182 Iowa 789 | Iowa | 1918
The defendant sued out a temporary writ of injunction against the plaintiff herein in another action, entitled Jacobs v. John Baldwin and R. A. Archer. Subsequently, the writ of injunction was dissolved upon motion. Later, the plaintiff (the defendant herein) dismissed the same without prejudice. New of the facts involved are iii dispute. Jacobs was the owner of a farm of- 200 acres, which 'lie leased to Archer for one year, from March 1, 1915, to March 1, 1916. The farm and the dwelling house thereon were occupied by Archer and his family up to the middle of January, 1916. A renewal of the lease.does not appear to have been in contemplation bétween the parties, and Archer leased a farm in another county for the. year 1916. Preparatory to his contemplated removal, he held a public sale in December. At this sale, he sold considerable rough feed in the form of shock corn, with the option to the purchaser to either remove the same or to feed it upon the place. He also had upon the place considerable other rough feed,
In defense to this action, as to both counts thereof, the defendant herein pleads largely the same facts as were pleaded by him in his own petition in the first suit.
In submitting the case to the jury, the trial court withdrew from the consideration of the jury all items claimed in Count 1 of the petition, except the claim for attorneys’ fees for obtaining a dissolution of the temporary writ. On the second count, he submitted to the jury the question of whether the conduct of the defendant herein amounted to a wrongful eviction of Archer from the premises. The jury evidently found in the affirmative on this question. So finding, the jury was authorized by the instructions of the court to allow the reasonable rental value of the premises for the unexpired portion of the term.
“A failure to pay the rent as agreed upon, or to comply with any of the stipulations of this lease by the said party of the second part, shall authorize the said party of the first part to consider the lease forfeited, and he may*793 take possession of the premises with 30 days’ notice, and he may bring an action of forcible entry and detainer, as allowed by law, to recover possession.”
It also contained a provision that the lessee shall commit no act upon the premises which would invalidate any policy of insurance thereon, “under penalty of forfeiture of this lease and the payment of all damages.”
It may be conceded that the arrangement» between Archer and Baldwin bordered close to an assignment, or subletting. And yet there is surely a field within which a tenant may freely contract with third parties for the sale and utilization of the products of the farm. It is not unusual that an occupant of land deems it advantageous to sell his matured crop while standing in the field. Such an arrangement necessitates an entry by the purchaser for the purpose of utilizing the crop. It has been held that such an arrangement is not a violation of a proviso against subletting. Kirkpatrick v. Fonner, 82 Neb. 82 (116 N. W. 779). Taking the testimony of Archer and Baldwin as true, as to what the arrangement between them was, we think it quite clear that it worked no violatión of the terms of
VI. It is also urged by the appellant that plaintiff was not entitled to recover attorney fees for services in the main action, but only for services rendered in obtaining the dissolution of the temporary writ. The trial court so instructed. It is urged, however, that there was no evidence of the value of attorney fees for that particular service, and that such evidence of value as was given covered the services 'for the whole case. We think this contention is not sustained by the record. The witness Newbold did
If there was any insurance upon the buildings, the proof of the fact was overlooked in the trial. Nor does there appear to be any provision of the lease that required Archer, as a matter of duty, to occupy the dwelling thereon ; although it may well be inferred therefrom that it was naturally intended that he would occupy it. ' From any point of view, these acts could only amount to breaches of the lease on the part of Archer which subjected him to a forfeiture at the option of Jacobs. As already indicated, the option was not exercised. The foregoing comprises the principal points argued. We have given the record careful consideration, and find nothing therein that would warrant a reversal of the judgment.
The judgment below is, therefore, — Affirmed.