165 Iowa 346 | Iowa | 1914
As a result of an accident, plaintiff received a simple fracture of both bones of his left leg, about three inches above the ankle joint. Defendant is a physician and surgeon, and was called upon to reduce and treat the fracture, and arrived at the hospital where plaintiff was taken immediately after receiving his injuries shortly after plaintiff arrived there.
Plaintiff was in the employ of the Clinton Street Railway Company, and defendant was the surgeon of the company.
That the said defendant carelessly and negligently failed to reduce said fracture, and to bring said fractured bones together, and failed to so bind and fasten said bones that, if brought together so as to heal, that they would remain in that position, and carelessly and negligently failed to watch and examine said bones to see if they were in a proper position, and-were properly uniting and healing, and carelessly and negligently removed the splints from said limb before the bone had proper time to knit and heal together, and handled said limb in such a careless and negligent manner at this time, which was about three days after the bone had been set, disuniting said limb, if it had already knit, and carelessly and negligently failed to give the plaintiff proper instructions for the use and care of said fractured leg, and carelessly and negligently discharged this plaintiff from his care when said bones had in fact never been properly set and brought together, and while said bones should still have been caused to unite and knit together by proper treatment, and so discharged said plaintiff, without giving him any warning or notice of the true condition of his leg, which condition was well known to said defendant at the time he discharged said plaintiff, or could have been known to said defendant had he used proper care and skill to ascertain the condition of said limb before he discharged said plaintiff.
The answer was in effect a general denial and a plea of the statute of limitations.
Such rulings are largely discretionary with the trial court, and we do not, as a rule, interfere in the absence of a showing of abuse of that discretion, or that an injustice has been done by the order. Nothing of the kind is shown by this record.
Plaintiff did not show sufficient diligence in obtaining the
II. The testimony for plaintiff regarding the treatment of the fracture was in substance as follows:
On cross-examination the plaintiff said:
I remained at the hospital for two weeks. At the time I left there the plaster cast was on my leg. The doctor came to see me out at home from time to time. Yes, sir; as I recollect it, I walked around on crutches to the kitchen and closet in about three weeks. I followed the doctor’s directions in all things. I think I went on crutches until about the 1st of June. I followed the doctor’s instructions all the time. After that I began to use a cane and crutch. As near as I can recollect, I went back to work for the car company about the 5th day of May. I was on crutches or a cane; at first I used two crutches. I followed the doctor’s instructions all the time. My leg was sore all the time I was at the hospital and at home. After that I used one crutch and a cane on the job work. I guess I commenced doing that along the middle of June or the 1st of July somewhere. Q. I thought you said a while ago that you ceased using crutches about the 1st of June? A. I think about the 1st of June I disposed of them, that is, I didn’t use both of them; then I used a crutch and a cane. Well, I think I continued to use one crutch and a cane in the neighborhood of two weeks after that. I quit that somewhere between the 4th and 10th of July. I think on the 4th I went on a crutch and a cane. Yes, sir; after the 10th of July, or about that time, I walked with a cane, and
Skiagraphs were taken of the leg not long before the commencement of the suit, which were introduced in evidence, and these showed that, while one of the bones had united, yet it was not straight, and that there was nothing but a fibrous union of the other bone; and this was also' testified to by expert witnesses introduced for plaintiff. It was the tibia, the larger of the two bones, which had not properly united. Some of these experts testified that the condition of the patient’s blood had much to do with his recovery, and, in order to show this condition, plaintiff’s counsel made the following record:
I am not asking you for an opinion. At the time you were injured, and just prior to your injury, when you were working about the shop and other places, whether you some time injured your hand or finger? (Objected to, as incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant.)
By Mr. Wade: It is a matter of common knowledge that sore fingers, or infected fingers, do not come from the condition of the blood, but from infections received outside.
By Mr. Walliker: It is to show that his blood was in good condition at that time.
By the Court: If at this particular time I will allow you to state— (Overruled. Defendant excepted.)
By Mr. Walliker: Did you just prior to ‘fracture’ sued on at any time fracture or injure your hands?
By Mr. Wade: In view of the previous objection and ruling, I want to object to this. It is the statement of counsel that the purpose of this question is to show by an injury to the hand the condition of the blood. Physicians might know the condition of the blood by an examination, while it is common knowledge infection may come from germs outside, and not from the blood.
By the Court: I think it is a matter of common knowledge that the condition of the blood may have something to do with it.
By Mr. Wade: We object for the further reason that the particular condition of the blood is not in evidence to show anything about this operation; it has no bearing upon the case, and it has not been shown there was any infection.
By the Court: The objection is sustained. There has no infection been shown. Plaintiff excepted.
Again counsel put to various experts the questions we shall now quote, and the record shows the objections and rulings thereon:
Q. You do not know anything about the original treatment of this ease, do you? A. I think Dr. Langan told me about it. I know nothing about it of my own knowledge. I cannot tell at this time whether this fracture was a simple or a compound one. It is my opinion that the original reduction of the fracture was a success. Q. From the examination then made of Baker’s leg, and from its appearance, did you find the leg in that condition broken legs are generally found in after the usual and customary treatment extending over a period of six weeks? (Objected to by the defense, as
Q. From your examination of said leg, did you find that the usual results had been obtained where reasonable care and skill were exercised by the surgeon in charge? (Same objection. Same ruling. Plaintiff excepted.)
Q. Assuming that Mr. Baker’s health was good, and his blood in good condition, in case such a fracture as that of Baker’s leg is properly treated, is it customary to find such a fracture of the leg in the condition you found it when you last saw it? (Objected to, as he is not competent to testify to that, and it is incompetent and immaterial. Objection sustained. Plaintiff excepted.)
Q. Now, acting on the supposition that Baker did as advised by the surgeon in charge, you may state whether or not, in your opinion, said fractured leg was properly or improperly treated, or properly or improperly cared for and looked after by the surgeon in charge. (Objected to, as there is no foundation in the evidence for the witness to answer such a question. Objection sustained. Plaintiff excepted.)
Q. Is it the usual practice, in a case like that of Baker ’s, for the surgeon in charge to pronounce the patient cured, or cease his visits and all care and attention, while a broken limb is in the condition you found Baker’s leg to be in when you last saw it? (Objected to by the defense, as incompetent, immaterial, and asking about things not shown in the testimony, nor is proper testimony. Objection sustained. Plaintiff excepted.)
Q. How soon after reducing a fracture, in case the same becomes disunited, should the surgeon in charge discover it, and, if discovered, what is usually and customarily done by the surgeon in charge, in ease he finds the fracture disunited? (Objected to, as immaterial, incompetent, and irrelevant, and there is no foundation for such question; it is asking for different conditions than shown in the testimony and the difference between them. Objection sustained. Plaintiff excepted.)
Q. What effect would the taking hold of the fractured leg have on the fracture, if the foot is raised two or three days after the fracture* was reduced, or the bony parts reunited, provided the same was done before placing the broken limb in a cast? (Objected to, as incompetent and immaterial, and
Q. You may state whether or not'raising the leg under the circumstances detailed in the preceding question would be proper treatment of the patient and the fracture, whether simple or compound? (Same objection. Same ruling. Plaintiff excepted.)
Q. Now, what is usually done when a physician is called to reduce a fracture? (Objected to, unless he states what kind of fracture is stated. It is incompetent and immaterial. Objection sustained. Plaintiff excepted.)
Q. What kind of a fracture did Mr. Baker have? (Objected to as already answered that the witness did not know, and that the question is incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial. Objection sustained. Plaintiff excepted.)
Q. Well, if a simple fracture is found, what is usually done? (Objected to, as incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant.)
By Mr. Walliker: This fracture was one or the other, and I think the witness should be allowed to answer. (Objected to, as assuming that it was one or the other. There is no evidence of one or the other; there are other fractures besides those mentioned; it is an outside issue; there is nothing here to indicate what kind of a fracture this was. I am speaking of the bone itself, whether it was in one or two pieces; all those conditions should be found out, and what they were. You cannot even find out whether both bones were broken or only one, and the treatment would be different in either case. Objection sustained. Plaintiff excepted.) •
Q. Assuming, now, that there was more than one bone broken, would the treatment be the same as if there was a simple fracture? (Objected to, as he has already testified that he could not tell, and for reasons heretofore stated. Objection sustained. Plaintiff excepted.)
Q. How long ago was it that you made this examination of Mr. Baker’s leg? A. About a month ago. Q. Was this a compound or simple fracture? (Objected to, because he has already stated that he could not tell. Sustained. Plaintiff excepted.)
Q. You may state if, from the examination you made of Baker’s leg and its appearance, you found the leg in that condition broken legs are usually found in after the usual
Q. You may state from your examination if you found that the usual results had been obtained where reasonable care and skill are exercised by the surgeon in charge. (Objected to, as incompetent, and there has been no foundation laid for the question. Objection sustained. Plaintiff excepted.)
Q. Assuming, now, that Baker’s health was good and his blood in good condition, and if such a fracture as that of Baker’s leg was properly treated, is it customary to find such a fracture or leg in the condition you found it when you last saw it? (Objected to, for reasons last given. Objection sustained. Plaintiff excepted.)
Q. Would the leg have been found in the condition you found it if the same had been cared for and treated in the usual, customary, and in a skillful manner by the surgeon in charge? (Same objection. Same ruling. Same exception.)
Q. What effect does its present condition have on Mr. Baker when he uses it in walking about, and does its use in walking give him pain? If so, why? A. It interferes with his locomotion in getting about; but whether it causes pain I am unable to state. Q. In case a surgeon treating a broken limb like that of Baker’s finds that the fracture has not been reduced, and that the ends of the fracture are not united, or have not united, what is the usual and customary course pursued by the surgeon in charge, or that should be pursued in such cases? Why? (Same objection. Objection sustained. Plaintiff excepted.)
Q. Is it the usual practice, in a case like that of Baker’s, for the surgeon in charge to pronounce the patient cured, or to cease his visits and all care and attention, while a broken limb is in the condition you found Baker’s leg to be in when you last saw it? (Same objection, and there is no evidence on which to base such a question. Sustained. Plaintiff excepted.)
By the Court: The question in that form is objectionable.
Q. How soon after reducing a fracture, in ease the, same become disunited, should the surgeon in charge discover it.
Q. What effect would the taking hold of the foot of the fractured leg have on the fracture, if the foot is raised two' or three days after the fracture was reduced, or the broken parts reunited, provided the same was done before placing the broken limb in a cast? (Same objection. Same ruling. Plaintiff excepted.)
Q. You may state whether or not, in your opinion, raising the leg under the circumstances detailed in the preceding question would be proper treatment of the patient and the fracture. (Same objection. Same ruling. Plaintiff excepted.)
Q. You may state whether or not, after the reduction of broken or fractured limb, it is customary to use an X-ray for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the attempted reduction was a success. (Objected to by the defense, as immaterial, incompetent, and it depends entirely on the nature of the injury received. Objection sustained. Plaintiff excepted.)
And to another witness who testified that the fracture was a simple one, the following questions were put, and the record thereon follows:
Q. What is usually done in the treatment of a fracture of that kind, Doctor? (Objected to by the defense, as there is no proper foundation laid for the question. It is incompetent and immaterial. Objection sustained. Plaintiff excepted.)
Q. From the examination you made at that time, was the attempt to reduce the fracture originally a success? ( Objected to, as immaterial, incompetent, and asking for the opinion of a witness without stating the facts. Objection sustained. Plaintiff excepted.)
Q. Now, from your examination then made of Mr. Baker’s leg, and from its appearance, did you find the leg in the
Q. From the examination of said leg, did you find that the usual results had been obtained by the surgeon in charge ? (Same objection. Same ruling. Plaintiff excepted.)
Q. In case a surgeon treating a broken limb like Mr. Baker had finds that the fracture has not been reduced, and that the ends of the fracture are not united, or have not united, what is the usual and customary course pursued by the surgeon in charge, or that should be pursued in such cases? Why? (Same objection as generally made before. Objection sustained. Plaintiff excepted.)
This was in addition to questions propounded to all of the other experts, which we have already quoted. From this record, it is apparent, we think, that a verdict for the defendant should not have been directed. The defendant introduced no testimony, and that offered and received for and on behalf of plaintiff should be given the strongest interpretation in his favor.
Most, if not all, of the questions put to these witnesses which we have copied into the record should have been answered. See Peck v. Hutchinson, 88 Iowa, 320, Rogers v. Kee, 137 Iowa, 260.
Now, while what are usually called blood troubles result from infection, it is not true that every infection of a wound results in harm; to some extent this depends upon the condition and consistency of the blood, its normal or subnormal admixture of proper elements, and whether or not it has the usual powers of resistance within itself. In view of the other testimony in the case, we are inclined to think the witness should have been permitted to answer the questions propounded, leaving the final conclusion to the jury.
For the reasons stated, the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial ordered.
Beversed and Bemcmded.