The clause of the will sub judice reads:
"Second. I givе to my son Aaron Grover Baldwin, M.D., the sum of five thousand dollars, provided I have at the time of my decease the sum of ten thousand dollars or more in cash after paying all my debts, if the sum is less than ten thousand dollars, then in that event the cash shall be divided by giving my said son Aaron Grover Baldwin one-third, and my son Orton Roswell Baldwin two-thirds of said money remaining."
The testatrix died possessed of a parcel of realty, occupied as her residence, of the approximate value of $9,000, four bank accounts aggregating $8,013.46, рrepaid shares of stock in two building and loan associations of the value of $3,696.44, ordinary shares of stock in a building and loan association of an estimated value of $2,426.37, eleven shares of stoсk of Public Service Corporation of the value of $1,255, United States liberty bonds of the value of $300, and wearing apparel, household furniture and silverware of an appraised value of $900. She devisеd her real estate (together with the wearing apparel, furniture and silverware above mentioned) to her son Orton, the defendant herein. She named her son Orton as executor of her will. Bequests of $400 were made to two cemetery associations. No residuary clause is contained in the will. Cоmplainant and defendant are the next of kin of testatrix. It was conceded in argument by counsel for the respective parties that no debts were owing by the testatrix at the time of her death. The only debts chargeable against her estate were funeral expenses incurred by the executor for her burial. Complainant claims that the terms "cash" and "money," as used hereinabove, are to be regarded as comprehending the bank accounts, building and loan association shares, bonds and shares of stock in Public Service Corporation. The defendant claims that such terms must be given ordinary meaning and therefore restricted to actual cash, or, in lieu thereof, to the moneys in banks. It cannot be presumed that the testatrix intended the use of such terms in such a restricted sense. If she so intended the *93
result would be that she died intestate as to her shares of stock in the building and loan assoсiations, United States liberty bonds, and Public Service Corporation stock. It is manifest from the proofs herein that upon the personal property of the testatrix being reduced to cash by the executor (there being no debts of the testatrix payable therefrom), the executor would have uрwards of $15,000 for disposal. It is a well-established rule of law that a will ought not to be so construed as to рroduce intestacy, and that the natural and reasonable presumption is, that when a will is exeсuted the testatrix designs to dispose of her entire estate, and does not intend to die intestate as to any part of her property. Leigh v.Savidge,