeing apprehension or resisting arrest by a police officer. As used in this paragraph, “motor vehicle” means any vehicle which is self-propelled and any attachment thereto, including vehicles operated by rail, through water or in the air.
The parties each assert that the appellate precedent of this Commonwealth supports their position. With respect to the pertinent issue in this case, both parties rely, in part, on Love v. City of Philadelphia, 543 A.2d 531 (Pa. 1988). In Love, a 73-year-old woman who was blind in one eye and visually impaired in the other, would receive transportation to and from a City-administered adult day care center in a City-owned van. The driver would park the vehicle at the curb in front of Mrs. Love‘s home and would place a portable step at the van doors. He would then assist Mrs. Love entering and alighting the vehicle. On the afternoon of February 15, 1980, the van was parked three feet from the curb in front of Mrs. Love‘s home when she fell from the portable step the driver placed next to the van. As a result, Mrs. Love sustained injuries which led to her placement in a nursing home. Mrs. Love filed a negligence action against the City, and at the conclusion of a non-jury trial, the court entered a verdict in her favor in the amount of $375,000. The court concluded that “Mrs. Love‘s cause of action came within the ‘motor vehicle’ exception to the . . . Tort Claims Act.” Id. at 532. The Commonwealth Court reversed, and this Court granted Mrs. Love‘s appeal on the following issue: “whether the act of entering into or alighting from a motor vehicle constitutes operation of that vehicle under
Because the word “operation” is not defined in the statute, this Court recognized “our responsibility to derive the intent of the General Assembly in using the word. See Statutory Construction Act of 1971.
Black‘s Law Dictionary defines the word “operate” as follows:
This word, when used with relation to automobiles, signifies a personal act in working the mechanism of the automobile . . . (citations omitted).
Black‘s further defines “operation,” as: the process of operating or mode of action.” Black‘s Law Dictionary, p. 984 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
Similar definitions are found in the Oxford Dictionary. See Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VII, p. 144 (1933). The American Heritage Dictionary defines “operation” as “[t]o run or control the functioning of: operate a machine“; and defines “operation” as “[t]he state of being operative or functioning in operation.” See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, p. 920 (7th ed. 1971).
Upon review of these definitions, this Court concluded:
To operate something means to actually put it into motion. Merely preparing to operate a vehicle, or acts taken at the cessation of operating a vehicle are not the same as actually operating that vehicle. Thus, according to the common and approved usage of the word “operation,” the van was not in operation at the time of Mrs. Love‘s accident. Getting into or alighting from a vehicle are merely acts ancillary to the actual operation of that vehicle.
Id. at 533 (emphasis in original).
Appellant asserts that the critical point to be gleaned from Love is that where alleged damages are caused by the movement of the defendant‘s vehicle, immunity does not apply. Appellant supports this position by relying on the decision of the Commonwealth Court in Cacchione v. Wieczorek, 674 A.2d 773 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). In Cacchione, homeowners brought an action against the City of Erie for damages they sustained when its employee, Tom Cacchione, Jr., parked a City-owned truck in front of their house with the engine running and exited the vehicle. The truck later rolled backwards crashing into their home, causing them physical and mental injuries, as well as property damage. The City filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings asserting that the alleged facts did not establish that the truck was in operation at the time of the collision. The court denied the motion, but amended the order certifying the matter for
However, the Cacchione court noted:
Where, as here the injury was caused by the movement of the entire vehicle, or moving parts of the vehicle, this Court has consistently held that the vehicle was in operation at the time of the injury for the purpose of deciding whether the case falls within the vehicle exception.
Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that “[b]ecause the injury in this matter was caused by the movement of the entire truck, the truck was in operation at the time of the injury.” Id.
Q: Based on your observations at the accident scene the [CWA] vehicle moved into Mr. Flores, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And that movement is what caused his death; correct?
A: Yes.
Pugh Dep., 11/3/14, at 64.
Metra foreman Bonilla also testified:
Q: And the reason this happened [the death of Medina-Flores] is because the [CWA vehicle] was moved into his body: correct?
A: Yes.
Bonilla Dep., 11/3/14, at 65.
Appellant also finds support in Bottoms v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 805 A.2d 47 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002), where the Commonwealth Court reviewed Cacchione and Sonnenberg v. Erie Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 586 A.2d 1026 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). In Sonnenberg, the plaintiff filed an action against the Authority for injuries sustained while exiting the rear door of a bus when the door suddenly closed, hitting her in the back and locking her in a position from which she could not extricate herself. The trial court entered summary judgment in the Authority‘s favor based on its conclusion that the bus was not in operation at the time the plaintiff was injured. The Commonwealth Court reversed and held that “[t]he movement of parts of a vehicle or an attachment to a vehicle, is sufficient to constitute
Appellant finds further support in Mickle v. City of Philadelphia, 707 A.2d 1124 (Pa. 1998). In Mickle, a plaintiff who was being transported to the hospital in a City fire rescue van sustained injuries when the rear left wheels of the van came off. Plaintiff filed suit against the City, which moved for summary judgment asserting immunity. Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment asserting the vehicle exception. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. “While acknowledging that the firefighter did not drive in a negligent manner the court found that Mickle‘s injuries are causally related to the movement or operation of the City vehicle and as such, fall under the exception.” Id. at 1125. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court affirmed, as did this Court. We noted:
Negligence related to the operation of a vehicle encompasses not only how a person drives but also whether he should be driving a particular vehicle in the first place. The motor vehicle exception does not say that liability may be imposed only where the operator‘s manner of driving is
negligent. Rather, it requires that the injury is caused by a negligent act with respect to the operation of a motor vehicle.
Id. Relying on Mickle, Appellant asserts that because the injury was caused by the CWA vehicle illegally parked on the roadway with the engine running, her claim is proper. Appellant‘s Brief, at 15.
Appellees also cite appellate decisions in support of their position. Initially they note that in Love, this Court held that “to operate something means to actually put it in motion. Merely preparing to operate a vehicle, or acts taken at the cessation of operating a vehicle, are not the same as actually operating the vehicle.” Love, 543 A.2d at 533. Because the CWA vehicle was parked, they assert there was no operation of the vehicle by Mathues that caused the movement of the vehicle.
Appellees rely on First National Bank of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 609 A.2d 911 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992), where a driver collided with a DOT vehicle parked on or near the berm of a road. The administrator of the estate of a passenger killed in the accident brought an action against the Department. The trial court entered summary judgment against the estate based on the motor vehicle exception to sovereign immunity.4 The Commonwealth Court affirmed, stating that in Love, this Court “defined the word ‘operation,’ as used in the motor vehicle exception to mean actual motion of a vehicle.” Id. at 914. Noting that the DOT vehicle was parked on the side of the road and that the “[d]ecedent‘s injuries were not caused by any moving part of the DOT vehicle,” id., the vehicle was not in operation.
Appellees find further support for their position in City of Philadelphia v. Melendez, 627 A.2d 234 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). While Melendez was exiting her driveway she collided with a vehicle owned by a third party. Melendez asserted that the City was
With respect to the principles that guide our analysis, this Court has recognized:
As questions of governmental immunity are legislative in nature, we begin by considering the dictates found in the Statutory Construction Act.
1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1501 et seq. The objective of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a) . The best indication of the legislature‘s intent is the plain language of the statute. When the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, we may not go beyond the plain meaning of the language of the statute “under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”Id. § 1921(b) . Therefore, only when the words of a statute are ambiguous, should a reviewing court seek to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly through considerations of the various factors found in Section 1921(c).Id. § 1921(c) ; see generally Bayada Nurses Inc. v. Com. Dept. Labor and Indus., 607 Pa. 527, 8 A.3d 866, 880–81 (2010). Additionally, we are mindful that, in interpreting the Tort Claims Act, exceptions to the absolute rule of immunity expressed in the statute “must be narrowly interpreted given the expressed legislative intent to insulate political subdivisions from tort liability.” Mascaro v. Youth Study Ctr., 514 Pa. 351, 523 A.2d 1118, 1123 (1987).
Dorsey v. Redman, 96 A.3d 332, 340-41 (Pa. 2014).
The vehicle liability exception to governmental immunity refers only to “operation,” and not to “motion.” Se
In light of Love and its progeny, Appellants have been placed in the position of arguing that the voluntary or involuntary motion of a vehicle in the possession or control of a local agency, is a necessary element of negligent operation of a vehicle. Concomitantly, Appellees argue that only voluntary motion can lead to imposition of liability. Inherent in whether the Commonwealth Court erred by holding that involuntary movement does not constitute operation of a motor vehicle, lies the more fundamental question regarding the relationship between motion and operation.
This issue was first raised by Justice Papadakos in his dissenting opinion in Love, where he noted:
Under the majority‘s interpretation, one can only be operating a vehicle if he actually puts it in motion or drives it. If the legislature so intended, I am sure it is capable of making such a distinction by using the appropriate language. The legislature used the term operation of a vehicle and this includes conduct which is generally within the intended use of the vehicle and entails the use of the vehicles appurtenant parts.
. . .
Moreover, the term operation cannot be construed without regard to the facts of this case and the duties of the operator with respect to the vehicle and the Appellant.
Justice Newman elaborated on this concept in a dissenting opinion in Warrick v. Pro Cor Ambulance, Inc., 739 A.2d 127 (Pa. 1999), where she observed:
The process of operating a vehicle encompasses more than simply moving the vehicle. When a person “operates” a vehicle, he makes a series of decisions and actions, taken together, which transport the individual from one place to another. The decisions of where and whether to park, where and whether to turn, whether to engage brake lights, whether to use appropriate signals, whether to turn lights on or off, and the like, are all part of the “operation” of a vehicle.
. . .
The term “operation” reflects a continuum of activity, the boundaries of which this Court should define. “Operation” does not mean simply moving forward or backwards, but instead includes the decision making process that is attendant to moving the vehicle. Had the legislature intended that recovery was permissible only when the vehicle was actually in motion, the legislature would not have used a word that implies a process, such as the term “operation.” Moreover, the term “operation” of a motor vehicle occurs in other statutory provisions and in those cases, we have not required that the term “operation” means that the automobile actually be in motion. For example, in the context of the offense of driving under the influence (DUI),
75 Pa.C.S. § 3731 , to find that a motor vehicle is in operation requires evidence that the driver was in actual physical control of the vehicle, but not that the vehicle was actually “in motion.” Commonwealth v. Wilson, 660 A.2d 105, 107 (Pa. Super. 1995). See also Commonwealth v. Wolen, 685 A.2d 1384 (Pa. 1996) (recognizing that a finding of “actual physical control” does not require that car is actually moving).
Id. at 128-29 (Newman, J. dissenting).
By defining operation as motion, this Court and the Commonwealth Court have created precedent that is contrary to Section 1922(1) of the Rules of Construction, which provides that in ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly, we may
The approach set forth in the Warrick dissent, as advocated for by Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania Association for Justice, does not contradict the “intent of the Tort Claims Act to insulate local government agencies from liability.” See Appellees’ Brief, at 21. Under the Tort Claims Act, before a court may address the underlying merits of an action against the government, the plaintiff must first state a claim upon which relief may be granted by pleading facts alleging: (1) that the government would have been liable under common law or statute for the injury; (2) that the injury was caused by the negligent act of the government or its agent acting within the scope of his duties; and (3) that the negligent act falls within one of the exceptions to immunity enumerated in subsection 8542(b) of the Judicial Code,
In her dissenting opinion in Warrick, Justice Newman recognized that operation of a vehicle “reflects a continuum of activity,” 739 A.2d at 129 (Newman, J. dissenting), which entails “a series of decisions and actions, taken together, which transport the individual from one place to another. The decisions of where and whether to park, where and whether to turn, whether to engage brake lights, whether to use appropriate signals, whether to turn lights on or off, and the like, are all part of the ‘operation’ of a vehicle.” Id. at 128 (Newman, J. dissenting). This definition, which we adopt today, creates a reasonable standard that comports with the intent of the General Assembly and avoids the illogical results that have flowed from the emphasis on motion in Love and its progeny.5
For these reasons, the order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Justices Todd, Dougherty and Wecht join the opinion.
Justice Baer files a concurring opinion in which Justice Donohue joins.
Justice Wecht files a concurring opinion in which Justice Todd joins.
Chief Justice Saylor files a dissenting opinion.