42 Barb. 549 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1864
It is scarcely necessary to reiterate, at any length, what this court, at general term in this district, took occasion emphatically to assert, (Lowber v. The Mayor, &c. 5 Abb. 487,) that it belongs to the inherent essential powers of this court to exercise so efficient a control over every proceeding in an action as to effectually protect every person actually interested in the result, from injustice and fraud, and that it will not allow itself to be made the instrument of wrong, no less on account of its detestation of every thing conducive to wrong than on account of that regard which it should entertain for its own character and dignity. This power, as was then declared, should indeed be regulated by a sound discretion and exercised with the utmost caution. Buies, orders and decisions, deliberately made, should not be lightly disturbed. As a general rule, none but parties to an action and attorneys on the record will be allowed to meddle with its management, or will be recognized as having any standing in court in relation to it. But this rule must yield when extraordinary circumstances of neglect, collusion, or even of mistaken opinions, honestly entertained, on the part of agents, have produced gross and palpable wrong. Courts of justice will, in such cases, be as zealous and vigilant in rectifying wrongs so produced, as in rectifying the acts of a trustee, by which the interests of a trust may be injuriously affected. In the case of Parker and others v. The City of
I agree with the counsel of the comptroller, that the provision of the "act of 1863,
II. Having disposed of this preliminary question, there can be little difficulty in relation to the merits. The legislature and the courts have been, both alike, audaciously and preposterously, made the instruments of flagrant injustice. It has been repeatedly decided by this court that the plaintiffs had no right to damages against the city, because the city had made no contract; but, on the contrary, through the positive action of the proper authority, emphatically refused to make any such contract. Notwithstanding this, by an act passed in 1860, entitled “An act to facilitate the acquisition of land for a junction gate-house, &c. and to provide for
Under this view of the case, it is unnecessary to consider
'The judgment must be vacated, and all proceedings under it, together with the order of reference, must be vacated, $10 costs of motion.
Olerhe, Justice.]
Laws of 1863, p. 409.
Laws of 1859, p. 1127.