29 Pa. Commw. 453 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1977
Opinion by
Appellant is a professional employe of the School District of the City of Allentown (School District). He was arrested and subsequently entered a plea of nolo contendere to the federal offense' of operating an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 Ú.S.C.
Appellant first contends that a plea of nolo contendere is not competent evidence in a civil proceeding and that a finding of immorality based solely upon such a plea cannot stand. We disagree. While a nolo contendere plea has no effect or operation in a civil action to vindicate individual rights, Teslovich v. Firemen’s Fund Insurance Co., 110 Pa. Superior Ct. 245, 168 A. 354 (1933) (plaintiff recovered on fire insurance policy after pleading nolo contendere to arson), this case is controlled by State Dental Council & Examining Board v. Friedman, 27 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 546, 367 A.2d 363 (1976). In that case, where a dentist’s license was suspended for the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude, a plea of nolo contendere was admitted as evidence of an admission of the crime. Judge Menceb stated:
[W]e are not here dealing with a civil suit to enforce individual rights. Rather, we are dealing with an administrative agency of the sovereign which seeks to carry out its duty to protect the citizens of the Commonwealth by regulating the conduct of its licensees. It is the interests of many rather than the interests of few which impels the Board.
Id. at 550, 367 A.2d at 366.
Appellant’s second contention is that the evidence does not support a finding that his actions offended the moral standards of the community. A careful review of the record, however, convinces us that the decision below is supported by substantial evidence. Indicative is the testimony of Allentown’s Superintendent of Education. On the evidence below a reasonable man acting reasonably could have reached the decision made by the school board. Landi v. West Chester Area School District, 23 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 586, 353 A.2d 895 (1976).
Thirdly, appellant contends that he cannot be dismissed for immorality because the term is unconstitutionally vague, violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. We cannot agree. Immorality under Section 1122 has been judicially defined as “a course of conduct as offends the morals of the community and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals a teacher is supposed to foster and to. elevate.” Horosko v. Mount Pleasant Township School District, 335 Pa. 369, 372, 6 A.2d 866, 868 (1939). By so defining the term our courts have foreclosed the potential for abuse that would exist if a school board could dismiss an employe for conduct which incurred its disapproval, thus imposing its conception of morality on a community.
Further definition of the term where criminal sanctions are not employed, however, is neither necessary
Having rejected appellant’s arguments, we affirm his dismissal on the grounds of immorality. Consequently, we consider the School District’s cross appeal as moot and dismiss it.
Order
Now, April 4, 1977, the order of the Secretary of Education, dated June 22, 1976, number 279, is affirmed.
Order
Now, April 4, 1977, the petition of the School District of the City of Allentown is dismissed for mootness.