1 Lans. 125 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1869
Present — James, Rosekrans, Potter and Bockes, JJ.
By the Court
The facts in this case are undis puted, and only questions of law are presented upon this appeal. The judgment can only be sustained upon the contract made with the operator of the United States Branch Company at Ogdensburgh. The defendant was the second company upon the line of communication over which the plaintiff’s message was to be transmitted. Hence the important question is fairly presented, how far are intermediate or remote companies, making up the route of transit, liable to senders of messages for their breach of the contract made with the operator at the terminus of the line, who receives pay for the whole distance, and whose agency they recognize by receiving and transmitting or attempting to transmit the dispatch.
The English rule is that a carrier, who knowingly receives a parcel directed to any particular place, undertakes to carry it there, unless he makes known a different purpose; and, in conformity therewith, if has been repeatedly decided in England, that the sender of the parcel has no contract with the second carrier, and cannot recover of him for damages done on his part of the route. (Coxon v. Great Western Railway Co., 5 H. & N., 274.) But the American decisions have wholly overthrown this doctrine, and the prevailing rule in this country is that the carrier receiving the parcel under
In the case of Hart v. The Rensselaer & Saratoga Railroad Co. (4 Seld., 37), the plaintiff purchased from an agent,
Upon the authority of these cases, the Superior Court of Ohio held the Little Miami Railroad Company liable upon a contract made at the depot of the Washington Branch Railroad Company, in Washington city. The plaintiff bought a through ticket, and had his baggage checked through from Washington to Cincinnati. The defendant was the last company upon the route, and in its possession the plaintiff’s baggage was found, broken open and rifled. The plaintiff claimed to recover upon either of two grounds: 1st. That whatever relation the defendant might have sustained to the Washington Branch and intermediate railroads, inter se, yet, as to the world, they held themselves out as partners; and the plaintiff had, therefore, a right to charge them as such, and to hold each liable for the acts of either or all. 2d. That, independent of partnership, the trunk being found in possession of defendant, in a mutilated condition, throws upon it the burden of showing that the loss did not happen whilst the trunk was in its possession as carrier. The only facts relied upon as going to show a partnership, were the employ
The same view is taken by Professor Parsons, in his learned work on contracts. At page 212, vol. 2, fifth edition, he says: “ If carriers for different routes which connect together, associate for the purpose of carrying parcels through the whole line, and share the profits, they are undoubtedly partners, and each is liable in sólido for the loss or injury of goods which he undertakes to carry, in whatever part, of the line it may have happened. If the carriers are not sp distinctly associated, but are so far connected that they undertake for the whole line, they should be responsible as before.” And at page 214 he says: “ The purchase of what is called a through ticket, of an agent authorized by sundry carriers to sell such a ticket, and the price of which is shared in certain proportions by all of them, would estop the carriers from denying a partnership for the whole line, and, at the same time, would perhaps permit the plaintiff, if his person or goods were injured on any part of the route, to sue the carrier on whose route the injury took place, separately.”
This well founded rule of the joint liability of connecting carriers, upon the contract made at the terminus of the route, with the common agent who receives pay for the whole distance, applies with equal force and good- sense to telegraph-as to railroad companies. Judge Daly, in his elaborate opinion in the caste of De Rutte v. N. Y., Albany & Buffalo
The case of Leonard & Burton v. N. Y., Albany & Buffalo Tel. Co., decided at General Term, in the fifth district, stands upon the same rule, and in many respects, is parallel with this case. The plaintiff’s agents sent a message from Chicago, III., to Oswego, N. Y., and paid for the whole dis tance. The route was composed of three separate lines; the defendant’s line extended from Buffalo to Syracuse; the message was an order for 5,000 sacks of salt; the defendant’s operator, at Syracuse, changed the word “ sacks ” to “ casks,” from which error the damages ensued. It was held, that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff for the damages resulting from the error.
The same view of the law, as applicable to telegraph companies, was taken by this court at General Term, when the present case was before us on demurrer. Justice Potter said, in his opinion, in which all concurred, that “ the branch company was the agent of defendant for making contracts over the line of both,” and that “the contract, made with the agent, whether it arises from implication of law, or by express special terms, is the contract which may be enforced.”
The complaint in this case averred, that the lines of the branch company connected at Syracuse with defendant’s line, which extended from Syracuse to Rouseville; and that the
These facts show conclusively, that there was a connection between the two companies; that they, together, made up the whole line of communication, for the use of which plaintiffs had paid; that the defendant recognized the authority of the operator at Ogdensburgh to contract in its behalf, and assumed, and attempted to perform the contract" made with him, and, within the cases above cited, clearly establish that the defendant is liable to the plaintiffs for its failure to perform that contract.
■ By § 11, of chapter 265, of the Laws of 1848, it is made the duty of telegraph companies to receive dispatches from, and for other lines; and on payment of their usual charges, as established by the rules and regulations of each company, to transmit the same with impartiality and good faith. At the time this action was tried, there was no defense made, or proof offered, to show that the usual charges of the defendant, for the transmission of this dispatch had not been paid, as established by its rules and regulations. And from the fact, that defendant received the dispatch for transmission, and undertook to transmit it, for the sum demanded and received, the law will infer, in the absence of proof, that its charges were paid, and its regulations complied with. Neither was there any written contract for the transmission of the plaintiff’s message, nor was any such defense presented by the answer when this cause was tried; or proved, or offered to be proved, upon the trial. The defendant, in its original answer, had set-up as a defense that the printed matter on the paper on which the plaintiff’s
The contract in this case was' simple and clear. The plaintiffs handed the message to the operator at Ogdensburgh, and requested him to send it to Rouseville. They told him distinctly the purpose the message was intended to accomplish and the consequences that would follow a failure to transmit it. They paid him the price asked for the correct and careful transmission of the dispatch the entire distance, and he received the money and agreed to send the message to Rouse-ville carefully. All that was said and done related directly to the message in question, and was fully within the scope of the operator’s employment as the representative of the companies making up the route. The defendant, by the confessed negligence or incompetence of its operator, failed to perform the contract, and the result followed which the plaintiffs had foretold. They said that Francis B. Baldwin would accept Thompson’s offer of $3,800, unless the answer to this dispatch informed him at Rochester that the property was worth more. Defendant, therefore, knew that if the dispatch was not delivered, Francis B. Baldwin would get no answer; that if he got no answer he would sell to Thompson for $3,800, and if. he sold to Thompson for $3,800, and the property was worth more, the plaintiffs would lose the difference.
This brings the case fully within the second branch of- the rule of damages laid down in Hadley v. Baxendale (9 Exch., 341), viz.: That the party breaking the contract is liable for such damages as, although not at all or not merely the natural or usual result of the breach, were such as the parties had an opportunity to know, and should have expected would be the probable loss entailed by it under the circumstances of the particular case. The rule in Hadley v. Baxendale was adopted by the Court of Appeals in Griffin v. Colver (16 N.
This rule of damages has been adopted by the courts in telegraph eases. In Landsberger v. Magnetic Tel. Co., (32 Barb., 530), it was held, that plaintiff could not recover his damages, because “on receiving the dispatch for transmission, the defenda/nt had no i/nformation, whatever, i/n relation to it, or the purposes to be accomplished by it, except what could be deri/vedfrom the dispatch itselfP . While in Bryant v. Am. Tel. Co. (1 Daly, 575), it was held, that the damages were recoverable, because, “from the tenor of the despatch, and statements, made by the writer to the operator,” the object of the message was made apparent. This whole subject is elaborately discussed at page 413, of the fourth edition of Sedgwick, on the measure of damages, and the same conclusion adopted. Strong reasons of public policy, and common sense, alike make it necessary, that this should be the' rule. Contracts are now frequently made by telegraph ; and telegrams often relate to business transactions, of such a character, that great losses would ensue from a failure to transmit, or an error in transmission. The nature of the business is such, that the sender of a message can only deal with the operator, who receives it for transmission, while it is impracticable to explain in the message itself, the result that would follow a failure to deliver it. It is, therefore, both just and necessary, that the sender of a message should be required to disclose to the operator receiving it, the object of the message, and the consequences which will
The special damages, sustained by the plaintiffs in this case, were sufficiently averred in the complaint, to enable' them to give evidence to show that such damages were in contemplation at the time the contract was made. It was not necessary, that the complaint should contain a statement of this evidence. The rule of pleading special damages laid down in Squier v. Gould (14 Wend., 159), so far as it applies to actions for breach of contract, only requires that the particular injury sustained, should be set out in the complaint. The defendant, thus has notice of the claim made against him, and is not taken by surprise.
It does not help the defendant that the plaintiff, Francis B. Baldwin, waited a reasonable time at Rochester for an answer toi his dispatch before making the sale to Thompson. It was expressly understood with the operator who received the dispatch for transmission, that Francis B. Baldwin should accept Thompson’s offer, unless the answer to that dispatch informed him that the property was worth more. It was, therefore, his duty to give the telegraph company ample time to deliver the message and receive the answer. But there was no obligation upon Baldwin to send a second dispatch, for the proof shows that the only telegraph line at Rouseville belonged to defendant; and, to require a second message, would be to compel the plaintiff to make a second contract with defendant in order to hold him liable on the first. And if a second message had been sent, and a like error committed, the same reasoning would require him to send a third dispatch; beside, the plaintiffs did not know that there was any breach of their contract. No case can
But the fact, that the plaintiffs contributed to their own loss, must be affirmatively shown by the defendant. The onus rests upon it. (Costigan v. M. & H. R. R. Co., 2 Denio, 609.) No such defense was made in this case. It had been set up in the original answer, but stricken out on demurrer, and the defendant had omitted to plead anew, although opportunity was given. Hence, it was out of the case when tried, and no evidence was produced on the trial, from which the jury could find that such was the case.
It was objected on the trial, that the plaintiffs should not be permitted to prove Thompson’s offer, which was by telegraph, without producing the original dispatch. But it was wholly immaterial whether such an offer was -made or not. The proof showed conclusively, that plaintiffs told the operator, when they handed him their dispatch, 'that they
The judgment should be affirmed with costs.
Reported 40 IT. Y., 433.