It seems that speed cameras are a particularly unpopular law enforcement tool, having provoked some Marylanders to vandalism. See Erin Cox, Speed Cameras v. Vandals, Balt. Sun, 28 June 2012, at Al. Angry drivers are reported to have set fire to, hurled rocks at, and slingshot marbles at the cameras. In perhaps the most extreme example of retribution, we are informed that a man approached a car-mounted speed camera along the Baltimore-Washington Parkway, brandishing a shotgun and a hammer. He smashed two of the car’s windows with the hammer before fleeing the scene (the occupant of the car was unhurt).
Not deterred, the local governments of Montgomery County, the Mayor and Council of Rockville, the City of Gaithersburg, and Chevy Chase Village (referred to collectively as Respondents) established speed cameras — defined technically as “speed monitoring systems.” These systems recorded, among many others, Petitioners
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. The intermediate appellate court affirmed, agreeing with the Circuit Court that § 21-809 does not contain an express or implied private cause of action to support the maintenance of Petitioners’ tort claims. The Court of Special Appeals declared moot the declaratory and injunctive relief claims because Respondents amended their contract with ACS to state specifically their understanding that the governments operate the speed monitoring systems. Petitioners secured a writ of certiorari from this Court to review the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
We shall affirm the judgment of the intermediate appellate court, although not for all the same reasons it offered. As an initial matter, Petitioners, although arguing so in their brief, failed to question in their petition for writ of certiorari whether § 21-809(j) applies to all Respondents, not merely the local government of Montgomery County. Therefore, we shall not address it.
Petitioners’ momentum in this case ends there, however. Section 21-809 does not provide an express or implied private cause of action in tort, for the following reasons. First, § 21-809 is a general welfare statute that does not benefit a particular class of persons, let alone Petitioners. Second, the statute provides a remedy in the District Court for challenging speed monitoring system citations. These factors, combined with the lack of supporting legislative history endorsing an implied private right of action, establish that § 21-809 does not create a private cause of action. With regard to Petitioners’ injunctive and declaratory relief claims, Petitioners concede that they lack the necessary taxpayer standing to pursue those claims, in the event we did not find a private cause
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On 25 January 2006, the Maryland General Assembly, overriding then-Governor Ehrlich’s veto, enacted House Bill 443 (2005), which was codified as Transportation Article, § 21-809. 2006 Md. Laws 15. The statute took effect on 24 February 2006. Section 21-809 authorized the use of speed monitoring systems on certain highways in school zones and residential districts in Montgomery County. Transp. Art., § 21-809(b)(i). The statute defines a “speed monitoring system” as “a device with one or more motor vehicle sensors producing recorded images of motor vehicles traveling at speeds at least ten miles per hour above the posted speed limit.” Transp. Art., § 21-809(a)(5). When a speed monitoring system detects an offending motor vehicle, it is supposed to create a “recorded image”
The “local police department”
If a citation recipient elects a trial in the District Court, the local government must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the citation recipient violated the speed limit. Transp. Art., § 21-809(e)(3). The government must submit in evidence a certificate alleging the citation recipient violated the speed limit; a certificate of training, issued to the “speed monitoring system operator”
The gravamen of Petitioners’ complaint centered on Transportation Article § 21-809(j), which provides, “If a contractor operates a speed monitoring system on behalf of Montgomery County, the contractor’s fee may not be contingent on the number of citations issued or paid.” Transp. Art., § 21-809(j). On or about 9 February 2007, Montgomery County contracted with ACS to “provide for the implementation, use, and servicing of photo speed enforcement technology and services as requested by [Montgomery] County.” The Montgomery County — ACS contract specifies that ACS will “provide, install, and support all traffic camera equipment” and “supply an automated violation services solution.” Under the section titled “Compensation,” the Montgomery County — ACS contract states that ACS shall be compensated “at a rate of $16.25 per paid citation or $18,000 per month [for the duration] of the program, whichever is greater.” Between 21 February 2007 and 28 May 2007, the municipalities entered separately into similar contracts with ACS. These contracts incorporate by reference the Montgomery County-ACS contract. The munieipalities-ACS contracts provide similar compensation formulae also: that ACS will be compensated at a rate of $16.25 per paid citation or $2,999 per month for the duration of the program, whichever is greater (Chevy Chase Village contracted for $16.25 per paid citation or $6,000 per month of the program).
Respondents issued speed monitoring system citations to Petitioners for speeding violations that occurred during 2007 and 2008. The Chevy Chase Village Police Department issued a citation to Janet Marburger for a violation occurring on 23 February 2008 and two citations to Matthew Charles Baker for violations occurring on 9 July 2008. The Rockville City Police Department issued a citation to Johnny Ray Garza for violations occurring on 11 and 13 November 2007, to Thomas Jeffrey Wheatley for a violation occurring on 19 July 2008, to Kenneth King Sleeman for violations occurring on 17 August 2008 and 29 September 2008, and to David Alfred Schiller for a violation occurring on 4 September 2008. The Gaithersburg Police Department issued a citation to Walter McKee for a violation occurring on 19 August 2008. The Montgomery County Department of Police issued a citation to Garza for a violation occurring on 24 November 2007, to Sleeman for a violation occurring on 10 February 2008, to Aristone Luiz Pereira Jr. for violations occurring on 4 and 8 April 2008, and to Schiller for a violation occurring on 25 June 2008. Petitioners paid voluntarily the civil penalty associated with each of their citations; thus no District Court trials were conducted.
Between September 2008 and June 2009, prior to the final disposition of Petitioners’ claims in this litigation in the Circuit Court, Respondents amended their contracts with ACS. The amendments stated that ACS provides speed monitoring system equipment only, and that Respondents are solely responsible for the operation of their respective systems. Chevy Chase Village and ACS amended further their contract to change the compensation formula to a flat rate per month, i.e., compensation was not keyed to the number of successful citations issued.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On 2 May 2008, Timothy P. Leahy, on his behalf and others situated similarly, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for
Between 21 April 2008 and 21 July 2008, Rockville, Montgomery County, the Town of Chevy Chase, and Gaithersburg filed motions in opposition to class certification. Rockville, Montgomery County, and Gaithersburg filed also motions to dismiss. Additionally, Gaithersburg and the Town of Chevy Chase filed motions for summary judgment. On 30 July 2008, the Circuit Court granted the Town of Chevy Chase’s motion for summary judgment. After a hearing on 26 August 2008, the Circuit Court granted the remaining defendants’ motions, dismissing with prejudice Leahy’s claims against them, and denied Leahy’s motion for class certification, without prejudice.
On 6 October 2008, Petitioners
Petitioners filed a third (and final) amended complaint against Respondents on 7 October 2009. The third amended complaint contained the same nine counts as the second amended complaint. Petitioners alleged that ACS operated the subject speed monitoring systems for Respondents and that Respondents compensated ACS on a per-citation basis. As such, Petitioners urged that the contracts between ACS and Respondents were in contravention of § 21 — 809(j) and therefore were ultra Adres, rendering all of the previously issued speed monitoring system citations invalid. Petitioners asked that Respondents refund the collected civil penalties stemming from the speed monitoring system violations, with interest. Respondents opposed Petitioners third amended complaint by filing, between 27 October 2009 and 2 April 2010, motions to strike and motions to dismiss or for summary judgment.
The Circuit Court opined further, in the alternative, that even if ACS were deemed to be the operator of the subject speed monitoring systems within the meaning of the statute, § 21-809 did not create a private cause of action for Petitioners to sue for an alleged violation of subsection (f) of the statute. Even if a private cause of action was authorized, the court concluded, Petitioners waived the right to sue separately on this ground after they paid voluntarily the civil penalties. On these additional bases, the Circuit Court granted Respondents’ motion for summary judgment as to Petitioners’ seven claims sounding in tort.
Petitioners filed timely an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which, in a reported opinion, affirmed the Circuit Court. Baker v. Montgomery Cnty., 201 Md.App. 642,
Petitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, which we granted on 16 March 2012. Baker v. Montgomery Cnty.,
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Maryland Rule 2-501, the grant of a motion for summary judgment is appropriate only “if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Md. Rule 2 — 501(f). The parties here agree that there are no genuine disputes of material fact generated on the record before the Circuit Court. Thus, as was said in Breslin v. Powell, “This case presents a question of statutory interpretation, and therefore, we review the trial court’s disposition through summary judgment under a non-deferential standard of review.” 421 Md. 266, 277,
“discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied.... ” We approach the statutory interpretation process by looking first at the plain language of a statute, giving the words their natural and ordinary meaning. If the language is clear and unambiguous on its face, our inquiry ends ordinarily. If, however, the language is ambiguous, we move on to examine the “legislative history, case law, statutory purpose, as well as the structure of the statute” to aid us in ascertaining the intent of the Legislature. When focusing on the relevant part of a statutory scheme, we attempt to harmonize the part with the whole, consideringthe “purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body.” When interpreting an ambiguous statute, we must reject any construction that would be illogical or nonsensical.
Davis v. State,
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Petitioners’ Ability To Maintain the Present Action Against Respondents After Paying Speed Monitoring System Penalties Without Protest
We conclude that, by paying the speed monitoring system penalties for issued citations, Petitioners did not waive their right to pursue subsequently a claim against Respondents for violating Transportation Article § 21-809(j), if such a claim is otherwise actionable. Respondents urge to the contrary, arguing that principles of res judicata prevent Petitioners from doing so and that, instead of paying simply the civil penalties, Petitioners should have elected to stand trial in the District Court and raised the claimed violation of § 21 — 809(j) as a counterclaim or defense in those proceedings.
Maryland’s permissive counterclaim rule of procedure, Maryland Rule § 2-331(a),
Respondents retort that a defendant may not bring a separate and subsequent action based on a prior counterclaim that could have been raised if “[t]he relationship between the counterclaim and the plaintiffs claim is such that successful prosecution of the second action would nullify the initial judgment or would impair rights established in the initial action.” Rowland,
B. Does Transportation Article, § 21-809 Contain an Express
Although Petitioners did not waive, by paying the civil penalties without contest, their ability to maintain the present complaint, they are not entitled to bring their tort-based counts as a private cause of action under Transportation Article § 21-809. A private cause of action in favor of a particular plaintiff or class of plaintiffs does not exist simply because a claim is framed that a statute was violated and a plaintiff or class of plaintiffs was harmed by it. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
The U.S. Supreme Court fashioned the prevailing test for determining whether a statute contains implicitly a private cause of action:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff “one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted[.]” Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? [15 ]
Cort v. Ash,
Thus, our analysis begins with the language of the statute at hand and whether it confers a beneficial right upon a particular class of persons. Univs. Research Assn.,
Transportation Article § 21-809(j) is framed as a prohibitive command and does not confer rights on a class of persons
The legislative history fails to reveal an intent to benefit a particular class of persons. Instead, the bill file for House Bill 443 (2005) is replete with generalized statements from citizens, advocacy groups, and municipal politicians urging the General Assembly to authorize speed monitoring systems in order to slow down drivers; to protect pedestrians, bicyclists, and transit riders; and to free-up police officers to attend to other matters. Bill file for H.B. 433, 2005 Leg., 420th Sess. (Md. 2005). Even were we to assume that Petitioners are correct that the General Assembly intended the statute to benefit recipients of citations, issued according to speed monitoring systems established pursuant to the statutory scheme, whether it intended also that § 21-809 create an implied private cause of action is a separate issue. Transamerica,
Next, we look to the purpose of the statute. Section 21-809 creates rules and procedures for Montgomery County (and perhaps its municipalities) to operate a speed monitoring system. It does not provide expressly for a private cause of action, as we noted supra in footnote 14. The purpose of the statute also furnishes a remedy for challenging a speed monitoring system citation. Subsections (d), (e) and (f) of § 21-809 lay out a procedure for a
“ ‘[A]n elemental canon of statutory construction [is] where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.’ ” Sugarloaf,
Finally, the legislative history of § 21-809 does not reveal a legislative intent to create an implied private cause of action. Of relevance to this factor, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that
such legislative silence is often encountered in implied-right-of-action cases; it is to be expected that “the legislative history of a statute that does not expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically be equally silent or ambiguous on the question.” Therefore, “the failure of Congress expressly to consider a private remedy is not inevitably inconsistent with an intent on its part to make such a remedy available.” But unless this congressional intent can be inferred from the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not exist.
Nw. Airlines,
C. Petitioners’ Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Claims
As noted supra in footnote 18, Petitioners’ declaratory and injunctive relief claims regarding § 21-809 may stand on different footing (theoretically) than their tort claims. Respondents amended their contracts with ACS to make plain (ostensibly) that they, and not ACS, operate their speed monitoring systems. The Court of Special Appeals, in light of these amendments, concluded that Petitioners’ declaratory and injunctive relief claims were moot: “We discern, however, no basis to look beyond the plain, unambiguous language of the contracts, which specifically provides that [Respondents] and not ACS are operators of the speed cameras in Montgomery County. Based on the amendments, we conclude that there is no longer an existing controversy between the parties____” Baker,
In any event, Petitioners do not have standing to pursue declaratory and injunctive relief on this record. Petitioners maintained steadfastly, albeit quixotically, in the Court of Special Appeals that they were not asserting standing as taxpayers, relying instead solely on their claimed private cause of action theory. Baker,
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED; PETITIONERS TO PAY COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS.
Notes
. The petitioners are Matthew Charles Baker, Johnny Ray Garza, Aristone Luiz Pereira Jr., Janet Marburger, Walter McKee, David Alfred Schiller, Kenneth King Sleeman, and Thomas Jeffrey Wheatley.
. This case involves speed camera citations issued in 2007 and 2008. Therefore, all references to Transportation Article, § 21-809 shall be to the version of the law in existence in 2007 and 2008.
. For the same reasons, Petitioners did not preserve for our review the Circuit Court’s conclusion that the Local Government Tort Claims Act notice provisions, Md.Code (1973, 2006 Repl.Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 5-304(b), apply to their claims.
. " ‘Recorded image' means an image recorded by a speed monitoring system: (i) On: 1. A photograph; 2. A microphotograph; 3. An electronic image; 4. Videotape; or 5. Any other medium....” Md.Code (1977, 2009 Repl.Vol.), Transp. Art., § 21-809(a)(4).
. " 'Local police department’ means: (i) The Montgomery County Department of Police; and (ii) The police department of any municipal corporation in Montgomery County.” Transp. Art., § 21-809(a)(2).
. " 'Owner' means the registered owner of a motor vehicle or a lessee of a motor vehicle under a lease of 6 months or more. 'Owner' does not include: 1. A motor vehicle rental or leasing company; or 2. A holder of a special registration plate issued under Title 13, Subtitle 9, Part III of this article.” Transp. Art., § 21-809(a)(3).
. " ‘Speed monitoring system operator’ means an individual who operates a speed monitoring system.” Transp. Art., § 21-809(a)(6).
. Timothy Leahy and Michael Brody named Petitioners as additional plaintiffs in their second amended complaint; however, Leahy and Brody are not parties to this appeal. They dismissed voluntarily their claims on 19 June 2009 and 28 September 2009. Upon those dismissals, Baker became the lead plaintiff.
. Prior to filing their third amended complaint, Petitioners filed a new motion for class certification on 17 July 2009, which Respondents opposed. In an order, dated 23 March 2010, the Circuit Court granted Petitioners’ motion for class certification as to their injunctive and declaratory relief claims only, except that it denied class certification as to all counts pleaded against Chevy Chase Village. Later, on 1 April 2010, Petitioners filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asking the Circuit Court to rule that ACS is a “speed monitoring system operator,” within the meaning of Transportation Article § 21-809(a). Respondents opposed Petitioners’ motion.
. Previously, the Attorney General of Maryland, Office of Counsel to the General Assembly, concluded also, in a letter of advice to a member of the House of Delegates, from Montgomery County, that Montgomery County "operates” its speed monitoring system. Letter from Dan Friedman, Esquire, Counsel to the General Assembly, Attorney General of Maryland, to the Hon. Brian J. Feldman, Maryland House of Delegates (5 March 2008).
. The Circuit Court concluded also that several Petitioners failed to comply with the Maryland Local Government Torts Claim Act by failing to give proper notice of their claims. Petitioners did not preserve properly this issue for review by this Court.
. Petitioners, in their petition for writ of certiorari, framed the questions presented as follows:
A. Did the [Court of Special Appeals] err in ruling that any challenge by recipients of speed camera citations, no matter how complex, must be raised in Maryland District Court during the defense of a trial on a speed camera citation?
B. Did the [Court of Special Appeals] err in ruling that the recipient of a speed camera citation waives all challenges to a speed camera citation by paying the fine?
C. Is the [Court of Special Appeal’s] ruling that the amendment, during this litigation and after the Plaintiffs citations were processed, of all four government contracts with the prime contractor, to recite that the contractor "does not operate’’ the speed monitoring, render the term, “operator” not applicable to the contractor, erroneous?
. Maryland Rule 2-331(a) provides:
Counterclaim against opposing party. A party may assert as a counterclaim any claim that party has against any opposing party, whether or not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. A counterclaim may or may not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the pleading of the opposing party.
. This query may be answered succinctly. The relevant statutory scheme does not extend expressly a right of private action to Petitioners or the purported class they represent.
. When a court determines whether a federal statute contains a private cause of action, there is a fourth factor not implicated in the present case: “[I]s the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law.” Cort v. Ash,
. This conclusion forecloses also Petitioners’ alternative argument that their causes of action are based on common law tort duties. A statute creates an enforceable duty " ‘when the plaintiff is a member of the class of persons the statute was designed to protect and the injury was of the type the statute was designed to prevent.’ Furthermore, the statute must 'set forth mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole.’ ” Gourdine v. Crews,
In Gourdirte, the plaintiff argued that the following language in the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act created an enforceable duty in the defendant drug manufacturer: " 'The following acts and the causing thereof are prohibited: (a) The introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.’ ”
The assertedly relevant portion of the present statute, like the statutes in Gourdine and Muthukumarana, protects the public in general by prohibiting certain contingency fees, without enumerating a particular class of persons. Therefore, no actionable tort duty inures from § 21— 809 to the benefit of Petitioners.
. Indeed, Respondents inform us in their brief that a speed monitoring system citation recipient contested her citation in the District Court, sitting in Montgomery County, by arguing that Montgomery County’s contract with ACS violated Transportation Article § 21-809(j). She did not prevail in the District Court and appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The Circuit Court concluded ultimately that Montgomery County was the operator of its speed monitoring system and affirmed. State v. St. John, Criminal No. 112596 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery Cnty. 18 May 2009). Appellate review was not sought.
. Petitioners argue that, even if they cannot sue on an implied private cause of action in tort, the District Court would not have had jurisdiction over their claims for equitable and declaratory relief. See Md.Code (1973, 2006 Repl.VoL, 2011 Cum.Supp.), Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 4-402(a), (c). Such claims, however, are separate from a private cause of action and ordinarily may be pursued independently in the Circuit Court. For the reasons to be explained in terms of the posture of the record in this case, Petitioners’ injunctive and declaratory claims for relief are moot.
. As a result, we do not decide whether Petitioners had standing, on a basis other than an implied private cause of action under Transportation Article § 21-809, to seek a declaration that Respondents’ contracts with ACS violate § 21-809Q) or to an injunction against Respondents' enforcement of their speed monitoring systems.