30 Me. 121 | Me. | 1849
— The deed under which the plaintiff claims purports to convey the right, which the assignee of Jonathan Vining had in the premises ; but the notice given by the as
The conveyances to Stevens and Jewett, and to Lord, are treated by the plaintiff as bona fide on the part of the grantees respectively. It is not denied, that the quitclaim deed of Jonathan Vining, of his interest in the premises, to James Child and others, on the 26th of March, 1831, in consideration, that he was discharged from imprisonment on executions in favor of the grantees, was also a bona fide and valid transaction. After this release Jonathan Vining had no further interest in the land. The legal title was in Lord, and if Vining had any equitable interest, it passed to his creditors by that deed.
2. But it is insisted, that after the conveyance made by Lord to Daniel Vining, on August 23, 1833, Jonathan Vining had a resulting trust in the premises, by virtue of having paid to Lord the full consideration.
It is a well settled principle, if one purchases an estate with his own money, and the deed be taken in the name of another, a trust results by presumption of law, to the one who pays the money. “ This is a well known and universally admitted rule in equity.” Boyd v. McLean, 1 Johns. Ch. 586; Buck
But these cases all show manifestly, a determination in Courts, not to enlarge by construction or analogy, the doctrine, in allowing the introduction of parol evidence, to contradict the language of the deed, and the answer of the alleged trustee, in order to raise a resulting trust; but to confine the party presenting such a claim rigidly within the limits which practice has established. And no case has been found where a resulting trust has been held to arise upon payments made in common, by the one asserting his claim and the grantee in the deed, wherein the grantor acknowledges the receipt of the consideration from him alone, when the amount belonging to one and the other is uncertain, and unknown even to those
The presumption of a resulting trust may be rebutted by parol evidence. If the plaintiff sets up an equity founded on parol proof, it may be rebutted, put down, or discharged by parol proof. There may be parol waiver of even a written contract. 2 Story’s Eq. § 770, a; Paine v. Dyer, 17 Vesey, 356; Botsford v. Burr, before cited. Facts and circumstances which satisfactorily contradict the presumption, are received as effectual. 2 Story’s Eq. 1202. And the common case of rebutting the presumption of a trust is, when the purchase may be fairly deemed to be made for another, from motives of love and natural affection. The purchase by a parent in the name of the son, would ordinarily be considered as intended for the benefit of the latter, so as to rebut the presumption of a resulting trust for the parent. But this last presumption may be rebutted by evidence, manifesting a clear intention that the son shall take as a trustee. Ibid. Where money is advanced as a loan to the party taking the deed, upon the credit of the borrower alone, it cannot be pretended that any presumption of a rebutting trust would arise. Boyd v. McLean, before referred to.
The answer of the defendant, Daniel Vining, is full, that in August, 1831, he made a contract with Lord, for the purchase of the land, made a payment, took a bond for a deed, and made other payments from time to time, with his own means,
All legal presumption, that it was the expectation of Jonathan Vining, that he had a trust interest in the farm, is effectually repelled by the uniform declarations made by him in the most solemn manner, that he had no interest therein. His acts in negotiating a loan to be secured by a mortgage upon the land, as the agent of Daniel, speak emphatically the same language. It was not until a difficulty arose in the family which had not been anticipated, that his views were changed, and he sought to accomplish a purpose, which could not be done, without his stamping his former declarations with the character of perjury. The most charitable construction, which can be put upon his conduct in reference to the land is, that he did not suppose he had any equitable interest in it, at the time of the conveyance to his son, and notwithstanding some of the avails of his labor contributed with the earnings of the son to accomplish the purchase from Lord, still it was done under such circumstances, that the presumption, by operation of law, if any could be regarded as having arisen, is effectually rebutted. Bill dismissed with costs.