64 Ala. 551 | Ala. | 1879
There is no controversy in the present case about the facts. Under the will of Benjamin B. Jones, who died in 1830, his widow, Martha Maria Jones, became entitled in fee to an undivided third part of his real estate, when, in 1834, she intermarried with Augustine B. "Washington. There was issue of this second marriage born alive, and thus Washington became the owner of a life-estate in the lands of his wife, as tenant by curtesy. Mrs. Washington died in 1847, and Mr. Washington in 1865. The present action for the recovery of the possession of the land was brought in 1871 by the next of kin of Mrs. Washington. They claim and make title as her heirs at law; and their title, as such, appears to be undisputed, unless the proceedings and deed after noticed cut off the descent. Argument is made before us touching the manner and legality of the partition. The partition was made in 1835, and Mr. and Mrs. Washington, and those claiming under them, have enjoyed and occupied the part allotted to her, ever since, without disturbance or adversary claim, until the institution of the present suit in 1871. We will regard and treat the partition as regularly and rightfully made, without inquiring into the regularity of the proceedings by which it was effected.— White v. Hutchings, 40 Ala. 253; McArthur v. Carrie, 32 Ala. 75; Wyatt v. Scott, 33 Ala. 313; Philippi v. Philippi, 61 Ala. 41; Goodwyn v. Baldwin, 59 Ala. 127.
What|effect did the deed of Saunders, commissioner, to Mr. and Mrs. Washington, have on the title to the land in controversy ? It will be observed that, under the will of Mr. Jones, the title to the lands was vested in Mrs. Washington, and by her second marriage and issue born of it, a life-estate in Mr. Washington was carved out of it.' — Bibb v. McKinley, 9 Por. 636; Cheek v. Waldrom, 25 Ala. 152; Bishop v. Blair, 36 Ala. 80. This left the reversion in fee in Mrs. Washington ; and if her title has not been legally devested, that title vested in her heirs at law, at the termination of Mr. Washington’s estate by his death. The deed of Saunders, commissioner, was made during the coverture, and conveyed the lands to “Augustine B. Washington and his wife Martha M. Washington, . . to have and to hold the above conveyed lands, with the tenements appurtenant thereunto belonging, or in any wise appertaining, to the only use and behoof of Augustine B. Washington and Martha M., his wife aforesaid.” The recital part of the deed is, “ Whereas, at the term of the Circuit Court of Lawrence county. Alabama, in a cause therein pending in chancery, wherein John L. Townes, executor of Benjamin B. Jones, is complainant, and the heirs of said Benjamin B. Jones defendant, an interlocutory decree was made,
At the time this partition took place in 1835, we had no separate Chancery Court. The Circuit Courts exercised chancery jurisdiction. Courts of equity, under our system,
... . The partition made in the present case, the order for title, and the title actually made by Saunders, commissioner, to Washington and wife, were all done under the order and direction of the Chancery Court. The deed in evidence, and the agreed state of facts, prove this. The chancellor is specially charged with the duty of protecting persons not sui juris. He had the pleadings and proofs in this cause before him, and we must presume he decreed aright. He approved the allotment made to Washington and wife, - and appointed a commissioner to make them title pursuant to the allotment. There are many conceivable states of fact, on which this order would have been eminently proper. The third interest in the lands was the exclusive property of Mrs. Jones, or, rather, would become her exclusive property, when she married Mr. Washington. In this third interest her children had no right or title, vested, contingent, or otherwise. As to this property, her right of disposition was absolute. She may have made a valid antenuptial agreement, by which she and Mr. Washington were to become seized by entireties. She had the right to make such agreement, and there is nothing in the record to show she did not make it. It may have rested on valuable and ample consideration. The chancellor, before ordering the deed made to Mr. and Mrs. Washington, may have subjected her to privy examination, and thus learned it was her wish to have the deed so made. It was his duty to pursue this course, unless there was some good reason for dispensing with it; and it is our duty to presume he did his duty. We are not informed that Mrs. Washington was dissatisfied with the form in which the title was taken ; and the husband of one of her two heirs at law by her first husband, purchased the land from Mr. Washington soon after the partition ; thus proving that he at least believed Washington’s
The deed being made to Washington and wife during their coverture, they took by entireties; and when Mrs. Washington died, leaving her husband surviving her, the entire title remained, in him as survivor. Such was the rule of the common law, by which this case is governed. Mrs. Washington, then, had no estate to transmit, and the present plaintiffs took nothing by inheritance. There is no error in the record, and the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.