12 Ga. App. 553 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1913
Many differ as to the weight to be given dying declarations. Some think that a man is as apt to tell a falsehood when death is approaching as at 'any other time. Others hold that a statement made in the article of death by one conscious of his condition is entitled to very great weight and consideration, upon the theory that one without hope of life would be unwilling to cause harm to his fellow man by telling a falsehood in reference to the manner in which the mortal wound was inflicted. Those who hold this opinion think that consciousness of impending death takes away motive for revenge and gives to a solemn declaration, made under such circumstances, the very sanctity of truth itself. Oftentimes the jury may be composed of men holding different opinions in reference to the weight to be given to this character of evidence. Some of the jurors might think that the dying statement ought to be given the same weight as testimony delivered on oath. Others might be of the opinion that since the accused has had no opportunity for cross-examination, the statement ought to be received with caution and scanned with care. The trial judge had no right, by an expression of his own «opinion, to settle this conflict among the jury. He should not tell them what weight to give this species of evidence. He should simply charge them when and under what circumstances an alleged dying statement should be considered by the jury, and leave them free to determine what weight the statement is entitled to, if they consider it at all. The statute compels us to order a new trial whenever the judge expresses or intimates an opinion as to what has or has not been proved, or as to the weight the jury should attach to any particular kind of evidence. We have no discretion in the matter, and we
Judgment reversed.