67 Cal. App. 2d 780 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1945
This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff who was the sole beneficiary under a policy of life insurance issued by defendant on the life of Garrett O. Wigell. The action was defended upon the ground that the policy lapsed prior to the death, of the insured and this is the sole issue in the case. The exact
The policy was issued on March 31, 1920. It was originally written on an annual premium basis, said premiums to be paid in every year during the lifetime of the insured. It provided that annual dividends should be paid or applied as directed by the insured. The insured paid premiums on an annual basis until March, 1924. Premium payments, however, were changed to a quarterly basis commencing with the premium due on the 31st of March of that year. Thereafter all quarterly premiums were paid to and including the one due on March 31, 1933. Pursuant to written request of the insured, the Automatic Premium Loan Provision of the policy was put into effect January 22, 1931. That provision (10b) reads as follows: “Upon request of the Insured, and Assigns if any, made prior -to default in premium payment and remaining unrevoked, the premiums thereafter falling due and not paid will be charged as a premium loan with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum, provided the then cash surrender value be sufficient to cover such loan. Any premium loan may be repaid at any time.” Various premium loans were thereafter made by the defendant. The insured also obtained certain policy loans (cash loans) from the company.
On June 30, 1933, the cash surrender value of the policy was insufficient to pay the quarterly premium then due, after deducting the amount of the policy loans and premium loans together with the interest thereon as computed by the company. It thereupon applied a portion of the cash surrender value to payment of the said obligations and the balance to the purchase of term extension insurance, which term expired February 20, 1934. The insured was notified of this action by letter dated September 21, 1933. He was advised to notify the general agent or the home office if he desired to apply for reinstatement of the policy. He made no such request. He died on June 1, 1937.
Cash dividends were apportioned to the policy annually on its anniversary date, March 31st. The dividend provision of the policy and the options given the insured with respect to dividends is as follows: ‘ ‘ This Policy while in force except under the extended term insurance provision shall par
Plaintiff contends that the company should have applied these balances (the excess of the annual dividend over the quarterly premium) in reduction of the indebtedness of the insured to the company, thus reducing the interest accumulation on said indebtedness. The effect of this proposition may be stated another way, viz., that the company should have allowed the insured interest at 6 per cent on these balances from March 31st until it was necessary to apply the same on the next quarterly premium which fell due on June 30th. If this had been done the amount on hand would have been sufficient to pay the premium in question. The company, however, contends that it had no authority to apply said balances on the insured’s indebtedness to it and that it was not obligated to pay interest on said balances but merely to hold them for the benefit of the insured until such time as they were, applied on the next quarterly premium. In our opinion the position of the company must be sustained.
The law seems to be clear to the effect that dividends must be paid or applied by an insurance company in accord
Incidentally, the defendant in the Eckstein case is the same company that is defendant in this case and the policy gave the insured the identical options with respect to dividends as those quoted herein.
In the Gardner case, supra, the insured in his application had directed that dividends should be left “with the company at interest unless otherwise directed.” No other direction was given by him. On May 11, 1930, a semiannual premium became due. It was not paid and the policy lapsed. On that same date a dividend of $25.30 was declared on the policy. This sum was retained by the company, at interest, in accordance with the election of the insured. The insured died on August 24, 1930. If this dividend had been applied by the defendant to the purchase of term insurance; the policy would have been extended beyond the date of the death of the insured, and would have been in force on said date. The plaintiff contended that the company should have done this. In holding against plaintiff’s contention, the court said: “If in violation of the contract with the insured, with respect to this dividend, the defendant had so applied it, it would nevertheless have been liable to the insured for the amount of the dividend, with interest, when called upon by him for its payment. There is no principle of law or equity upon which the defendant can be held liable to the plaintiff because after the death of the insured within the time for which the policy would have been extended, if the insured had directed that the dividend be applied to the purchase of extended insurance, it appeared that such application would have been to the interest of the plaintiff or the beneficiary in the policy.”
The court in the Eckstein case relied upon the Williams case, supra. There the defendant issued a policy of life insurance on the life of plaintiff’s husband for $10,000, dated July 26, 1927. A premium of $449.10 was payable annually on June 10 of each year and was paid to and including June 10, 1930. The premium due June 10, 1931, was not paid when
If the dividend had been applied in reduction of the amount advanced against the policy and the balance then applied to the purchase of extended term insurance, the policy would have remained in effect beyond the date of the death of the insured, on October 15,1931. On this point Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the court, said: “It is the contention of the petitioner that, on the lapse of the policy, the dividend of $74.80 should have been applied in reduction of the amount advanced against the surrender value of the policy, thus raising what remained of that value from $11.12 to $85.92, a sum sufficient to extend the insurance until after the death. But the policy gave no warrant for an application of the dividend to the reduction of advances against the policy. As this Court pointed out in Board of Assessors v. New York L. Ins. Co., 216 U.S. 517, 522, 54 L.ed. 597, 601, 30 S.Ct. 385, such advances being against the surrender value do not create a ‘personal liability’ or ‘debt’ of the Insured, but are merely a deduction from the sum that the company ‘ultimately must pay.’ While the advance is called a ‘loan’ and interest is computed in settling the account, ‘the item never could be sued for’ and in substance ‘is a payment, not a loan.’ The company had no right, without agreement with the Insured, to apply a dividend, payable in cash, to the reduction of the advance against the policy(Italics added.)
Under these principles, where the provisions of the policy are clear as they are in this case, the company had no authority or right to apply the surplus dividend toward the partial satisfaction of the loans against the policy in view of the specific direction of the insured as to the use that should be made of said dividends. For us to hold otherwise would be to make a new contract for the parties.
There was no obligation on the part of the company to pay
The dividends by direction of the insured were to be used by the company for a particular purpose. It carried out this direction promptly in March and June of the years 1925-1930, inclusive, and in our opinion was not obligated either expressly or impliedly to pay interest on these dividend balances.
It must now be determined whether or not, excluding interest credit on the aforesaid dividend balances, the quarterly premium of $63.40 due on June 30,1933, could have been paid by an automatic premium loan within the terms' of the contract. If the cash surrender value of the policy exceeded the amount of the premium loans and the cash loans by a sum sufficient to pay that premium the company should have so applied it and the premium would have been thereby paid. It is plaintiff’s contention that the amount was sufficient. It was stipulated that the policy had a cash surrender value of $1,800.90 on June 30, 1933. The parties disagree as to the total of the sums chargeable against the cash surrender value, and, therefore, as to the amount of the excess of the cash surrender value above these total charges that was applicable to payment of the quarterly premium that fell due on that date. In the computation that follows we have taken as the basis for our calculations plaintiff’s figures and not those of defendant. Plaintiff’s exhibits, however, do not disclose di
The views herein expressed make it unnecessary to consider other questions discussed by counsel.
The judgment is reversed.
Desmond, P. J., and Shinn, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied March 30, 1945. Carter, J., voted for a hearing. Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., disqualified. Nourse, J. pro tern., and Peters, J. pro tern., participated.