60 N.H. 422 | N.H. | 1880
It was decided in Baldwin v. Phoenix Ins. Co., ante 164, that the conveyance of his land by the plaintiff to his daughter, and by her to her mother, was a change in the title of the property such as avoided a policy containing a provision against alienation. By reason of the change of title the plaintiff cannot recover the insurance upon the house and carriage-house.
It is suggested that the plaintiff had an insurable interest in this property at the time of the loss as occupant and tenant by the curtesy, because the daughter immediately conveyed the premises to the wife of the plaintiff. But even if the plaintiff had an insurable interest at the time of the fire, the conveyance to the daughter, and from the daughter to the wife, was a change of title that defeats the plaintiff's right of recovery upon this policy, which contains a stipulation that any change of title shall render the policy void. The question is not whether there still remained an insurable interest in the plaintiff, but whether the plaintiff can recover under this policy. By the express terms of his contract, the plaintiff agreed that he should have no right of action for property conveyed without notice to the defendants; and the law does not annul or alter his contract. Atherton v. Ins. Co.,
As to the barn, there appears to have been no change of title. It stood upon land of the plaintiff's wife when the policy was issued and when the loss occurred, and no claim is made by the defendants that the title was not originally correctly described. We *424
understand that all objections to the description of the title to the barn are waived. This presents the question, whether the alienation by the insured of one of several parcels of real estate separately valued in the same policy, containing a provision against alienation, avoids the policy as to the parcels not alienated. Upon this point the authorities are not agreed. May Ins., ss. 277, 278; Clark v. Ins. Co., 6 Cush. 342; Kimball v. Ins. Co., 8 Gray 33; Lee v. Ins. Co., 3 Gray 583, 594; Friesmuth v. Ins. Co., 10 Cush. 587; Gould v. Ins. Co.,
Without considering the question whether the contract of insurance in this case is to be regarded as entire and indivisible because a gross sum is insured for a single and entire consideration (Plath v. Ins. Co.,
Judgment for the defendant.
STANLEY, J., did not sit: BLODGETT, J., dissented on the last point: the others concurred.