48 Misc. 2d 362 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1965
The plaintiff has moved for an order vacating the defendant’s demand for a bill of particulars. The defendant has cross-moved for an order to preclude.
This motion arises during the pendency of a motor vehicle personal injury action for injuries which the plaintiff allegedly sustained on June 25, 1964. A summons and complaint were served on June 24, 1965. On July 9, 1965, the defendant made a demand for a bill of particulars. The defendant has moved to preclude the plaintiff on the grounds that the bill of particulars purporting to be in response to defendant’s demand was deficient in the following particulars:
a. The bill was signed by the plaintiff’s attorney and not by the plaintiff;
b. The bill of particulars, in response to a demand to specify the acts of negligence claimed, refers to a paragraph in the complaint;
c. In response to a demand for those injuries claimed to be permanent, the bill of particulars states that all injuries are permanent except those of a superficial nature;
d. In response to a demand for the number of house calls made to the plaintiff by his physician and the number of visits made by the plaintiff to his physician’s office, the plaintiff stated that this was an improper demand ;
e. In response to a demand for bills for property damage the plaintiff responded that he did not know;
f. The name of plaintiff’s employer was not set forth as demanded by the defendant.
As a result of these alleged deficiencies, the defendant by letter dated -September 16, 1965, returned the bill of particulars served upon his attorneys stating that he was treating the bill of particulars as a nullity and brought this motion to preclude.
The court will consider each of these alleged deficiencies in the bill respectively:
b. & c. As to both b. & c., the plaintiff concedes that the bill of particulars was deficient and has prepared and attempted to serve a supplemental bill remedying these deficiencies;
d. Rule 116 of the Rules of Civil Practice specifies the particulars that may be required of a plaintiff by a defendant in a personal injury action. Clearly, subdivisions a, b, c, d, e and f have nothing to do with visits to a physician at his office or by a physician to the plaintiff’s home.
A literal reading of g. and h., which are concerned respectively with confinement to bed and house (g), and to length of time incapacitated from employment (h), also does not bear on the question of physician’s visits. ¡Subdivision (i) is concerned with physician’s services, loss of earnings, hospital expenses and nurses’ services. This subdivision could conceivably have some connection with a physician’s visits since the frequency of the visits may be an aid in determining- the value of the physician’s services. Finally, subdivision (j) provides that nothing contained in the foregoing subdivisions shall be deemed to limit the court in granting other, further or different particulars.
CPLR 3043 is drawn almost verbatim from rule 116 of the Rules of Civil Practice. It contains nine subdivisions. Prior to the enactment of the CPLR there was conflicting authority regarding physician’s visits (Desimone v. Robertson, 19 Misc 2d 80, 81 [Supreme Ct., Onondaga County, 1959] [not a proper demand]; Sakolish v. Lilga, 25 Misc 2d 205, 206 [Supreme Ct., Erie County, 1960] [the number of visits to and by a physician properly obtainable in a demand for a bill of particulars]). The enactment of the CPLR with its mandated liberal construe
e. Plaintiff must furnish the defendant with information regarding the damage to the vehicle, but is not entitled to a copy of the repair bill;
f. Plaintiff must furnish the name of his employer to defendant. (CPLR 3043, subd. [a], par. [9].)
The plaintiff’s motion to vacate the defendant’s demand for a bill of particulars is denied and the plaintiff is directed to furnish the information as enumerated in this decision within 10 days after service of the order. The defendant’s motion to preclude is denied unless the plaintiff shall fail to furnish the information set forth herein within the 10-day period specified, in which case it will be granted.