Baker v. General Motors Corp.

463 Baker v General 1984] REMAND) (AFTER v CORPORATION BAKER GENERAL MOTORS (AFTER v GENERAL MOTORS COLLIER CORPORATION REMAND) (AFTER v CORPORATION SEIDELL GENERAL MOTORS REMAND) 3). (Calendar 9, Argued June 1983 No. Docket Nos. 59861-59863. 17, 28, January Rehear- December Released 1985. Decided 1984. ing denied 422 Mich 1201. Collier, Seidell, Baker, Jr., and other A. Kenneth R. Robert J. G. employees who were members of United Auto Workers Corporation were laid off because of work General Motors shortages resulting plants from strikes at General Motors other plaintiffs members of than those at which the worked other Michigan Employment Security Commission the UAW. The compensa- approved unemployment claims hearing ground plain- A reversed on the that the tion. referee unemploy- dispute that tiffs had "financed” the labor dues, Employ- by paying emergency ment strike fund and the Board, Security Appeal predecessor Re- ment of the Board of view, affirmed the The Genesee Circuit referee’s decision. Court, Yeotis, J., Baker, Wayne Thomas C. reversed in Court, Canham, J., Collier, Circuit James N. reversed Court, Kallman, J., Ingham Circuit James T. affirmed in Burns, P.J., Appeals, Kelly Seidell. The Court of T. M. and M. J. Walsh, JJ., judgments and D. F. reversed of the Genesee Wayne judgment Circuit Courts and affirmed the 24150). (Docket 24083, 24084, Ingham Circuit Court Nos. Supreme plaintiffs’ unemploy- The Court determined that the [1-9] [5-7, [2, ^[8] What constitutes General 48A Am Jur 3, 48 Am Jur compensation ployment compensation pute. 63 ALR3d 88. ployment 76 Am Jur 7] 76 Am Jur Am principles pertaining Jur 2d, 2d, References 2d, Labor and Labor Relations 9. or strike within 2d, Labor and Labor Relations 2003. 2d, Unemployment Compensation participation Labor and Unemployment Compensation for Points in Headnotes acts. ALR3d 314. benefits Labor Relations or direct interest disqualification provisions statutory disqualification because of strike or labor dis- § §§ §§ in, 263-267. 78, 80, § or 84. 85. for unem- unem- of, Mich progress,” in active to a labor ment was "due extraordinary paid by strike fund dues, payment regular and that the emergency dues and not plain- automatically disqualify the extraordinary did not compensation. Court receiving tiffs require disqualification must have that dues which would held dispute that the meaningful the labor connection to Review unemployment. to the Board of The case was remanded sufficiently connected with the dues were whether to determine (1980). "financing” Mich 639 dispute it. 409 amount to the meaningful remand, connection that a the board found On unemployment plaintiffs benefits. the existed and denied Appeals remand, judgments of are of the Court After the by equally Court. affirmed an divided Cavanagh, Brickley Ryan, joined by and Justices Justice receiving disqualified unem- were from stated that the dispute ployment the labor their dues financed benefits because meaningful unemployment and there was a that caused their dispute. Employ- financing the The the and connection between Supremacy of Security violate the Clause Act does not ment plain- unconstitutionally burden the or the federal constitution rights of tiffs’ First Amendment association. Michigan Employment Security Act was enacted in 1. The provided Security for response Act which to the federal Social unemployment pro- funding insurance federal for states with grams. Eligibility unemployment benefits under the MESA for persons involuntarily unemployed. Unem- is limited to who are dispute ployment involvement in a labor is as a result of direct voluntary unemployment. eligible unem- A worker is not for unemployment ployment where results from a benefits dispute in an establishment within the United States that integrated place employment functionally with the worker’s i.e., strikers, worker."financed,” paid funds to and where the financing meaningful and there is a connection between the and the meaningful financing dispute 2. A connection between a labor engages unemployment and in financ- exists where the worker ing disputes significant proxi- at amounts and times mately dispute related to the which caused the worker’s unem- exists, ployment. meaningful In that a order find dispute it must be determined that the labor that caused the worker, by worker’s in fact the was financed scope dispute question foreseeably that the was within the financed, type disputes the of labor and that the resulting unemployment worker’s was also foreseeable. Baker v General financing according purpose the must be determined to the appeared financing they at the time of the and not facts as hindsight, may the be shown from statements of worker or support funds to officials of a union that collected strikers financing is a member. Where is accom- of which worker through organization, significance plished an of the amount by reviewing organiza- must be determined the amount of the program Where non- tion’s as well as individual contributions. organization ordinary by the to raise funds to dues are used dispute, non-ordinary the amount of the dues must finance compared regular with the amount of dues and the effect of be organization non-ordinary on the resources support played by allocated to and the actual role non-ordinary be examined to determine dues must whether non-ordinary significant the amount of the dues is or de mini- Finally, mis. which caused the upon unemployment must one worker’s have followed another light practical realities of the time needed to collect, transfer, and disburse the funds raised the non- ordinary dues. a direct 3. There need not be transfer of funds a worker Payments to a striker connection to exist. may a for the made a worker to union benefit of strikers provide meaningful disqualify connection that would the receiving unemployment worker from benefits. Workers and objectives strikers need not share common interests and for a Whether, meaningful degree, connection to exist. and to what dispute worker finances a labor has no direct correlation with any may dispute. benefit that be derived from a successful Finally, funding the voluntariness of the is not relevant of meaningful meaningful whether a connection exists. A connec- might tion exist where a contribution of a worker is forced and might voluntarily given. not exist where Voluntariness is rele- disqualification, vant to however. cases, plaintiffs eligible unemploy- 4. In these the are not they unemployment by ment benefits because caused their dispute meaningfully a labor connected with their unemployment. emergency (non-ordinary) The dues were estab- paid purpose supporting disputes. lished and for the It support was foreseeable that the dues would be used to local against operation strikes General Motors. Because of Gen- comprised production eral Motors is of a series of interrelated producing automobile, only component units one of an it was against plant also foreseeable that a strike one could result in layoffs plants dispute, at not involved in the such as those Mich emergency of the worked. The amount where aggregate, plaintiffs’ in the in terms of the when considered strikers, and in terms of the effect on the was contributions significant and demonstrates a connection with the plaintiffs’ unemployment. Finally, dispute that caused immediately preceded payment unemploy- support of the time-lag between the collection and disbursement of ment. The light funds was minimal when considered "by employed. The funds were collected hand” at the method fund, level, to the union’s strike insurance local were forwarded only to the after the distributed strikers initial and were waiting period required had been satisfied. preempted by laws are 5. laws that conflict with federal State Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution unless conflicting Congress to tolerate the state law. The intended provides employees Labor Relations Act have the National assist, assist, including financially organizations right engage in other concerted activities for collective bar- and to aid, protection gaining, or and that violation of the mutual Michigan practice. Employment rights is an unfair labor disqualification Security provides for of a worker from Act unemployment eligibility benefits if the worker to receive which causes his finances the labor disqualification required by Employment Secu- Because the right rity to assist the Act affects the exercise of the worker’s NLRA, guaranteed by the a conflict in fact exists. The union as Congress showing intended to has the burden of defendant indication in the NLRA that tolerate the conflict. There is no conflict, legislative Congress to tolerate the but the intended Act, history Security shortly after the of the Social enacted NLRA, many the states are contains indications of such intent: complete unemployment compensa- to have almost control over Act, during Security programs; over the Social tion debate prohibit support provision to there was considerable for a states; payment unemployment by the benefits to strikers compensation programs implementation unemployment was rather, given required; complied states that would be benefits; guide financial tax and draft bills to be used to instituting compensation programs states provided disqualification financing specifically for for a following dispute. significant nearly years It is that in the NLRA, during Security and the the enactment of Social Act provided disqualification many of workers which states have unemployment, disputes who finance labor that cause conflict, leading Congress to the con- addressed the has never Baker v General Thus, it elusion that intended to tolerate the conflict. NLRA, preempted Employment Security by Act is nor not Supremacy does it of violate the Clause the United States Constitution. Employment applied Security 6. Act on its face and as plaintiffs’ rights this case not violate the Amendment does First of freedom association. of Levin, Williams, joined by Chief Justice Justice stated that considering payments strike fund from the insurance to be composed percentage regular of the same of dues emer- gency larger always dues as fund will result some of the emergency remaining dues in the fund the fund is unless depleted, a result that is neither fair nor intended Rather, Legislature. by adopting determining a formula for financing dispute by pay- whether the amount of of significant minimis, ments from a strike fund is or de paid being views funds the last into the fund as the first funds out, paid voting emergency of and contribution dues would proximately equivalent relate more to distribution an of disqualification, subject triggering amount in strike benefits emergency payments subject disqualifi- the duration of dues cation would be inflated overall size the strike fund, perpetually By the strike fund would not be tainted. contrast, adoption of would the first formula view funds paid being paid into the fund as the first out would result in a paid determination that strike funds would be out the least and, proximately moneys concerned if the fund strike were large enough, emergency might pass any without emergency being Thus, paid out. the case should be determine, using remanded to the Board of Review to the last- formula, any emergency in-first-out beyond whether funds a de actually so,

minimis amount financed strike If benefits. plaintiffs disqualified receiving benefits; not, would be from if paid. benefits be should Boyle agreed Justice stated that she Chief with Justice Williams that the provides last-in-first-out formula the fairest evaluating means of properly whether the dis- qualified receiving unemployment benefits for the labor light caused their adoption "temporal Court’s proximity” aas factor to be determining considered in whether there awas connection between payments dispute. and the Affirmed. Mich by Voluntary — Compensation — Unemployment Disqualification

1. Unemployment. unemployed person a result of direct involvement is as A who compensa- unemployment ineligible dispute receive to a is (MCL voluntary unemployment is the tion benefits because 17.531). 421.29;MSA Voluntary — Compensation — Unemployment Disqualification 2. Disputes. Financing Unemployment — Labor dispute unemployment a in an results from labor A whose worker functionally integrated with States establishment in the United eligible place employment is not receive the of worker’s compensation the worker unemployment beneñts where by dispute by paying the strikers funds to be used the financed financing meaningful the a connection between and there is (MCL 421.29[8][a][ii]; unemployment MSA 17.531[8][a][ii]). Financing Unemployment Compensation — — Disqualification 3. Disputes. Labor financing by a exists between A dispute functionally in an establishment of a labor worker place integrated employment his of with the worker’s significantly resulting unemployment where the worker proximately dispute at time related to the a finances financing dispute that the would cause and it foreseeable was 17.531, (MCL 421.29, 421,29[8][a][ii]; MSA his 17.531[8][a][ii]). Financing — Unemployment Compensation — Disqualification 4. Disputes Purpose. — Labor purpose of a labor Determination a worker’s they light appeared must made in the of the facts as at be by financing; by time of the statements the worker or officials of of union the worker is a member and which (MCL support may collected funds in of strikers be considered 17.531, 421.29, 421.29[8][a][ü]; 17.531[8][a][ii]). MSA Unemployment Financing Compensation — — Disqualification 5. Disputes — Labor Amount. significance used to a labor amount funds finance dispute through organization be a labor must determined organization’s program reviewing the as amount entire contributions; non-ordinary well are as individual where dues organization dispute, used a labor to raise funds finance compared non-ordinary be with amount dues must non-ordinary regular the amount of dues and the effect of the Baker v General organization support on the resources of the dues allocated to played by non-ordinary and the actual role be

must examined determine whether amount of the (MCL 421.29, non-ordinary signiñcant or de minimis 17.531, 421.29[8][a][ii]; 17.531[8][a][ii]). MSA Unemployment Compensation — — Financing Disqualification 6. Disputes. Labor

A direct transfer funds from a worker striker of to a need not be meaningful ñnancing for made a connection to exist between a dispute unemployment; payments and the labor worker’s made by may provide a worker to a union for the beneñt of strikers a disqualify connection that would the worker from (MCL receiving compensation 421.29, unemployment 17.531, 421.29[8][a][ii]; 17.531[8][a][ii]). MSA Unemployment Compensation Financing — — Disqualification 7. Disputes. Labor

Emergency paid by purpose to their for dues workers union of disputes supporting disputes amounted to disqualified eligibility and the workers from to receive unem- ployment compensation it was where foreseeable that the funds against would be used to ñnance local strikes other their of employer’s production units of because the interre- production lated nature of unit each to the total of the business employer against layoffs the effect of a strike one unit could be units, employed workers, at such as one that that were (MCL dispute 421.29, 421.29[8][a][ii]; not involved in the MSA 17.531, 17.531[8][a][ii]). Unemployment Compensation — — 8. Constitutional Law Fed- Preemption — Disqualification. eral

Disqualiñcation Michigan a Employment of worker under the Security eligibility unemployment Act compensa- to receive tion where the worker a ñnances his causes preempted by provision is not of the Na- guaranteeing right tional Labor Relations Act workers the to organizations, assist labor Supremacy nor does it violate the Constitution; Congress Clause of the United States because speciñcally approved disqualiñcation of workers in the Social Security shortly Act enacted after the NLRA and has never any provisions addressed conflict such between the laws years enacted, other states in almost since the NLRA was it Congress be any can inferred that intended to tolerate conflict (US Const, VI, 2; 157, 158; 421.29[8][a][ii]; art cl 29 USC MCL MSA 17.531[8][a][ii]X Mich by Ryan, J.

Opinion Williams, C.J. Financing — Compensation — Unemployment Disqualification 9. Disputes. n Labor receiving unemployment Disqualiñcation beneñts of workers ground they that re- ñnanced the labor on the paying emergency unemployment by into a dues sulted pay subsequently used to strike fund strike insurance union by applying formula determined a to should not be beneñts emergency payments to whether the from the fund determine part signiñcant of the strike beneñts or de minimis percentage composed payments same to be that considers itself; rather, emergency regular fund dues as the dues and being paid as last funds into fund formula which views the applied voting paid out should be because the ñrst funds proxi- relate more dues would contribution equivalent mately in strike bene- of an amount distribution disqualiñcation, subject triggering emer- ñts duration subject disqualiñcation payments not be gency would fund, and the strike overall size of the strike inñated (MCL 421.29, perpetually would not be tainted fund 17.531, 17.531[8][a][iij). 421.29[8][a][ii];MSA Rossen, & A. Fillion and Jordan Altshuler John Stephen Altshuler, Berzon, Berzon Fred (by and Grillo), Hamburg- Mazey, Mazey Rothe, & Trina Mazey) er William plaintiffs. for the (by Gilbride, Fildew, Hinks, Miller & Todd Jon- (by Wayman), Smith, M. athan and Otis N. General Wheatley, Counsel, and J. R. General Motors Corp- (M. Jr., Dilworth, J. Basford and E. J. oration of counsel), Corporation. for General Motors

After Remand J. The issues in this case whether are Ryan, plaintiffs disqualified were under MCL properly 17.531(8)(a)(ii) 421.29(8)(a)(ii); MSA receiving for unemployment "financing” benefits the labor dispute which caused their (After Rem) v Baker General whether, properly disqualified if the "financing,” 421.29(8)(a)(ii); MSA for MCL 17.531(8)(a)(ii) as Suprem- is invalid violative of the Const, VI, of art Clause US cl or of the acy First right to freedom Amendment These association. issues arise the context of the following facts. 1967, 6, September On United Automobile expired. Workers with General Motors contract Prior expiration, to its UAW at had members GM However, authorized overwhelmingly a strike. GM "target” UAW did not choose as its company. Instead, against the UAW called a national strike beginning the Ford Motor Company September on 7, 2, 1967, 1967. October the UAW On called against national strike Caterpillar Tractor However, work at Company. GM with- continued out interruption during this entire time. October, 1967,

In early faced stalemated with bargaining at and Caterpillar, the UAW Ford special called a national convention UAW 8, 1967. October The stated purpose special convention, according Proceedings,”1 the "UAW was threefold:

"Purpose of Convention Special "The Convention is being held to: "1. Review the bargain- status of our 1967 collective ing effort. "2. To consider revision of program the dues Union, UAW, provide adequate International funds strike challenges to meet of the 1967 and 1968 bargaining collective effort.

"3. To consider revisions Constitution Union it International dues, as relates to payment of fund, strike membership eligibility, insur- strike 1 Proceedings” The published report “UAW was the official UAW’s special Proceedings” convention. "UAW will hereafter be simply Proceedings. referred to as the 420 463 472 Mich s Opinion by Ryan, J. emergencies related to matters other program and anee Union, UAW.”2 International facing the special one-day During convention, the UAW to allow 16 of its constitution Article amended Amended Article dues to be increased. strike fund (in part) pertinent as follows: 16 read 16. "Article 2(a) (New):

"Section "Emergency Dues during the month payable current "All dues are secretary of the local union. the financial (8th) October, eighth day of "Commencing with 31, 1967, month there- 1967, and each until October para- last defined in the during emergency as after subsection, union administrative this graph of ($3.75) per seventy-five cents three and shall be month and Union dollars Fund dues shall be Strike Insurance as follows: average working plants where For "1. those * * * ($3.00) three or earnings is dollars

straight more, time ($21.25) twenty-ñve cents twenty-one dollars and per month. working average plants where "2. For those * ** earnings less three dollars

straight time than ($11.25). ($3.00), twenty-ñve cents eleven dollars during of dues remain in effect "This schedule shall bargaining emergency as deter the current collective mined the International Executive Board there after, necessary, if until Union Strike the International twenty-five Insurance Fund has reached million sum of ($25,000,000), at which time the dues dollars 2(b) below, become effect structure established shall (Emphasis ive.”3 added.)_ Appendix, p 487a. Plaintiffs’ 651-652, 639, 4; Corp, Baker v General Motors 409 Mich fn (1980). NW2d 10(a) convention, During the 16 was same Article amended provide as follows: 1984] Baker 473 v General Opinion by Ryan, J. 16, Prior to member amendment Article each UAW paid per strike insurance dues of $1.25 month and administrative dues of There $3.75. fore, the 16 amendment to Article mem increased by 1,600%.4 strike fund dues or bers’ 800% Caterpillar The national strikes at Ford and special ended before the first strike fund collection the new October, Nevertheless, 1967.5 emergency the new strike fund dues were collected membership from the UAW in October and No vember, 1967. Since there was no at contract GM 15, 1967, until December the dues were collected "by by by hand” union stewards and not GM through system. an automatic checkoff January February, 1968,

In UAW members Michigan, foundry plants Ohio, at GM and New disputed York on went strike local over issues. In regulations, striking accordance with UAW foundry plant paid GM workers were strike bene fits from the UAW’s International Union Strike (SIF). foundry Insurance Fund Due the GM plant striking shortages developed strikes, work at non plants.

GM As a result of these work shortages, plaintiffs6 early GM off the laid 1968.

Following layoff, plaintiffs their filed unem- 10(a) (New): During emergency 2(a), "Section out in set Section dues, each from member’s union administrative each local union must monthly per capita seventy-five remit ($1.75) tax of one dollar and cents ($2.00). and the local union shall retain two dollars month, "In each each local union must remit the full amount of Union, Union Strike Insurance Fund dues to the International such placed dues to be in the International Union’s Strike Insurance Fund. per monthly capita The member’s tax and Strike Fund Insurance. Secretary-Treasurer. dues shall be forwarded to the International ($1.00) "One dollar of each reinstatement fee shall be forwarded to * * Secretary-Treasurer the International depended upon "average straight The amount of the increase hourly wages plant. time” at the UAW member’s 22, The Ford strike Caterpillar ended October 1967. The strike 25, majority ended October 1967. The Board Review found that the increase was not needed the Ford strike. 6Plaintiffs are all employees members the UAW and at GM Mich Ryan, J. Michigan with the claims compensation ployment opposed GM Security Commission. Employment GM asserted claims. these unemployment benefits receiving disqualified "financed” had they because paying which caused cited the Michi- fund dues. GM strike 29(8), Act stated Security gan Employment (in pertinent part): "(8) disqualified for benefits for be An individual shall partial or respect to which his total

any week with dispute prog- in active to a labor unemployment ress, is due start-up operations by caused or or to shutdown which he in is dispute, in the establishment such labor (other dispute than employed, last or to a labor or was a lockout) start-up or progress, in or to active shutdown dispute, any in by labor other operations such is func- within the States which establishment tionally United oper- integrated and is with such establishment unit. individual shall be by employing the No ated disqualified same 29(8) if he this subsection under directly dispute. in involved such

"(a) 29(8), this purposes For the subsection no in directly involved be deemed be individual shall that: dispute labor unless it is established "(ii) financing directly in or or participating He is dispute total which causes his or labor interested partial unemployment. regular union payment (in purposes prior amounts established inception dispute) con- of such labor shall not be dispute meaning strued as labor within * * subparagraph 421.29(8)(a)(ii); of this MSA MCL 17.531(8)(a)(ii). GM’s objections, approved plain- Over the MESC tiffs’ claims.

plants Michigan. plaintiffs paid emergency All strike fund dues October, Special authorized at the UAW 1967. Convention 1984] Baker v General Mtrs appealed hearing

GM the MESC decision to a disqualified referee who reversed the MESC and plaintiffs unemployment benefits since they had "financed” paying

caused their the emer- plaintiffs gency appealed strike dues. The fund Michigan Employment referee’s decision to the Security Appeal Board which affirmed the refer- plaintiffs disqualified ee’s decision that from benefits under the MESA "financing” provision 29(8) by payment § plaintiffs appealed strike fund dues. The then three circuit courts. Two circuit courts appeal decision, reversed the board’s while one appeal appeal, affirmed the board’s decision. On Appeals Court of held that had "financed” which caused their unemployment by paying emergency strike fund they disqualified were, therefore, dues and that under MESA Corp, 29(8)(a)(ii). Baker v General Motors (1977). App 237; Mich NW2d granting appeal, After leave to this Court de Corp, cided three v issues. Baker General Motors (1980). 639; 409 First, Mich 297 387 NW2d the plaintiffs’ unemploy Court determined that the prog ment was "due to a in active seniority ress” and was due not to the GM/UAW system. Second, the Court determined that the paid by plaintiffs amended strike fund dues the in "regular November, October and 1967, were not extraordinary dues,” union but rather were emer gency Third, that, dues. the Court determined ordinary, payment while the dues were not the of extraordinary disqual automatically did dues ify compensation. receiving unemployment the extraordinary emergency

For or disqualify plaintiffs, "financing” dues to the the through payment non-ordinary dues must 463 Mich "meaningful dis to the labor connection” have unemployment. plaintiffs’

pute which caused "meaningful connection” whether a determine To case, the case remanded this Court existed to the Board proceedings to for further of Review7 plaintiffs’ emergency dues "whether determine payments sufficiently connected with unemploy disputes local 'financing’ dis those labor to constitute ment p supra, putes.” Baker, 668. remand, of Review conducted the Board

On September hearings 15, 3, 22, 2, and and on June completion 13, of the October 1981. At the October hearing, the the record to further closed board arguments during However, on De- final evidence. reopened 8, 1981, the record the board cember (over place plaintiffs’ objection) GM to to allow spe- "Proceedings” UAW evidence Article 16 re- which amended cial convention clip- "emergency” newspaper quire pings and actions officials’ statements about UAW plurality, board, 3-2 and 1968. "meaningful holding that a con- a decision issued payment existed of the emer- nection” gency between dispute which caused the dues and the labor plaintiffs’ unemployment. Therefore, the Board of plaintiffs unemployment Review denied under MESA benefits 29(8)(a)(ii). jurisdiction, Since we had retained case judgment this returned to the Board of Review and hold that a Court. We affirm

"meaningful connection” existed between the foundry local GM strikes which caused the Additionally, we hold 17.531(8)(a)(ii) 421.29(8)(a)(ii); that MCL MSA does Supremacy not violate the federal Clause ^[7] Board Review is the successor to appeal board. 1984] Baker v General Mtrs 477 (After Rem) Opinion by Ryan, 1. disputes constitution since the of labor is touch[ing] deeply so "conduct interests rooted in * * * feeling responsibility local we could Congress deprived not infer had the states of power Diego Building act,” San Trades Garmon, 236, 244; v 79 773; Council US S Ct (1959), Congress L Ed 2d 775 and since has stated "financing” disqualifica- intention to tolerate its tion to unemployment Finally, benefits. we hold 17.531(8)(a)(ii) 421.29(8)(a)(ii); that MCL MSA does place upon plain- not tiffs’ First Amendment unconstitutional burdens

rights of association. I deciding plaintiffs, In the issues raised it necessary is to understand the role of MESA 29(8) in relation to the entire and in act relation labor-management relations. we be- gin with an overview the MESA. Michigan’s response

The MESA is to the Social Security 1935, Act of 620; Stat USC 301 et seq., provides funding which for federal to states unemployment programs. with state insurance In defining eligibility unemployment benefits, persons MESA limited benefits to who are involun- tarily unemployed. Legislature As the stated in policy the MESA’s section: legislature

"Sec. 2. The acting in the exercise of the police power of public the state policy declares that the of the unemployment state as follows: Economic insecurity due to health, is a serious menace to the mor- als, and people welfare of the Involuntary this state. subject general is a interest concern requires legislature action prevent spread its lighten and to its burden which so often crushing falls with upon force unemployed family, worker and his to the detriment of welfare 463 Mich Opinion by Ryan, J. requires security Social state. of this

of people our life.” of economic against hazard protection this 421.2; (Emphasis supplied.) MSA 17.502. MCL recognized, is the MESA intended This Court unemployed. only involuntarily those benefit Security Employment vCo I M Dach Underwear (1956): 465, 472; 80 NW2d 193 Comm, 347 Mich primarily "[cjlearly for the intended the act was unemployed.” involuntarily We of those benefit light interpreted therefore, the MESA in have, providing purpose benefits to of not its stated persons "voluntarily” unemployed. who are provide is Since MESA intended benefits persons, pur- unemployed only involuntarily to of pose § 29 circum- § 29 MESA lists the obvious. is Legislature holds a which the stances under to benefits under the MESA person not entitled is unemployed. involuntarily Sub- he not is because specifically labor discusses section MESA 29(8), disputes. applicable case, to this as Section involuntarily unem- a worker is states that ployed unemployment labor if his is due a dispute the United an establishment within functionally integrated with his States which is employment and which was "financed” person. unemployed decision,

In we our earlier determined plaintiffs’ unemployment a was due to dis- pute in an establishment within the United States functionally integrated which that of the was with plaintiffs’ place employment. However, we did disqualified not resolve whether the unemployment benefits their unem- because ployment "financing” was due to their of a local dispute. "financing” required We held that "meaningful payment connection” between non-ordinary strike fund dues and the local labor General v Baker Opinion by Ryan, plaintiffs’ dispute unemploy- caused which "meaningful A ment. connection” between the and the labor which required per- was since a "voluntarily” unemployed under MCL son 421.29(8)(a)(ii); 17.531(8)(a)(ii) only MSA if he is "directly in the labor involved” causes his to the We remanded the case of Review for a determination of Board whether showing such connection existed plaintiffs "directly the were in- dispute in volved” the labor which caused unemployment. background,

With this we turn our brief atten- determining "meaning- tion to a whether there is plaintiffs’ financing by ful connection” between the payment strike dues and fund the dispute labor which caused their

II assignment determining The first in whether the plaintiffs’ financing "meaningful has a connection” dispute unemploy- to the labor ment is to define what is meant which caused their "meaningful a impres- connection.” Since this an is issue first parties’ sion, we shall consider the the Board of Review members’ recommended definitions "meaningful connection.”

A surprisingly, plaintiffs Not the and the defen- agree upon properly dants do not what elements "meaningful should be in included the definition of parties agree connection.” Even the where on a given "meaningful element of the definition of they disagree connection,” on the whether element is in established this case. Mich "meaning- plaintiffs to define ask Court

The fully is follows: there as connected” the labor which connection between unemployment and the claimant’s the claimant’s voluntarily, directly, financing if the claimant significant funded amounts in caused the claimant’s which purpose dispute, assisting and with personally from the he benefit intention that proposed dispute. defi- This of the labor "success” financing First, must has six elements. nition argue plaintiffs "voluntary.” the they The be financing involuntary since in this case was subject required payments make or be good being not UAW members to dismissal for standing. financing Second, the involve must plaintiffs payment in- those from the direct argue dispute. plaintiffs The volved that the labor financing in was direct but this case through accomplished the UAW’s was all rather SIF. amounts. this case significant financing Third, be in must financing argue per plaintiff only or was $20 $40 insignificant. Fourth, de minimis and must occur contemporaneously dis- with the labor argue financing pute. plaintiffs The the in 1967, November, case this occurred October and dispute January while the labor occurred February, financing Fifth, 1968. the must be for purpose assisting particular the of the dis- labor pute plaintiffs’ unemployment. which caused the plaintiffs argue financing The that the in this case purpose supporting particu- for was not the of the disputes lar local labor which caused their unem- ployment, porting sup- purpose but rather was for the Caterpil- against

national strikes Ford and Finally, financing lar. that include intention must plaintiffs benefit from the resolution of Baker General Mtrs v supported dispute issues in favor of the the labor argue plaintiffs local The labor side. dispute plaintiffs not affect the and that issues did benefiting they from had no intention the suc- disputes. financing cess in this case was remote rather than labor

"meaningfully dispute labor connected” to the plaintiffs’ unemployment. meaningful which caused the aspect no

Since definition satisfied plaintiffs’ actions, the Board of Review’s determi- disqualified plaintiffs nation that were receiving unemployment benefits was erroneous. defendant, on the other would hand define "meaningful connection” as follows: there is a dispute connection between the labor claimant’s which paid any the non-ordinary if claimant’s the claimant purpose supporting disputes foreseeably labor included the la- dispute unemploy- bor that caused the claimant’s non-ordinary ment, and if the dues were fact paid support dispute the labor that caused the proposed claimant’s This definition First, had four elements. the claimant must have paid non-ordinary dues. The defendant notes that supra, paid Baker, we held in that the dues in this extraordinary case were and all admit paying purpose Second, such dues. of the non- ordinary support dues must have been to labor disputes. The defendant claims that the dues in support disputes this case were intended they paid since Third, the UAW’s SIF. supported disputes foreseeably must include the labor that caused the claimant’s unem- ployment. The defendant claims local GM Finally, strikes were foreseeable. those involved in the labor extraordinary must receive benefits from the payments. The defendant Mich Eyan, by nearly SIF benefits the strike claims paid half of foundry striking workers GM the emergency payment autho- of the the dues from special rized the convention. at UAW "meaningful the is connection” there a between payments strike the and unemployment; consequently, that caused the disqualified properly 29(8)(a)(ii). the Review Board of plaintiffs under MESA

B adopted either Review member Board of No adopted Instead, tests each these only member toto. suggested lists, certain elements upon agree were unable a members the board definition, "meaningful single Each connection” guidance attempt an definition follow was supra, p given we Baker, had 668: require payments does "While statute disqualification in issue whose be made traced dispute individuals into hands workers involved in unemployment, which caused individuals’ 'financing’ suggests meaningful term payments or said to class payment between constitute financed.” and the labor allegedly proposed each We indi- shall review definition vidually. Applied

1. Test Cohl Members Viventi "meaningful Cohl, For Viventi and members extraordinary existed if the claimant’s connection” payment significant amounts, involved was approximately at made dis- time unemployment, pute that caused claimant’s v Baker General Opinion by Ryan, J. purpose supporting of labor for the was and disputes made foreseeably included the labor dis- unemployment. pute the claimant’s which caused meaningful part first of the Viventi/Cohl The meaningful con that a definition held connection nection ing through only of financ the amount existed where extraordinary payment dues financing by If the amount was "substantial.” extraordinary payment was not "substan dues meaningful tial,” between there was no connection dispute that caused and the labor noting After the this require "payments made Court did not disqualification whose is in issue be individuals in traced into the hands of workers involved unemp dispute which caused the individuals’ loyment,”8 members Viventi and Cohl found that emergency paid in dues this case were one "substantial” amounts when considered They supported payments. effect all of the this following findings: conclusion with the 1) plaintiff per paid Each or month $10 $20 emergency dues.

2) The UAW raised million in two months $42 through tially emergency That amount essen- dues.

equaled the amount of the UAW’s entire prior emergency strike fund to the institution of dues.

3) The or increase in UAW dues consti- $10 $20 plain- tuted an or increase each 800% 1600% tiff’s strike fund dues.

4) foundry $247,000 strikers The received strike fund. UAW 5) 19,000 The alone claimants contributed some- through $380,000 $760,000 where between emergency payments. dues

8 Baker, supra, p 668. Mich Opinion by Ryan,

6) January, payments 1968, At the time the striking began foundry workers, to the of the 53% regular payments fund was from dues while 47% emergency payments. of the fund was from When the dues February, payments 1968, made, regular payments fund of the was from 51% while payments. of the fund was from 49% part meaningful second Viventi/Cohl definition held that a con- only nection existed where the claimant’s financ- ing approximately at occurred the same time as caused the claimant’s unem- ployment. temporal proximity If there was no emergency payments between the dues and the payment engaged of strike benefits to the strikers plaintiffs’ in the local GM strike that caused the unemployment, meaningful was no connec- there plaintiffs’ emergency pay- tion between the ments and the labor dues

dispute plain- that caused the according However, tiffs’ to mem- timing payment Cohl, bers Viventi and the dispute and the labor in this case indicated that meaningful there was a connection between the support two events. In of their conclusion that the plaintiffs’ emergency payments dues and the labor dispute plaintiffs’ unemployment that caused the proximate, temporally were members Viventi and following findings: Cohl made the 1) emergency The dues were collected October plants. November, 1967, and at local UAW 2) emergency At the month, end of each the dues were forwarded to the SIF of the UAW.

3) engaged dispute Those in the labor plaintiffs’ caused the received strike January benefits from the UAW’s SIF in February, and 1968.

4) plaintiffs’ emergency Therefore, pay- dues General Baker v they dispute assisted which and the labor merits only separated by two months. about were rigid Supreme no re- held that there was Court plaintiff’s emergency quirement dues each foundry directly payment GM to a be traced rigid extremely time con- no striker. placed upon consideration should lie straints temporal proximity between is a there whether emergency payments plaintiffs’ dues the labor ment. unemploy- plaintiffs’ that caused lag case, time does

In the two-month this destroy temporal between not plaintiffs’ payments labor dues plaintiffs’ unemployment. dispute that caused temporal proximity emer- of The gency receipt payments strike and the meaningful con- from the SIF manifest a benefits nection. part

The final Viventi/Cohl meaningful con- held that a connection definition only emergency dues nection existed where the supporting disputes purpose of for the labor were foreseeably included the labor unemployment. If the claimant’s the emer- purpose support- gency for a other than general pur- ing disputes or, labor while for pose supporting disputes, were not for purpose supporting disputes like the ones plaintiffs’ unemployment, caused the then which there is emergency meaningful no between payments dues the labor and plaintiffs’ unemployment. that caused the Mem- bers Viventi and Cohl to the looked statement passed emergency UAW officials who dues explained amendment and who the amendment membership purpose the UAW to determine the emergency In for which the dues were collected. looking statements, and these members Viventi Mich 463 Publishing upon Applegate v relied Palladium Cohl (1980), App 299; 290 95 Mich NW2d lv

o.C (1980). Having den Mich determined that purpose leadership the plaintiffs of the UAW binds the (UAW members), board members Viventi emergency Cohl conclude that dues were disputes plants, intended to fund local labor including at GM foundry plants which caused the plaintiffs’ unemployment. Members Viventi and support purpose Cohl their conclusion that emergency dues was to behind fund local plants following findings: strikes at with the GM 1) 16 of the UAW constitution allowed Article leadership emergency meeting the UAW to call an emergency. and to describe and delineate the 2) Ninety-eight percent delegates to the convention voted for the constitutional amend- allowing emergency ments dues.

3) "Proceedings” The and UAW letters to UAW emergency establish that members dues were beyond purposes Caterpillar the Ford and na- "earmarking” strikes. tional emergency There was no of the Caterpillar dues for the Ford and na- purpose emergency tional strikes. The of the dues supporting included local GM strikes. 4) emergency payments Plaintiffs’ dues voluntary Sep- since the UAW/GM contract ended 6, 1967, tember and with it went the union secu- rity system. clause and the automatic check-off

Therefore, board members Viventi and Cohl meaningful determined that a connection existed plaintiffs’ emergency payments between the dues disputes and the unemployment. connection existed emergency paid the amount

because was timing "substantial,” payments that caused the plaintiffs’ unemployment proxi- sufficiently was General v Baker Opinion by Ryan, J. emergency purpose the dues mate, payments the and strikes, supporting local GM included meaningful Consequently, ex- connection since emergency payment of dues and the isted between plaintiffs’ dispute caused unem- that the labor that and Cohl ployment, found members Viventi receiving disqualified plaintiffs un- the employment were 29(8)(a)(ii). § benefits MESA Chairperson Applied by Hall 2. Test proposed Chairperson what she Hall considered expedient” practical and a mining test deter "more meaningful is a there whether payments emergency plaintiffs’ dues between dispute caused the and unemployment.9 labor "practical this She stated upon expedient” test be based would and persons disqualify only Legislature to intent of the prolong a labor whose conduct "would tend dispute.”10 Chairperson proposed Hall such, As only meaningful one connection definition with A between element. connection exists payment the claimant’s and the unemploy that caused claimant’s paying only the emer ment where the claimant engaged gency person dispute concerning objectives shared common interests and

the labor claimant’s If there were shared disqual plaintiffs objectives, were interests receiving unemployment ified from benefits under 29(8)(a)(ii). However, absent MESA terests and common in objectives, plaintiffs not dis qualified.

Chairperson Hall concluded that p Appendix, 742a. Plaintiffs’ 10 p Appendix, Plaintiffs’ 377a. Mich Ryan, J. objectives shared common interests and GM with the supports foundry strikers. She her conclusion following findings: with the 1) plaintiffs foundry The workers, through 60-day union, sent a notice that the agreement national would not be renewed.

2) plaintiffs foundry The and the GM strikers subject emergency were all to the dues.

3) triggered dispute The same event the labor plaintiffs striking foundry which the and the GM i.e., involved; workers were non-renewal agreement. national UAW/GM Chairperson Therefore, Hall concluded that a meaningful pay connection existed between the emergency dispute ments of dues and the labor plaintiffs’ unemployment. that caused the meaningful plain connection existed because the engaged tiffs and those in the labor plaintiffs’ unemployment caused the shared com es.11 objectiv Consequently, mon interests and plaintiffs disqualified receiving unem ployment 29(8)(a)(ii). by benefits MESA Applied by 3. Test Member Gravelle meaningful Member Gravelle defined connection in a manner which he felt took into account "practical impli- considerations and related issues question” "meaningful cated [the] of a connec- supra, p tion,” provided Baker, 668, and "a liberal * * * good construction consonant with reason and supra, p Baker, discretion.” 664. Member Gravelle meaningful defined connection in terms of two meaningful facts. A according exists, connection Gravelle, member labor where the claimant financed the that caused his with Appendix, p Plaintiffs’ 379a. General Baker v payments. contemporaneous only existed sup- payments both made the where their unemploy- dispute that caused the labor port pen- during those payments and made ment their unem- dispute that caused of the labor dency explained his member Gravelle As ployment. definition, meaningful connection contempo are not in issue either "If the contributions dispute causing unemploy with the labor raneous ment dispute causing the do the labor or not subsidize disqualification can result.”12 unemployment, no meaning- claims his Member Gravelle the basis MESA language of definition is the ful connection 29(8)(a)(ii) "is” to present uses tense which § will timing of the which explain the Therefore, according to result disqualification. 29(8)(a)(ii) Gravelle, al- MESA does not member § financing. disqualification past low meaningful applies his connec- Member Gravelle con- of this case and tion definition to facts emergency payments cludes that the dues plaintiffs’ to the labor dis- meaningfully are not connected Member pute unemployment. caused following is upon Gravelle’s conclusion based findings:

1) plaintiffs’ The labor which caused the unemployment was the local negotiations either preceded the three local at GM strikes plants foundry or the local GM foundry three strikes and 1968. January February, 2) If the by plaintiffs’ unemployment was strikes, negotiations leading up local there meaningful no between plaintiffs’ emergency payments un- dues and their Plaintiffs’ Appendix, p 384a. Mich by employment negotiations since these were funded entirely by regular dues. there is no plaintiffs’ connection in fact between the emer- gency payments unemployment. dues and their

3) plaintiffs’ unemployment by If the was caused foundry meaning- the local strikes, GM there is no plaintiffs’ emergency ful connection between the payments unemployment dues and their since, supported by while the strikes were SIF dollars including emergency dues, emer- gency payments contemporaneous were not unemployment. with the strike that caused their paid dues were in October and November, 1967, while the strike occurred Jan- uary February, 1968.

Therefore, member Gravelle concluded that meaningful there was no connection between the plaintiffs’ emergency payments and the labor that caused their Conse- quently, receiving disqualified were not benefits MESA 29(8)(a)(ii). Applied by 4. Test Member Salomone joined Member Salomone member Gravelle’s opinion parts conclusion, but he added several meaningful to the proposed connection definition According member Gravelle. to member Salo- mone, connection exists between the emergency payment claimant’s dues and the labor dispute unemployment only that caused his where voluntarily the claimant direct, made substantial payments during pendency dispute the of the labor unemployment that caused his payments and such purpose were supporting, for the actually and support, dispute did the labor that caused the unemployment. claimant’s General Baker v case, of this member facts applied As meaningful was no that there concluded Salomone dues plaintiffs’ emergency between dispute and the labor payments in the reasons stated for their addition, In member opinion. Gravelle’s member following findings: Salomone made 1) dues, whether emergency The purpose or intent leadership’s union considers the one intent, support only individual was plaintiffs’ on the no evidence was national strikes. There Salomone, record, that according to member support dues emergency was purpose plaintiffs’ caused the foundry local GM strikes unemployment.

2) were not vol- emergency payments The dues to make the required were untary. not losing being or their payments jobs risk standing. in good UAW members 3) plaintiff were de paid by The amounts each most, At each minimis insignificant. plaintiff and or not may may dues which paid emergency $40 support used the SIF to actually have been striking GM workers. foundry

4) In members’ strike fund dues reality, union it are an "insurance” fee intend they inure to their benefit. only member Salomone concluded meaningful

there was no connection between and the labor emergency payments dispute that caused their There plain- was no connection because tiffs’ were not volun- payments de minimis amounts, tary, were were not for purpose supporting foundry local GM strikes, not contemporaneous were with the labor unemployment, that caused support fact used to the local

492 Mich 463 by Opinion Ryan, J. (if plaintiffs’ unemployment that negotiations leading up was the strikes). Consequently, member Salomone con- disqualified cluded that were not receiving unemployment benefits MESA 29(8)(a)(ii).

5. Conclusion meaningful faces, On their connection defini proposed by tions appear quite the Board of Review members upon However,

different. closer exam majority ination, it becomes evident board members considered three elements in de termining plaintiffs’ emergency pay whether meaningfully ments were dispute connected to the labor that caused their proposed three elements included most of the meaningful connection amount, definitions were purpose, timing.13 In addition to these three "commonality” elements, one member included proposed meaningful her connection definition and another member included "voluntariness” in his proposed meaningful connection definition. separately sug- We shall consider each element gested meaningful for the connection definition.

C evaluating suggested In connec- 13Viventi & Cohl Hall Gravelle Salomone #

Amount Purpose Timing Timing Purpose Purpose Amount Timing ^{[3] [4]}

Commonality

Voluntariness Baker v General elements, we constituent and their tion definitions must remain the Court the reasons that mindful of "financing” required supra, be Baker, meaningfully to the connected unemployment. MESA 29(8)(a)(ii) larger part only of a one small § is light interpreting in of the whole it In statute. 29(8)(a)(ii) disqualifies persons statute, § MESA financing unemployed by "voluntarily” are who the labor unemployment. causes their that "financing” of the is one statuto- It rily so does because person may designated ways evi- in which a dispute. in a labor "direct involvement” dence MCL involvement” is 17.531(8)(a). 421.29(8)(a); "direct Since MSA activity, prohibited must helps interpreted determine it the Court so that be directly in the labor involved if the claimant was unemployment. dispute quently, "meaningfully Conse- that caused his be defined connected” will only elements which manifest to include those in the labor some direct involvement caused sug- If a the claimant’s meaningful gested connection defini- of a element to show direct involvement tion does not tend larger compatible proper statute, it not a with meaningful defi- of the connection element proper meaningful nition. The end result of a per- to delineate connection definition should be sons unemployment unemployed whose own activities have contributed to voluntarily as to make them so ineligible therefore, and, for unem- ployment compensation benefits. background,

With this we turn our attention determining proper meaning- elements of the ful connection definition. suggested by plaintiffs

Three elements Mich by part of Review members are Board meaningful they do not definition since connection envi- tend to show the kind involvement direct 29(8)(a)(ii). unacceptable MESA These sioned meaningful definition elements persons payments from are direct engaged claimants dispute, commonality, a and vol- untariness. We these elements for the exclude following reasons. meaningful us define would have require

connection so as to there be a direct person transfer of funds claimant to the from engaged dispute. They correctly argue requirement such a would show justifying direct involvement connection and disqualification claimant’s They saying that, also benefits. correct are adopt meaning- this Court element into plaintiffs definition, ful connection not the would disqualified they paid be since the to the directly and the UAW’s rather than UAW SIF striking foundry

to the GM workers. How- plaintiffs wrong asserting ever, the are in that required every a such in order for a in case direct connection meaningful connection to exist. For following meaningful reasons, a connection the can exist in this case a direct transfer without First, funds from the define to the strikers. to

meaningful existing only connection as where is a there direct transfer of funds the from person engaged dispute claimant the in a to labor unnaturally financing would limit restrict disqualification involving organi- to not situations (such unions) zations as which on act behalf accomplish group’s goals. members definition Such a provide exception

would an enormous financing disqualification which would effec- the tively legislative disqualification

eliminate the for 1984] Baker v General Ryan, 1. meaningful

financing. Second, con a definition required a direct transfer of funds nection which person engaged a labor to the from the claimant language statutory dispute with would conflict 29(8)(a)(ii) inherently recognizes which of MESA that organizations financing involving is not ex disqualification. financing empt This is explic language which statute’s from the evident itly "regular” are union which states that " purposes and for established 'in and prior amounts ” dispute’ inception are [the] labor to the eliminating By financing not under statute.14 disputers through payments made to labor certain unions, might payments be but not other Legis disputers through unions, the to labor made lature indicated organizations disqualified through financing that all not being prevent will claimant from in a "direct involvement” labor dispute through financing. Third, this Court said meaningful supra, Baker, that directly require money be that does traced disputer. recog to the labor We from the claimant union) (such organization that as a can nized an a claimant from the not be used disqualification. shield pay Therefore, we hold person directly to ment from the claimant engaged part in a is not meaningful connection definition. reject plaintiffs’ suggestion

We also there can be no connection unless person engaged claimant in the objectives. share interests and common Chairperson saying While this element Hall is correct adopted meaningful

would, into if provide "expedient” definition, connection for test an determining meaningful whether there is financing between the claimant’s connection 14 Baker, supra, p 668. 420 Mich 463 Ryan, J. dispute that caused the claimant’s unem-

the labor ployment, plaintiffs in are incorrect

she and reading requirement meaningful this into the con- (see above), nection definition. Like directness meaningful "commonality” of the as an element definition is inconsistent with the stat- connection utory 29(8)(a)(ii). language § of MESA MESA 29(8)(a)(ii) directly in- § stated that a claimant receiving disqualified from volved and therefore "participating in if he is or benefits financing pute directly interested in or the labor dis- partial [the individual’s]

which causes total or 421.29(8)(a)(ii); unemployment.” MCL MSA 17.531(8)(a)(ii) added). (emphasis As is clear from disjunctive "or,” the use of the word is a concept separate "participating in” "di- or Financing rectly not, interested in.” does there- require showing fore, the claimant was participating directly either labor rectly in in or interested that caused his "Di- 29(8)(b) §

interested” is defined in MESA encompass everything would have us include "commonality

definition under interest and the rubric of 29(8)(b) objective.” MESA states: " interested’, 'Directly subsection, as used this shall be applied construed and disqualify so as not to individ- unemployed uals resolution of which affect their ment, as a result of a labor may reasonably expected be hours, wages, or employ- other conditions of disqualify hours, and to wages, individuals whose employment or conditions of may reasonably be ex- pected to be affected the resolution of the labor dispute. A expectation’ 'reasonable of an effect on an wages, hours, individual’s or other employ- conditions of exist, ment shall be considered to in the absence of preponderating substantial any contrary, evidence to the following situations: "(i) If it is established particular there is in the Baker v General Opinion by Ryan, J. employing practice unit a or custom or establishment or obligation to extend within a reasonable contractual grade or period to members of the individual’s class of in in which the individual is workers the establishment changes employed in terms and conditions or was last employment substantially which are similar or re- changes in terms and to some or all of lated conditions of employment which are made for the work- dispute among whom there exists the labor which ers partial unemploy- or has caused the individual’s total ment.

"(ii) in If it is established that of the issues or dispute change in purposes of the labor is to obtain a employment for members of the terms the individual’s conditions grade or class of workers the estab- in lishment ployed. which the individual is or was last em- "(iii) dispute If the labor exists at a time when the bargaining agreement, collective which covers the indi- grade vidual’s or class of workers in the establishment employed which the individual is or was last and the employ- workers another establishment of the same ing actively participating unit who are in the labor dispute, expired, opened by has has been mutual con- modified, may by supplemented, sent or replaced.” its terms be or 17.531(8)(b). 421.29(8)(b); MCL MSA commonality/directly Since the statute treats in- concept separate terested as a and distinct from financing, appropriately it is not considered as part meaningful of the connection definition. Even statutory guidance, without this we would find commonality part meaningful is not of the 29(8)(a)(ii) connection definition because MESA is disqualify "voluntarily” intended to those who are unemployed financing as a result of the labor causes Whether one is degree a labor and the doing to which he is so have no direct correlation with whether he will benefit from the dispute. reject "success” of the labor we Mich Opinion by Ryan, commonality plaintiffs’ suggestion that is a the necessary part meaningful connection defi- nition.

Finally, reject we contention that necessary any element of "voluntariness” definition. The voluntari- funding is not ness of the claimant’s the relevant meaningfulness of the connection between the financing dispute and the labor which claimant’s causes his example, For a mean- ingful connection can exist where the claimant is directly dispute forced to contribute to the labor unemployment. Equally, his which causes there may meaningful connection, be no where a contri- given. voluntarily such, bution is As voluntariness appropriately part is not meaningful considered as a of the says

connection definition it since nothing meaningfulness or about the the connec- payment tion between employment. and the claimant’s un- say However, dowe not mean to that voluntari- disqualification is ness irrelevant under MESA 29(8). § is, course, Voluntariness critical to a 29(8) 29(8) § MESA discussion since MESA is disqualify only intended to those whose own ac- tions cause their so that the unem- ployment properly "voluntary.” is But, considered while voluntariness is relevant to the determina- "financing” "participating” tion occurred, that or it is not relevant to a determination that financing meaningfully was connected dispute unemploy- which caused the claimant’s reason, ment. For that it is excluded from the definition, but not from the financing earlier definition. required Lest we be to hear this case third upon

time claim that the Board of Review failed to consider the voluntariness of their (After Rem) Baker v General Mtrs Opinion by Ryan, J. finding financing there was contributions financing and that was con- meaningfully plain- nected to the labor which caused the dispose plain- tiffs’ we will unemployment, their emergency payments tiffs’ claim plaintiffs argue were not voluntary. not payments were voluntary they

since the UAW in required by order for them to UAW required remain members and GM/UAW contract since UAW was membership making criterion for employment. By argu- this ment, again trying are to use an UAW, organization, as a to protect shield disqualification themselves for their unemployment. above, As noted recognize statute does such a ploy. membership required UAW for employment by bargains GM because the UAW provision such a in its contract with GM. In so doing, represents UAW its and they members ratify any agreed must upon contract UAW Therefore, and GM. any "coercion” resulting from of terms the contract does not make the plain- tiffs’ in action accord with the contract "involun- As tary.” the Court of Appeals said in Applegate v Co, Palladium Publishing 299, App 305; Mich (1980), 290 NW2d 128 and we adopt here: "Action taken by employees under a negoti- contract ated for them their agent authorized must be consid- effect, ered their voluntary plaintiff In acts. agreed to pursuant bargaining to collective agreement.” [act] Any holding other would make all actions taken by union pursuant members union contract and involuntary responsi- relieve members of bility their contract-based actions. We cannot agree with such a rule.

dues payments were not involuntary. Mich pursuant payment

Therefore, of union pursuant rules, to a or or constitution the union’s voluntary agreement, bargaining collective for constitutes 421.29(8)(a)(ii); determining payment purposes whether a meaning financing MCL within the 17.531(8)(a)(ii). But volun- MSA the determination not affect does tariness "meaningful connection” be- is a there whether tween the proximately dispute financing which the labor the claimant’s suggested Having elements those eliminated components appropriate of the are not which posi- meaningful definition, in a we are meaningful affirmatively the connec- tion to state tion definition. meaningful connection exists A supporting disputes purpose where, labor for the dispute encompassing foreseeably the labor unemployment, the claimant the claimant’s caused engages significant financing disputes in labor proximately to the and at times related amounts dispute unem- which caused the claimant’s labor ployment. connection between financing dispute that caused the the labor unemployment exists if three elements claimant’s financing present. purpose First, are of the part, support disputes be, must at least in labor foreseeably include the unemployment. Second, caused amount of claimant’s financing significant, must not de be minimis, both terms of the amount collected played and in terms of the role that those funds caused the financing unemployment. Third, claimant’s must occur at a time proximate to the which is 1984] Baker v General by dispute supported labor that caused the claimant’s unemployment. Only if elements all three are meaningful present connection there between dispute financing and the labor that caused unemployment. the claimant’s greater shall now discuss in detail each We meaningful component defini- connection tion. Purpose

a. meaningful component The first of the connec- phrase tion definition is delineated purpose "for the supporting disputes foreseeably encompassing dispute the labor which caused the aspects unemployment.” claimant’s There are five "purpose” requirement which merit further discussion.

First, it is assumed that the time the Court meaningful exists, considers whether a connection already dispute it has determined that the labor unemployment which caused the claimant’s was in by payments fact financed claimant. If it meaningful not, was there can no be payments between the claimant’s and the labor dispute unemployment. which caused his This is regardless true of whether the claimant made the payments specific with the intent and for the specific purpose assisting supporting dispute labor pose, that caused his Pur- strong,

no matter how will not substitute „ financing. actual

Second, a connection between the and the labor that caused the only claimant’s is demonstrated if the labor that caused the claimant’s unem- ployment disputes foreseeably scope was within the of labor financing. gave

for which the claimant If 420 Mich Opinion by Ryan, J. meaningful connection. not, can be no it there was financing gave words, if the claimant In other disputes supporting purpose different labor of the actually scope caused from the one in kind or his tion between that caused the claimant’s meaningful unemployment, is no connec- there financing and the labor the

unemployment. dispute financed

Third, the labor in addition to scope purpose being foreseeably the within the of resulting financing, unem- claimant’s of the ployment purpose If foreseeable. must also be disputes financing support was to labor of the foreseeably claim- have caused the not which could purpose aspect unemployment, of ant’s has been definition not 29(8)(a)(ii) only since MESA is This is so shown. intended untarily” reasonably persons disqualify are "vol- to those who person unemployed. A who could financing the fact that his foresee unemployment cause his cannot be said would be pur- "voluntarily” unemployed. Therefore, financing expose pose potentially must of the by unemployment claimant labor disputes he financed. financing purpose

Fourth, must of the be point that the determined from the time financ- using ing hindsight by not be occurred. It should determined or reference to statements after the financing purpose occurred. The is determined according they appeared to the facts as at the time financing. purpose

Fifth, in cases involving may union dues come either from the or claimant’s own statements from the statements necessary It is not union officials. consciously individual union members tively adopt or affirma- purposes. It the union’s stated sufficient that the union collected funds from (After Rem) Baker General Mtrs v Ryan, J. purpose supporting the claimant for the disputes foreseeably included the dis- putes that caused the claimant’s may The union member purpose by not assist the union’s contributing seeking while shelter disqualification from himself benefits ratifying purpose. by not the union’s As Appeals Applegate, supra, p the Court said in adopt 304, we here: union, being a "by employees the member had joined ratified or in of the decisions the union and bound those 'Any decisions. other result would de- stroy principles the of bargaining and render collective ” meaningless.’ Bergseth union-management contracts v Co, Baking 63, 70;

Zinsmaster 252 Minn 89 NW2d 172 (1958). purpose financing may Therefore, of be found either in the claimant’s own or statements organization in of statements which col- lects the funds to and which he is a member.

b. Amount meaningful A connection between the claimant’s financing unemployment dispute and the labor that caused his significant

must involve amounts financing. De minimis amounts do not demon- meaningful strate connection between the financing dispute caused unemployment. important claimant’s is an This since, Supreme connection Court as the United States recognized Telephone in New v York Co Dep’t York Labor, New State 519, 526; 440 US (1979), 1328; S 59 L 2d Ct Ed it is a availability "fundamental truism” upon willing- strike benefits ness of a direct effect has persons go and, strike, on strike on once Mich the amount of on strike. to remain financing important in deter- an consideration is mining there is a whether financing and the labor between the claimant’s financing determining the amount of In whether significant minimis, the must con- or de Court is sider four different engaged

figures. First, if the claimant through organization, financing an review the amount Court must program in terms of as well as terms of the entire the individual’s contribution. non-ordinary

Second, in cases of compare dues, union the Court must regular non- the claimant’s contribution with his ordinary contribution determine whether significant "emergency” dues is or amount of the involving non-ordinary Third, in de minimis. union cases dues, the Court must consider the effect of "emergency” upon the resources of the the union disputes. supporting Fi- allocated involving regular non-ordinary nally, in cases dues, union the Court must consider the role played supporting "emergency” which the the labor that caused the claimant’s unem- Regarding ployment. the role that the "emer- gency” played supporting dispute dues in the labor unemployment, which caused the claimant’s plaintiffs adopt contend that the Court must one of accounting they say two methods: either must that the first funds into the account are funds the first (FIFO) they say out of the account or must that the funds last into the account were the first funds (LIFO). However, out of the account it we find unnecessary adopt either the or the FIFO LIFO plaintiffs’ emergency pay- method. Where the dues go ments emergency into a fund which also contains the non- resulting commingling

dues, the of the plaintiffs. funds is attributable to the com- Once Baker v General Mtrs Ryan, J. mythi- mingling occurs, both FIFO and LIFO are Reality in indicates that the funds are cal nature. proportion out of the account to their taken per- percentage words, In in the funds. other centage each of the entire fund from source is from the reflected in the disbursements applied fund. As composed SIF, which is to the UAW’s regular emergency payments from both and payments sources, from the fund should be consid- composed percentage to be of the same ered regular emergency larger as the approach fund. We that such an is believe both logical regular fair and where the commingled single dues are fund. Temporal Proximity

c. meaningful financing A connection between the dispute and the labor unemployment that caused the claimant’s

requires payments that be closely made at a time which is related to the dispute unemploy- that claimant’s relationship timing ment. The between the of the financing timing dispute and the of the labor important caused the claimant’s any meaningful to the connection definition because

temporal may become so attenu- purpose payment ated as to make the amount of the or the payment meaningless. requiring

However, that the connec- temporal proximity require tion include does not payments exactly contemporaneous sup- with the ported as the assert. In- temporal proximity requires stead, the two events, the and the labor unemployment, meaning- causes the claimant’s be fully connected the sense that one event follow upon major the other without a break. The deter- Mich proximity temporal mination there whether sequence that in the ais break there

or whether upon prac- depends the connection attenuated tical realities fer is a factual collect, trans- needed time non-ordinary funds. Since this and disburse depend upon will which determination unique case, will not this Court of each facts bright limits which line time within establish beyond temporal proximity which and there is attenuation. there is Conclusion

d. meaningful exists between A dispute the labor causes and purpose unemployment where, for claimant’s reasonably disputes' assisting of foreseeably dispute that caused the labor include unemployment, claimant claimant’s the finances proximity . temporal significant amount his unem- that causes the labor ployment. three ele- the Court finds these Where timing), present (purpose, amount, and ments the that causes the connection between there is a financing and the labor

claimant’s

D apply of this Before can the test to the facts we case, found we must first decide what facts were this, the Board- of Review. To do we must plaintiffs’ challenges resolve the to the admittance arguments Board of at final after the evidence reopened chal- Review record. lenge the board’s admittance of the evidence first, abused its three reasons: the Board Review (After Rem) Baker v General by Opinion Ryan, J. the to admit additional power reopening record evidence, plaintiffs’ argu- over at final objections, Second, if of did not ments. even the Board Review record, power abuse the it exer- reopening its such as power cised the to violate the way right hearing due a fair and process to deprived them of to to the opportunity respond the Third, evidence for evidence. the was inadmissible substantive reasons. of Record to Admit UAW Reopening Documents

a. Newspaper and Articles plaintiffs opinion The contend that the below based upon incompetent evidence since the Board power of reopening Review abused its the rec- arguments ord at final to special admit UAW articles, convention "Proceedings,” and newspaper "Solidarity” all newspaper Admittedly, articles. five of accepted Board Review con- members and (in the sidered additional greater evidence and degrees) lesser in reaching their conclusions. However, the fact reopened the board the record to admit the does not make its evidence admission erroneous not automatically does bar its presiding use. The at an officer administra- tive hearing power has to "[r]egulate course hearings, of the set time place continued hearings and fix filing the time for briefs and other 24.280(d); documents.” MCL MSA 3.560(180)(d). The law does chairper- not limit power son’s regulate the course of hearings only prior to closing of the record. Absent any stated legislative limit on chairperson’s power to regulate the course of hearings following closing record, we shall not create one. The Legislature power committed this the dis- cretion the chairperson. Barring an abuse Mich the record reopen may

discretion, chairperson evidence. additional to admit arguments final at that an evidence presented have not plaintiffs The case. There- in this occurred of discretion abuse reopen power Hall had fore, Chairperson in so her discretion not abuse and did the record doing. as Record Reopened Into of Evidence Admission

b. Hearing to Fair Right Violation of Re- the Board contend rec- reopened into a of evidence admission view’s hearing. Specifi- to a fair right their violates ord of Review denied the Board allege that they cally, the and rebut to cross-examine right them the record. reopened the admitted into evidence right has a Board of Review A the party before the rebut opposing witnesses to cross-examine 421.1207(4)(c), AC, R him. against evidence the (e). when board are not reduced rights These evidence. admit additional a record to reopens to consti- However, must be asserted rights both The appeal. on objection tute a valid basis 8, 1981, arguments final record of the December or their counsel plaintiffs indicate that does the or rebut right asserted the cross-examine Rather, to the sub- objected they merely evidence. After the of the evidence. admissibility stantive evidence, hearing the ended board admitted the The plaintiffs. from the objection without further evi- witnesses and rebut right cross-examine case, it In this was waived may dence be waived. the failure to assert it. plaintiffs’ to cross- having right The plaintiffs waived evidence, the will not examine or Court rebut (a fair denial of process now find a due violation miscarriage of hearing), barring the existence of a 1984] Baker General v Opinion by Ryan, J. miscarriage presented justice

justice. No this case.

We find the other assertion of due process to be without merit. violations Admissibility

c. of the Evidence "Proceedings” UAW plaintiffs objections to the raise five admis "Proceedings.” plaintiffs First,

sion as "Proceedings” that not the sert are best evi transpired special convention; at dence what provide participants the best evidence. could argument upon an Such ing is based a misunderstand hierarchy rule; is no best evidence there Michigan of evidence in and the evidence rule best only requires produced. Michigan "original” document be v Ocean Acci

Bankers Ass’n Corp, Ltd, & 470; dent NW 868 Guarantee 274 Mich (1936); MRE 1002.

Second, assert "Proceed ings” However, were not authenticated. the "Pro ceedings” ques authenticated board’s tioning plaintiffs’ attorney.15 plaintiffs object

Third, the to the admission of "Proceedings” ground on the the defen required relevancy dant was not to state the of the material; relevancy However, GM did the of state "Proceedings”: the the evidence was offered to special show the "intent motive” behind the dues.16 response inquiries, plaintiffs’ attorney In the admitted that "Proceedings” probably reporter’s were transcribed from at notes made convention, special "Proceedings” the time of the published that UAW, by "Proceedings” the that were the version of what "official” transpired convention, at the and that the UAW made the record upon with the by intention be that it reliable and relied its officials any “Proceedings.” union members who read the Plaintiffs’ Appendix, pp 171a-172a. Appendix, 170a; p 12/8/81, Plaintiffs’ p Tr. 10. Mich explicitly re- Review never the Board

While quired clarify state- "intent motive” toGM admitting evidence, the record the ment before relevancy sufficiently the that GM stated indicates showing "Proceedings” reason the UAW’s as of the emergency requiring the dues. the "Proceedings” this on the admission board’s requiring point reversal. is not error "Proceedings” is that the fourth claim Plaintiffs’ knowledge personal or to their not relevant are purpose paying in at issue the "Proceedings” only the show since the this case plaintiffs purpose. are or While intent UAW’s "Proceedings” saying do correct they purpose statements, contain their individual assuming intent that the UAW’s are not correct ascertaining there is a emergency whether is irrelevant "meaningful between connection” dues and the strike which unemployment. above.

See "Proceedings” Fifth, contend Michigan hearsay. of Evi- Rule inadmissible are 801(d)(2) provides that admissions dence hearsay. party-opponent An admission are not "agent party’s by defined to include a statement or servant scope concerning a matter within during employment, agency exis- made his or against relationship,” and offered tence of the 801(d)(2)(D). clearly party. A union is MRE agent concerning purpose its of members proposed union collective bar- union dues and gaining "Proceedings” qualify strategy. Even if the Chairperson developed, by hearsay, her as Hall questioning plaintiffs’ attorney, "Proceedings” ex- within the records fall business 803(6). ception hearsay to the rule. MRE "Proceedings” of what were the "official” record transpired they special convention, were com- at the Baker v General by Opinion according general practice, to a the union piled convention special after the were made soon they of what tran- knowledge personal with by persons convention, they special at spired as an accurate the union members available convention. special at the transpired record of what 803(6), "Proceedings” qualify as MRE Under rule. exception hearsay to the records business Newspaper "Solidarity” Articles raise nu- "Proceedings,” plaintiffs As with Board of Review’s admis- to the objections merous newspa- clippings. Since newspaper sion to be treated as sufficiently are similar per articles evidence, kind of and since one not treat generalized, plain- are we shall objections newspaper clipping to each individ- objections tiffs’ ually. to the Board of plaintiffs’ primary objection newspaper of these articles is

Review’s admittance and contain inadmissible they hearsay. that are plaintiffs newspa- assert Specifically, unsworn, out-of-court state- articles contain per ments of and their named and unnamed reporters and that these were offered for sources statements agree the truth of the matter asserted. We with newspaper these articles are and that hearsay they do not fall within any However, recognized exception. while should they admitted, not have been griev- the error is not so ous that relief required is to correct the error. The information contained in the newspaper accounts merely confirms information contained in properly admitted evidence. erroneously while admitted and not a proper independent basis for decision, the Board of Review’s the evidence is of other It merely supportive admissible evidence. noteworthy newspaper articles are cited 420 Mich Ryan, J. supporting findings exclusively in footnotes almost "Proceedings” upon or a UAW letter. based ignore them in this decision. We shall Having plaintiffs’ evidentiary objec- dealt with apply "meaningfully tions, we now connected” definition to the facts of this case to determine purpose timing of, of, amount whether the the of plaintiffs’ emergency payments dues indicate meaningful foundry connection to the local GM plaintiffs’ unemployment. strikes which caused the Purpose a. definition,

Under the purpose emergency payments of the dues must be support disputes foreseeably labor which in- cluded the ones that caused the unem- ployment. case, In this there can be no doubt that emergency paid the purpose dues were assessed and for the supporting disputes. There is overwhelming support First, for this conclusion. "Proceedings” purpose special stated the of the convention at which Article 16 of the UAW consti- require payment tution was amended to emergency payments to be as follows:

"1. Review the bargain- status of our 1967 collective ing effort.

"2. To consider program revision of the dues Union, UAW, International provide adequate strike challenges funds to meet of the 1967 and 1968 bargaining collective effort.

"3. To consider revisions of the Constitution of the International Union as it payment relates to the dues, fund, membership strike eligibility, strike insur (After Rem) Baker General Mtrs v emergencies other matters related to program and anee Union, facing the International UAW.”17 emergency payments Second, were for- International Union Strike warded to the UAW implies, Fund. of the fund Insurance As name paid emergency into dues were the fund was for purpose supporting the stated disputes, specifically Third, execu- strikes. as UAW stated in his letter to GM UAW tive Woodcock workers: being "These extra dues are raised to protect ers. When our time comes at the support GM workers as well as the Ford strik GM, go we cannot back bargaining adequate table without an fund strike promise

behind us and of continued assistance from other members.”18 UAW emergency it is clear that dues paid purpose sup-

were established and for the porting disputes. labor

However, above, as noted it is not sufficient that emergency purpose support- dues are for the ing disputes. payments labor The must be for the purpose including supporting disputes, foreseeably

those that caused the unem- ployment. point, On this contend that emergency their only strike fund dues were intended support against for the of the national strikes Caterpillar. Alternatively, they argue Ford and emergency if even dues were intended to support disputes beyond the Ford and Cater- pillar purpose strikes, the of the supporting was limited to national strikes supporting excluded local strikes similar to the plaintiffs’ unemployment. ones that caused the 181967 Ex. 90. Plaintiffs’ Appendix, p 487a. 420 Mich support plain- However, record does tiffs’ contentions. 8, for the October impetus

It is clear 1967, was the stalemated bar- special convention Ford and against strikes gaining and national However, the emer- purpose Caterpillar. 1967, 8, at the approved strike October gency not limited to the national strikes conference was background state- Caterpillar. at Ford and "Proceedings” possible mentions other ment strikes at Ford and beyond the national strikes Caterpillar. Caterpillar support

"To the Ford and workers to members who strike and to assure strike benefits in other strikes in the course of the may be involved ahead, temporary and months emer- critical weeks needed, going gency dues increase is the total increase into the International Strike Fund to be used exclu- sively are forced to strike to achieve their support they workers and their families when

just demands.” "Proceedings,” Later in the UAW official Mazey said:

"In the event we have a strike at General Motors— my guess and Corporation begins educated is that unless General Motors bargain intelligently and unless the procedure tract, Corporation begins improve grievance GM representation system in the GM con- going

we are corporation to have a strike —I am sure nobody would want Vice President Leonard to strike fund bargaining go Woodcock and the committee to bargaining table at General Motors with our depleted.” it Additionally, purpose clear emergency dues not supporting was limited to Ford Caterpillar national strikes since those strikes ended before the first emergency Baker v General Opinion by Ryan, J. forwarded to the UAW’s SIF.19 Finally, the emer Constitution, gency dues amendment to UAW Ar 16, ticle does place upon not limitation any future use of the funds raised by the emergency dues. the evidence shows that the pur pose of the emergency was merely support the national against strikes Ford and Caterpillar.

The record also does not support contention that the purpose of the emergency dues assisting excluded persons engaged in local Rather, disputes with GM. it is clear that local GM UAW potential members were beneficiaries of the strike Woodcock, dues. As Leonard then UAW Vice President and Director of the General Department, Motors said an October 13, 1967, letter issued to explain the increased strike dues and addressed "To All UAW Members in General Warehouses, Motors Plants and USA”: "Every penny of this go increase will into the strike help pay fund to strike assistance benefits to Ford and Caterpillar Tractor strikers and other UAW members currently on strike. It is replenish also needed to fund so bargaining that our teams at General Motors and Chrysler plants other bargain with the —and —can assurance that strike assistance benefits will be avail- able should those workers have to hit the bricks later on. "These emergency extra being dues are raised to protect GM workers as well support as the Ford strik ers. When our GM, time comes at go we cannot back to

the bargaining table without an adequate strike fund behind promise us and of continued assistance from other UAW members.”20 19The 22, national 1967, Ford strike was settled October and the Caterpillar national 25, strike was settled October 1967.

201967 Ex. 90. 516 Mich 463 by Opinion goes it clear on to make letter support emergency local will be available dues by emergency justifies it. when strikes citing 1964 GM local strikes: recall, 1964, 10-day strike at we had you will "In strikes, issues, long many local by national followed GM on in a This resulted lasting as as six weeks. some strike $37,383,698.08.”21 expenditure of fund adequately Additionally, demonstrates the record negotia strikes in contract role of local the crucial tion. Local by SIF, strikes, the UAW’s funded agreement following contract a national occurred starting every year in 1958.22 GM in contract with These local were the time that the notably 1964, strikes, most those costly very Therefore, at to the UAW’s SIF.23 paid,

emergency dues were both appeared possible and national and local strikes even Consequently, probable. evidence shows supporting local GM strikes was within that purpose emergency payments and that

of the emergency dues it that the would was foreseeable support used to local GM strikes. fact be aspect purpose analysis focuses The final time of the on whether it was foreseeable at the financing supporting disputes the labor claimant’s In this would cause case, there is and can be no on this issue. it Since was foreseeable that local GM strikes would occur and be financed industry production dues, and since automotive upon production based a series of interrelated produce only component units which one automobile, it is obvious that a local labor 211967 Ex. 90. Tr. Tr. 6/22/81, 6/22/81, pp pp 19, 18, 24. 28. (After Rem) Baker General Mtrs v Ryan, J. might plant layoffs cause at other

which idles one upon component produced plants rely at plant. "chain reaction” can move the idled This layoffs "up” Therefore, "down” the line. both engaged plants presently a local labor at dispute disputes. were foreseeable due local conclusion, the evidence adduced in this case In purpose supports the conclusion that emergency dues included of the supporting disputes labor including actually those that portion unemployment. Therefore, the first meaningful connection definition is met.

b. Amount meaningful The second element of the connec- tion definition considers whether financing the amount of significant so as to demonstrate a connection to applied caused the claimant’s As portion case, must, this meaningful we under this of the definition, consider three aspects through of the amount contributed emer- gency aspect points dues. Each considered to the financing conclusion that the amount of involved emergency payments significant in dues was meaningfully and is connected to the labor plaintiffs’ unemployment. that caused the financing First, when we consider the amount of emergency program, involved with the entire dues help impressed signifi- we cannot but be with the emergency played cant role that dues in the ability financially support UAW’s dis- putes. significance in turn is due to the emergency amount of involved in the program. following dues This is manifested numbers which demonstrate both the amount and importance emergency dues for the UAW’s Mich 31, 1967, UAW’s SIF con

SIF. On October essentially $41,685,651.24 This amount was tained interest plus contributions regular due to November, 1967, In money. earned on totaling payments received new SIF UAW’s amount, $2,070,504 $14,195,411.25 only this Of $12,124,907 while union dues regular from came dues.26 The disburse emergency came from November, 1967, totaled, SIF for ments from the of each dollar dis $12,544,860.27 the ratio 1967, November, that came from the SIF bursed regular payment from the was: 78 cents emergency payment 22 cents from 1967, $13,441,- December, the SIF took In dues.28 $2,070,504 regular from union was of which $11,207,914 from the payment was dues and $3,686,807 dues.29 Of the disbursed December, 1967, the ratio of each dollar the SIF in regular from dues and 37 disbursed was cents beginning dues.30 At the emergency cents from $53,090,814 1968, and added grown the SIF had $14,893,039 receipts.31 in Of the new January funds, $12,772,535 dues emergency paym came from $2,809,765 disbursed in January, ents.32 Of 1968, the ratio of each dollar was 53 cents from regular emergency dues and cents from dues.33 Appendix, p Plaintiffs’ 263a. Appendix, p Plaintiffs’ 264a. regular figure average represents monthly dues income regular during from dues the first ten months of 1967. Appendix, p Plaintiffs’ 264a. = 55,881,062 41,685,651 14,195,- during Total fund month: + = 43,756,155 Regular 41,685,651 2,070,504. 411. Emergency dues in fund: + 12,124,907. 43,756,155 55,881,062 by dues in fund: divided = = .78,12,124,907 55,881,062 by divided .22. Appendix, p Plaintiffs’ 264a. Appendix, pp Appendix, p Computation per Plaintiffs’ 358a-359a. as fn 28. Plaintiffs’ 265a. Appendix, p Plaintiffs’ 265a. See fn 26. Appendix, pp Computation per Plaintiffs’ 358a-359a. as fn 28. Baker v General by $6,180,- February, 1968, had income the SIF In $4,109,709 attributable was 213 of emergency Therefore, the ratio of each dues.34 ($5,044,792) February was 51 dollar disbursed regular from and 49 cents cents emergency payments Therefore, the amount of the dues.35 consequently significant mani

was dispute meaningful connection to the labor fests a that caused unemployment. financ Second, consider the amount of we when again plaintiffs’ payments, ing we terms significant and demon find that the amounts meaningful to the labor dis strate pute plaintiffs’ unemployment. that caused emergency dues, to the commencement Prior members) (like paid plaintiff all UAW $1.25 each per commence SIF. After the month to the UAW’s plaintiff paid emergency dues, either each ment of per month to the UAW’s SIF.36 or $11.25 The $21.25 plain emergency increased the dues therefore support SIF either or tiffs’ of the UAW’s 800% By any standard, increase is the amount of 1600%. meaningful significant connec and demonstrates un that caused their tion with employment. beyond increase, the amount of Even the dollar amount contributed significant also and demonstrates a connection with thé labor which caused plaintiff paid Each either $10 per emergency pay or ments were continued for two months. during month for dues. These $20

the two months that in, effect, 19,000 contributed emergency $380,000 $760,000 between dues 34 Appendix, p Plaintiffs’ 266a. See fn 26. Appendix, pp Computation per Plaintiffs’ 358a-359a. as fn 28. Appendix, p "Proceedings,” UAW S Ct 37a and UAW Plaintiffs’ Appendix, p fn 6. 500a. See 420 Mich Ryan, J. significant, SIF. These amounts are to the UAW’s represent meaningful minimis, and con- not de dispute that nection with the labor plaintiffs’ unemployment.

Third, when we consider the amount of financ ing emergency played in in terms of the role dues payments persons the strike benefit the labor ployment, involved dispute that caused the unem again

we and demonstrate a find the amounts are significant meaningful connec dispute plain tion with the labor tiffs’ which caused the unemployment. striking At the time that GM foundry January, workers received SIF benefits in composed regular 1968, the SIF was 53% emergency By February, 1968, dues.37 47% composed regular SIF was dues and 51% 49% emergency Consequently, dues.38 the source of the paid striking foundry benefits was to the GM workers nearly evenly regular divided between emergency and strike dues. the amount of the

payments to the strikers involved in the dispute plaintiffs’ unemploy that caused the emergency significant ment from dues is and dem meaningful onstrates a dispute connection with the labor plaintiffs’ unemployment. that caused the aspects portion All three of the amount meaningful meaningful point connection definition toward a plaintiffs’ pay-

connection between ment of caused their dues and the labor Timing

c. The final element of the definition considers whether the is tem- porally proximate to the labor that caused 37See fn 33.

38See fn 35. Baker General v Ryan, J. by Opinion applied unemployment. to this As claimant’s the case, meaningful portion of the this we find payment since the definition is satisfied sup- immediately precedes emergency dues of port unemployment. plaintiffs’ dispute that caused the provide constitution to UAW amended its The emergency strike fund of the for the collection 8, 1967. The dues were collected dues on October and Novem- from the UAW members October emergency strike fund ber, SIF received 1967. The payments December, 1967. The in November and striking to the strike fund benefits SIF disbursed January February, employees in 1968. GM The time lag the collection and disburse- between fund benefits is minimal when ment of the strike "by the funds were collected it is considered level, the local were forwarded to the hand” at striking employ- SIF, GM and were distributed waiting only they had satisfied an initial ees after temporal prox- period requirement. Therefore, the payments imity plaintiffs’ emergency of the support dues to and the use of those dispute unemployment the labor that caused their meaningful that a connection exists. demonstrate

d. Conclusion components meaningful The three of the connec- tion definition are all purpose The satisfied this case. timing plaintiffs’

of, of, amount payments emergency all indicate that there pay- is a connection between their ments and the that caused unemployment. the Board of Review properly plaintiffs disqual- concluded that the receiving by unemployment ified from benefits 29(8)(a)(ii). eligible MESA are Mich they unemployment benefits because financing, meaning- in a their fully way, that caused the labor connected Ill 29(8)(a)(ii) plaintiffs § The claim the MESA financing disqualification the federal violates con- (US Supremacy Const, VI, art stitution’s 2) Clause cl financing disqualification inhibits the since rights guaranteed § § in 7 exercise of and of the Specifically, Relations Act. National Labor plaintiffs NLRA, a federal contend stat- guarantees plaintiffs, employees, ute, right as organizations”

to "assist and to "en- gage purpose in for other concerted activities bargaining.” § 7; of collective NLRA 29 USC 157. according plaintiffs, However, to the MESA 29(8)(a)(ii) penalizes exercising § guaranteed rights making federally these finan- cial assistance to one’s labor union a disqualification basis

from entitlement Supremacy Clause, benefits. under the (NLRA) plaintiffs contend, the federal statute (MESA pre-empts 29[8][a][ii]) § the state statute congressional which conflicts with the intent guarantee rights employees expressed certain as § 7 and 8 of the NLRA.

A Supremacy The Clause of the federal constitu- tion states: Constitution, "This and the Laws of the United States thereof; shall be made Pursuance and all General Mtrs Baker v Ryan, J. made, made, under or which shall be

Treaties States, supreme shall be the Authority of the United Land; Judges every State shall be of the Law Thing in or Laws thereby, any the Constitution bound notwithstanding.” US any Contrary to the of Const, State VI, cl 2. art Supremacy pre-emption Clause doctrine The may easily stated. The be is well established Supremacy pre-empts laws which con- Clause state congressional except flict federal laws where with conflicting law exists. intent to tolerate the state general adopted by United States The test Supremacy Supreme when the Court to determine easily may also be stated. Clause has been violated determining two-part involves, first, test there is in fact a conflict between the whether and, second, deter- and the federal law mining state law Congress intended to tolerate such whether the federal law and the chal- a conflict between lenged state law. easy pre-emption

However, of the articulation always easy rule application test does not translate into given state rule and test to a of the reality, determining In fact situation. the task of Supremacy whether the has been violated Clause is often difficult. difficulty applying pre-emp-

The involved given particu- tion to the facts of case is doctrine a larly apparent when laws state "conflict” with federal As the United labor relations laws. States Supreme Union, Court said Garner v Teamsters (1953), 485, 488; 161; 346 US 74 L S Ct 98 Ed 228 regarding pre-emption: relations law federal labor * * * * * *

"The national Act to the leaves much states, though Congress telling has refrained from us spell conflicting how much. must indica- We out from Mich 463 524 state area in which congressional will the of tions action is still permissible.”39 Supreme Court the United States recently, More arduous and sometimes of the subtle again spoke federal whether determining task of state law: challenged pre-empts relations law pre-emption concerns of law "The doctrine implicit limits on Congress placed has to which extent regulation activity scope of state of permissible 'the ” labor-management New touching upon relations.’ Labor, Dep’t State of Telephone Co v New York York (1979), 519, 527; 1328; L Ed 2d 553 99 Ct 59 440 US citing Council S Diego Sears, County Dist & Co v San Roebuck 180, 187; 1745; Carpenters, 436 US S Ct (1978). 56 L Ed 2d

B however, Court seeks to rescue this party, Each treading path implicit necessity directing our boundaries limits and unstated Court case Supreme attention to one United States the financ- provides the answer whether 29(8)(a)(ii) ing disqualification contained MESA § 8 of the in violation conflicts with NLRA § Supremacy plaintiffs, Clause. The Comm, v Florida 389 US part, cite Nash Industrial (1967). 235; 362; 88 S Ct 19 L Ed 2d 438 defendant, hand, on the other cites New York Labor, Co v York Telephone Dep’t New State examination, however, supra. Upon close we are language speaks Management The Gamer of the Labor Relations However, Supreme Act and not of the NLRA. has cited the Gamer cases. See the United States Court language quoted as edited and here in NLRA 76, Lodge Aerospace Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Workers v Comm, 132, 136; Employment Wisconsin 427 US 96 S Ct Relations (1976). 2548; 49 L Ed 2d 396 (After Rem) Baker v General Mtrs by Ryan, J. convinced that neither case controls the issue raised this case. disqualified Nash,

In the claimant was from receiving unemployment compensation benefits be cause the Florida Industrial Commission found engaged that she was in a labor with her employer. According commission, to the a labor dispute existed because a state law said that filing charge aof with the National Labor Rela by against employee employer tions Board an her dispute. Further, constituted a labor disqualified the state law per benefits all partial unemployment sons whose "total or is due progress to a labor in active which exists * * * premises at the employed.”40 at which he is or was last appealed

The claimant this decision Supreme to the United States Court where she argued ruling the commission’s violated the Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution be ruling cause the "frustrated” enforcement of the NLRA. Supreme agreed

The United States Court with the claimant and held that the state statute con flicted with the NLRA and that the federal law pre-empted the state law since enforcement of the congressional state law would "thwart” the intent "impede” and would resort to the federal act.41In reaching Supreme result, this the United States two-step analysis. Court used a First, it identified right conflict between the federal asserted upon claimant and the state law relied right commission. The federal was found in-- (a)(4) § 8 of the NLRA which makes it an unfair labor practice employers against to discriminate em- Unemployment Compensation Law, 443.06, Florida § renumbered 443.101. 41Nash, supra, p 239. Mich by Opinion Ryan, J. charges.42 practice ployees unfair labor filed who hand, made the exer law, other on the The state disqualifica right the basis for federal cise of that compensation benefits. from tion tendency to had a direct Therefore, the law state having right. Second, identi federal frustrate the law federal and fied a fact between conflict Supreme challenged law, United States state congressional in was no Court there stated The intent to a conflict. tent Congress tolerate such people free make to "leave to was charges practices to the Board.” unfair labor tendency "direct The law had a frustrate state supra, p Congress.” purposes Nash, 239. pre-empted and invali Therefore, the law federal law. dated the state plaintiffs upon

Relying Nash, assert support controlling this To their Nash case. they Supreme apply the States assertion United analysis to the facts of case. Court’s Nash this identify rights allegedly they First, the federal 8; §§ 7 29 USC in this NLRA involved case: provides, part, pertinent 157, § 7 as 158. NLRA follows: ** * right "Employees join, or shall have * * * organizations engage assist and to in other purpose activities for the of collective bar- concerted **

gaining protection or other aid or mutual § NLRA 8 makes the violations of NLRA right practice. MESA, an unfair labor accord- ing plaintiffs, disqualifies to the them from receiv- ing unemployment merely they benefits because "employer” provisions equally applicable 42 The are NLRA to the Nash, Supreme p As Court state. United States stated in 239: "We no doubt that coercive actions which the Act forbids have against persons making charges employers unions to are take prohibited being likewise taken from States.” 1984] Baker (After Rem) v General J, Ryan, right to asserted federal "assist” their have union Having by paying union dues. identified the p conflict, Nash; cite 239: permitted or be to defeat handi- should not "[A state] cap objective by threatening a valid national with- persons simply they state because draw cooperate benefits plan with the Government’s constitutional ^{[*] [*]} # >> stating argument continue their

that: case, because, governs through "Nash this precisely 29(8)(a)(ii) MESA, of the state application has im § rights which, NLRA,

paired claimants’ under are ex ** * * * protected *.”43 pressly against coercion plaintiffs argue Second, that, Nash, Con- as gress pre-empt intended to state laws conflict guarantee employees with that could "assist” their unions. * * * clearly dispositive just

"Nash as here: Florida was forbidden in Nash to protected interfere with the right ment complain to by denying to the NLRB unemploy so, Michigan benefits to those who do may not deny unemployment insurance benefits when effect impair denial right, protected of that under the is to also * * NLRA, pay to dues to a *.”44 union disagree plaintiffs’ However, we with asser- controlling that tion Nash is case. this We do so right employees because Nash involved the to Regarding specific to the NLRB. make claims that right, Supreme States Court United held congressional there was no intent to tolerate a 43Plaintiffs-Appellants’ (1979), Supplemental p Brief 17. 44Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Supplemental (1979), Reply p Brief 6. Mich the exercise law and a state between conflict report However, right the NLRB. to federal holding Supreme so is not Court’s States United support it assertion toas broad Su- Nash, the United States In this case. covers preme Congress did did not hold Court any law a state conflict between tolerate intend to right. Instead, any it stated a § 8 NLRA 7 or and specific right employees concerning finding complaints Therefore, con- NLRB. with to file trary pro- plaintiffs’ assertions, Nash while guidance Court, control- is not this Nash vides ling concerning nothing says unem- a state it compensation since persons disqualification ployment financed the labor who unemployment, congres- nothing says it about disqualifications concerning financial intent

sional paying extraordi- benefits nary dues. supra, Telephone,

Citing the defen- York New controlling States United that there is dant claims supporting authority Supreme the defen- Court Telephone, position. the claim- In York New dant’s company striking telephone workers were ants according law, were enti- who, to New York state waiting unemployment after a benefits tled to period. telephone company asserted that The striking providing to workers state law benefits Supremacy it Clause since was a violation of required major finan- share of the was to bear the unemploy- paying striking cial burden of workers company asserted, This, violated ment benefits. competing the NLRA which was intended to allow according parties to "the to decide a labor play in the collective bar- free of economic forces supra, p gaining process.” Telephone, New York Department However, Labor 526. the State 1984] Baker (After Rem) v General Mtrs Opinion by Ryan, unemployment striking awarded benefits to the workers. telephone company challenged

The the award of in the district benefits federal court on the basis pre-empted by the state law was the federal law. The district court held the availa- bility unemployment benefits was a substantial affecting willing go factor whether workers were willing stay and, there, out on strike on strike. This once obviously affected the balance of bargaining pro- economic forces the collective policy cess and conflicted with the federal of free bargaining. Therefore, collective the district court pre- declared that the federal labor law relations empted the state law. The claim- appealed ants then to the United States Court of Appeals which reversed the district court’s deci- Appeals sion. The Court of held that the conflict exist, identified the district court did in fact but Congress the conflict was one which the in- legislative tended to tolerate as indicated histories of the NLRA and Title IX of the Social Security seq., Act. See 26 USC 3301 et 42 USC 501 seq., seq. telephone et and 42 USC 1101 et company appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court.

By plurality decision, the United States Su- preme Appeals Court affirmed the Court of deci- joined by Stevens, sion. Justice Justices White and Rehnquist, began opinion by distinguishing his Supreme this case from some earlier United States pre-emption Court labor relation First, cases. this arguably protected case did not involve conduct § 7 or 8 Second, of the NLRA. it did not involve attempt regulate state instead, relations; program it involved a state for the distribution of challenged state benefits. since the law general applicability was a state law of which Mich policy implemented an area a broad state presumed important interest, that it was local deprive Congress intend state of to did compelling authority Here, than a so act. rather to precluding congressional action direction state laws, Con- the federal labor relations with conflict indicating any gress that it was omitted direction authority depriving to unem- of the make the state striking payments ployment In to workers. benefit Congress fact, indication that there considerable to it. and chose tolerate aware of the conflict was agreed with Justice Stevens’ Justice Brennan agree analysis. result, with his Instead but did not distinguishing presuming cases and the earlier of congressional

intent to tolerate conflict unless shown, Brennan held that Justice otherwise legislative and the Social histories the NLRA Security provided Con- sufficient evidence that Act pre-empt pay- gress did not intend to states compensation ing unemployment to strik- benefits preferred Therefore, he to leave ers. proof the burden Congress party on asserts that intended tolerate conflict. joined by Marshall, Blackmun,

Justice Justice agreed also with the conclusion reached Justice disagreed analy- with Justice Stevens’ Stevens but they that, Brennan, felt sis. Like Justice where with a state conflict existed act curtails parties relationship free economic dispute, to a labor pre-empted the state law is there is unless Congress evidence that conflict. intended tolerate the notwithstanding case, In this the conflict legisla- law, federal and between the the state Security tive histories NLRA and the Social provide Congress in- Act evidence sufficient tended tolerate this conflict. joined by Burger Powell,

Justice Justice Chief They Stewart, Justice held dissented. General Baker v by Opinion Ryan, J. pol- state law distorted icy federal labor relations protecting bargaining free collective from They legis- state intervention. did not find a clear intent to lative and therefore tolerate conflict in this case

they have would held that the state pre-empted by law was the federal law.

Upon holding, the basis this the defendant agreed "[s]ix asserts that members of the Court Congress any had decided tolerate interfer by policy ence state law federal in the with labor compensation.”45 unemployment area only the defendant states that this Court can draw one conclusion from the New York Telephone case pre and that conclusion is that it controls emption issue before Court: "The only conclusion that can be derived opinion, applies as it preemption the federal issue Court, not before preempted by this is that state law is authorizing federal unemployment in the prohibiting law area of or * * insurance benefits to strikers *.”46 assertion, however, defendant’s over- just broad, as the assertion was over- Telephone, In broad. New York the United States Supreme pains Court took that protected note the case did any rights arguably by not involve 8 § or § 7 By doing, they implicitly of the NLRA. so may noted that a different result or conclusion be required right. party § where a 8 § asserts a or NLRA reject

Therefore, we the defendant’s asser concluding tion that "this Court should feel safe in unemployment issue, a lesser the denial support strike, insurance benefits to those who a policy.”47 will likewise not offend federal 45Defendants-Appellees’ Supplemental (1979), p Brief 3. 46Defendants-Appellees’ Supplemental (1979), p Brief 7. 47Defendants-Appellees’ Supplemental (1979), p Brief 7. Mich necessary to review this

Instead, it is believe we specific light first, facts: of its case allege law and a federal a state a conflict between protected second, right NLRA; 8 of the § 7 or disqualifies challenged are law those who state dispute, through directly financing, involved receiving ben- from a state specific case, we must undertake In efits. careful such merely rely upon analysis distin- Supreme guishable Court cases. United States

C apply requires analysis that we the A careful two-step analysis preme by the United States Su- used Telephone to in and New York

Court Nash step identify this first is to facts of case. The the conflicting allegedly laws and federal and state that there is in fact a conflict between to ascertain find fact If that a conflict does the two laws. we law, law and state exist between the federal Congress whether in- must then determine we to the conflict between the federal tended tolerate analy- of and the law. In the course this law state forget by sis, we must not that the issue raised financing plaintiffs specific: disqualifica- is does the 29(8)(a)(ii) disqualified § of MESA which tion plaintiffs the labor caused their conflict with the rights employees § § 7 and 8 NLRA their union of to "assist” Congress so, and, if did intend to 29(8)(a)(ii) § tolerate such conflict or is MESA financing disqualification pre-empted by the fed- Supremacy eral constitution’s Clause?

1 plaintiffs right by The federal is asserted Baker General Mtrs v Ryan, J. found 7 and 8 of the NLRA. Section 7 of the § § NLRA states: * * * right "Employees shall have the assist labor * * *

organizations engage and to in other concerted purpose bargaining activities for the other mutual of collective or protection.” aid or 29 USC .157. Additionally, right assert engage assist a labor union and in concerted activ ities, protected is of the NLRA which makes § rights practice. the violation an unfair § 29 USC 158. The NLRA nowhere defines term However, it "assist.” would be inconsistent with the broad statement rights contained 7 of § the NLRA to define term "assist” without including financial Additionally, assistance. such interpretation an would be inconsistent with the legislative of the NLRA which history indicates the NLRA was to encourage intended union member support financial of labor unions and to prohibit employer financial support labor uni ons.48 it is clear that of the NLRA protects right ñnancially employees "as sist” their unions and that protection such within the purpose of the NLRA. plaintiffs 29(8)(a)(ii) MESA identify as the §

state law in conflict with the federal rela- 29(8)(a)(ii) tions statute. MESA contains a § "financing” disqualification prohibits which a claimant who "finances” which causes the claimant’s unemployment from receiv- ing unemployment compensation. Such a disqualification, to according the plaintiffs, inter- feres with their federally protected right to assist Therefore, labor union. assert 48 Rep 972, Cong Sess, 9684, (1935); Cong 7570, H 74th 1st 16 79 Rec 9699, (1935). Cong 74th 1st Sess 463 Mich

534 29(8)(a)(ii) the federal conflicts with § that MESA relations expressed § § of the 7 and 8 law as NLRA. agree plaintiffs that conflict does a with the

We and the MESA. the NLRA in The conflict exist fact between prohib- great MESA is not so guaranteed right in the NLRA. "assist” its the But to disqualification affect the the does the MESA guaranteed right to "assist” of the exercise NLRA. exists, having a conflict found that step proceed to second of this we must analysis. pre-emption Congress determining to intended whether

In § 8 § 7 and between tolerate the conflict NLRA and our cue from in 29(8)(a)(ii) MESA, must take § we justices differing opinions Telephone,49 York New begin determining party bears the We establishing congressional intent burden congressional intent must be established. and what party seeking uphold general rule, As conflicting the Con- state law must establish that gress However, intended to tolerate the conflict. Supreme recognized the United States Court has Building exceptions Diego to this rule. In San Garmon, 236, 244; S Trades Council v 359 US Telephone guidance, we While we look to New York continue reject provides controlling prece- the defendants’ assertion that it Telephone 7 or § dent for this case. New York involved no 8 NLRA § rights, majority Supreme no found the United States Court Congress either that of the NLRA and state intended to tolerate conflicts between 7 or § compensation laws or presumed barring Congress should be such evi- tolerate conflicts contrary. dence to (After Rem) 1984] Baker General Mtrs v by (1959), 3 L 773; Ct Ed 2d 775 the United States Supreme upon Court held that the burden was challenged party asserting that pre-empted to show that state law was

Congress intended to prohibit law conflict where state involves aspect touch[ing] of labor relations "conduct an feeling deeply interests so rooted in local and * * * responsibility that we could not infer that Congress deprived power had the States of the act.” upon

We hold that the burden is the defendant Congress show intended to tolerate the challenged law; conflict caused state it is upon Congress not to show that prohibit intended to the conflict caused challenged state this law. We draw conclusion opinions Telephone. from the four in New York joined by Stevens, Justice Rehnquist, Justices White and opinion, specifically in the lead did not state that eligibility the definition of benefit feeling was a matter of "local and re- sponsibility,” appropri- but he did state that it was ate to treat such a state with the law deference touching upon due to a state law a matter of local feeling responsibility: and

"It appropriate is therefore to treat New York’s statute with the same deference we have afforded analogous general state laws of applicability pro- tect 'deeply interests feeling respon- rooted in local sibility.’ respect laws, With to such we have stated 'that, in the compelling absence of congressional direc- tion, we could Congress not infer that deprived had ” States power Telephone, to act.’ New York supra, pp 539-540. Justice Brennan found "substance” in Justice Ste- feeling responsi- vens’ treatment the "local bility” exception applied as to this case but did Mich 463 420

536 by Opinion Ryan, J. Telephone, pp adopt 546, specifically it. York New joined by Marshall, Blackmun, Justice 547. Justice adopt specifically inter- Stevens’ to Justice refused feeling "deeply pretation responsibility” local and rooted in of the exception stated that state and compensa- unemployment statutory definitions of "deeply eligibility not fall within tion did responsibility” excep- feeling and rooted tion. Powell, Stewart, local pp Telephone, Justice 550-551. York New Burger joined by and Justice Chief Justice "deeply rooted local held nothing exception responsibility” feeling had and compensation unemployment laws to with state do "nothing in with common because such laws had personal against protecting torts or the state laws p Telephone, property.” 560. York violence to New majority of the Therefore, a of the members Supreme that a law Court held state United States defining eligibility compensa- unemployment "deeply rooted tion did not fall within benefits feeling responsibility” exception as and so local Congress intended to shift the burden to show that pre-empt rather than intended tolerate bears the burden conflict. defendant therefore showing Congress of to tolerate the the intended § § which exists and conflict NLRA and between 29(8)(a)(ii) § of the MESA.

b concerning evaluating congressional In intent §§ the conflict 8 of NLRA between and 29(8)(a)(ii) MESA, we must review two First, the lan- federal statutes. guage we must review legislative history NLRA from right. Second, which the claim federal Security of 1935 we must review Social Act (SSA) these which affects the MESA. From two 1984] Baker (After Rem) General Mtrs v Congress sources, we must determine whether in prohib "assistance]” tended that under the NLRA financing disqualification aits under the MESA.50 Congress passed July 5, on the NLRA 1935.51 Through right employees § 7, it declared the However, "assist” their unions. it did not or define explain what it meant the term "assist” and absolutely "financing” there was disqualification no discussion of unemployment

under a state com pensation congressional statute. Such silence is perspective understandable if viewed from the July, Only 1935. five states had compensation July, 1935, statutes and these split provide states strikers; over whether benefits to

Congress explicit no made it choice between passed statutes the when NLRA.52 the concerning the NLRA is silent it whether intended §§ to tolerate right pensation conflict between the NLRA 7 8 unemployment to "assist” and a state com disqualifies law which union members who "financed” the strike which caused their un employment. Consequently, we find no indication Congress in the NLRA that the intended to toler complained ate the conflict of in this case. Congress

However, at the same time that was considering considering NLRA, it the was also the passed August SSA, which it 14, 1935, on several weeks NLRA, after the NLRA.53 Unlike the the surrounding legislative history SSA and its con- 50As Supreme members of the United States Court noted in New Telephone, York the issue raised this case could be treated not as a pre-emption acts, issue but rather as a conflict between two federal Security However, the NLRA pre-emption analysis they and the Social Act. treated it as a phrased way issue since it was that and since the regardless phrased. was the same how issue was Congress issue before the Court is whether intended to tolerate the conflict in either case. 51 etseq. 29 USC 151 52 Telephone, supra, pp New York 540-541. 53 Security 1935, 620; seq. Social Act of 49 Stat USC et Mich by Ryan, congressional many intent con- indications of

tain challenged cerning in this the conflict toleration of surrounding passage reports First, case. that numerous statements the SSA contain great to deter- latitude with the states SSA leaves unemployment benefits to receive mine who is example, For benefits. of those amount report on the SSA said: Senate necessary which are "Except for a few standards compensa- unemployment the State render certain " considered, received, upon such legislature and acted has 'The measures, left merely States are relief acts and compensation system any unemployment up free to set wish, Washington.”54 they without dictation Additionally, Economic Committee on Senate report produced Security on the SSA which was the cor- and which became sent to President report In the committee of the SSA. nerstone said: compensation that we plan unemployment

"The suggest contemplates the States shall have broad compensa up type freedom to set they tion that all matters wish. We believe uniformity be left absolutely is not should essential the States.”55

The that committee also said states should determining have in wide discretion benefits eligibility for benefits:

"Benefits —The States in deter- should have freedom s 54 (1935). 628, Sess, Rep Cong, No 74th 1st 13 55 reprinted Report Security, on as the Committee Economic Finance, Hearings on S on 74th 1130 before Senate Committee (1935). Congress, Sess, p 1st 1326 Baker General v Ryan, J. rates, mining periods, waiting their own benefit maxi periods, mum benefit etc.”56 stating

The does not contain any section limitation paid persons must be benefits strike which caused their only conclusion that can be drawn from these materials Congress to provide intended the states with wide discretion and auton- very considerable establishing omy regulating their unem- This ployment compensation systems. state auton- omy recognized has been the United States cases, New Supreme including Court several supra, p York 542, Telephone, where it was said "the scheme the Social Act has Security great always allowed states latitude in fashion- ing Therefore, their own programs.” it is very Congress clear that intended the states to have complete almost control over their unemployment compensation programs.

Second, Congress debated the repeatedly issue paying unemployment benefits to during strikers the course of the SSA larger debate. The emphasis of that debate was not directed allowing toward Instead, strikers to receive benefits. there was considerable support for a provision prohibit states from paying unemployment benefits strik ers. provisions Those were ultimately excluded from the SSA because it was felt that states should be free to decide the issue for themselves.57 How ever, Congress, in an exercise of its "state-like” authority over the Columbia, District of provided for a disqualification receiving strikers benefits.58 indi Congress cated that it did not consider the rights mentioned

56Id., p 1327. Telephone, supra, p New York 545. 28, 1935, 794, August 10(a); Act of ch Stat 950. Mich by Ryan, J. involving right strike as to NLRA § 7 of the provision conflicting disqualifying prohibiting a compensation unemployment law.

the "state” While speak specifically to a financ- does not this ing disqualification, to Con- it relevant remains rights concerning gress’ and state § 7 NLRA intent Additionally, compensation unemployment laws. disqualifies Michigan only those who law since the are through directly in the labor involved disqualifies essentially only financing, MESA Congress’ analogous to the Dis- and is "strikers” compensation unemployment trict statute. Columbia Third, did not mandate that states the SSA compensation pro implement system grams. Rather, of financial and it created complying However, states for states. benefits tax were only position if those benefits in a claim Congress complied they the SSA which had with guidance intentionally specific written without so to allow states discretion. assist as writing acceptable unemploy state the states compensation Security laws, the Social ment SSA) (which by the was established issued Board legislatures.59 These bills bills for use state draft Congress because were not "model” bills wanted great authority to leave the states de velop unemployment compensation pro own grams pressure, federal even the limited without pressure of a federal "model” draft bill. The bill provided disquali specifically persons could be for fied direct involvement in a labor 5(d) which caused their Section the draft bill states: any

"For week in it is found commission Board, Security Unemployment Social Draft Bills State Com pensation Employer Types of Pooled Fund and Reserve Account (1936).

1984] Baker v General Opinion partial unemployment total is due that his or stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dis pute factory, premises or at the establishment other at employed, provided is or that which he was this subsec not is apply tion shall if it shown to the satisfaction of (1) participating the commission that: He is not in or ñnancing directly or interested in the labor * * (2) *; belong grade He does not to a or class of which, of immediately workers before commence stoppage, employed ment of there were members at occurs, premises stoppage any at which the ñnancing participating directly in whom are or or added.) dispute.”60 (Emphasis interested financing disqualifi clearly The draft bill found congressional cation to be with the consistent in expressed §§ tent in NLRA 7 and 8. it is significance pertinent not without that the most repeated language draft bill almost verbatim in the MESA.61 assessing congressional

Fourth, it is relevant concerning intent toleration of a conflict between during nearly that, the MESA NLRA years passage 50 that followed NLRA many passed legislation SSA, and the have states disqualifying persons who finance the labor dis- pute Congress which causes their never, has in the course of its amendments of the spoken SSA, NLRA and the to this conflict. There- logical Congress fore, it is assume intended to tolerate the conflict as it exists.

We find that the above four factors indicate that Congress intended to tolerate the conflict which NLRA, §§ exists between 8, 7 and and the 29(8)(a)(ii). MESA, § Therefore, we conclude that pre-empt the NLRA does the MESA and that 60Id., 5(d). § 29(8)(a)(ii)provides: participating § MESA "He is in or * * directly or interested the labor Mich Ryan, J. the Su- as violative not invalid the MESA is premacy constitution. of the federal Clause 29(8)(a)(ii) § MESA also claim plain- the internal decisions with interferes tiffs’ clearly not the § 8. It is NLRA union under 29(8)(a)(ii) so. To the extent to do of MESA intent that a conflict Congress exists, that the we believe peripheral it effect when to tolerate such intended toleration state indicated its disqualification containing clauses. financial laws Therefore, above, the NLRA we conclude as pre-empt that the MESA MESA and the does Supremacy Clause of the is not invalid as violative constitution. of the federal

IV plaintiffs’ is that the board final contention The disqualified of their First them in violation rights However, their association. Amendment argument of support has contention two of this upon it First, it is since is based flaws. outdated they this of the as stood before the facts Court decided case supra. Second, Baker, the religion to First Amendment freedom of cases cite support Amendment freedom of associa- First argument. quickly dispose The of tion both Court can

arguments. upon outdated facts re reliance adoption sults from their of the freedom of associa argument of the tion the amicus brief appeal time, United At the Steelworkers.62 applied financing disqualification board had the of 29(8)(a)(ii) any payment non-ordinary § MESA Brief, PlaintiíFs-Appellants’ p 55. (After Rem) Baker v General strike fund dues without consideration of whether connection existed between the the plain claimant’s through tiffs, the United Steelworkers amicus argue disqualification statutory brief, interpreted "as appeal applied” by board and Appeals the Court of has no rational sought interest be state achieved disqualification disqualifica section, financial persons "involuntarily” tion ployed who are not unem they

because financed unemployment.63 However, which caused their they 29(8)(a)(ii) argue did not that MESA was but, rather, unconstitutional on its face acknowl 29(8)(a)(ii) edged that "Section as written satisfied constitutionality.”64 They the test of made this acknowledgment they correctly recognized because "regulation this case involves in the social this, and economic field.”65 Because of the state only "legislative needed rational basis 29(8)(a)(ii)” classification made in Section to defeat challenge their freedom association and such a clearly rational basis existed in this case.66There plaintiffs, through adoption fore, the argue merely brief, United Steelworkers amicus interpretation 29(8)(a)(ii), for an MESA, § disqualification compat which makes the financial general purpose ible with MESA, which disqualifies only dispute financing those of whose the labor unemployment

which caused their made unemployment "voluntary” their under the stat already ute. This the Court has done remand ing requiring the case to the review board and

63 Brief, p United Steelworkers Amicus 7. 64 Brief, p United Steelworkers Amicus 7. 65 Brief, p United Steelworkers Amicus 7. 66 Brief, p United Steelworkers Amicus 7. 420 463

544 Mich between claimant’s caused the the labor Having interpreted the MESA narrowly, disqualification there is more financial longer any the First it violates risk that no by "needlessly of freedom association Amendment burdening] Instead, MESA unionization.”67 29(8)(a)(ii) as and as written is constitutional adopted plaintiffs applied. in their As note Dandridge [v "under brief, it is well-settled law L 471; 1153; 25 Ed 2d Williams, 397 90 S Ct US * * * Michigan (1970)] State of can 491 compensation grant of its condition knowingly disqualify those who benefits so as to unemp their which causes finance having loyment.”68 Therefore, the statute been plaintiffs having narrowly interpreted validity recognized constitutional 29(8)(a)(ii), argument pro written, MESA, § as this no basis for relief. vides ar- second freedom association

gument disbursing unemploy- state, in is that may put benefits, to a ment claimants "hard argument, support In choice.” this Verner, 83 398; cases: Sherbert v 374 US cite two S (1963), 1790; 10 2d v Ct L Ed 965 and Thomas Security Employment Review Board of the Indiana Division, 707; L 1425; US 101 S Ct 67 Ed 2d (1981). While both cases involve claimants for unemployment benefits who raise First Amend- objections disqualification ment such benefitSj case neither involves First Amendment Instead, freedom association. both cases involve employment claimants either or left who lost be- religious it cause conflicted with their beliefs. As Brief, p United Amicus 8. Steelworkers Brief, p United Steelworkers Amicus 8. 1984] Baker v General Opinion by Ryan, J.

such, First both cases involve Amendment freedom plaintiff religion. case, In no this has asserted religion. Therefore, of his freedom violation religion traditionally since freedom of has been very differently from economic and treated social association, these not freedom of cases are rele- plaintiffs by to the issue raised vant and provide no basis for relief.

Additionally, reject- note reason for we another ing plaintiffs’ First freedom of Amendment argument. plaintiffs pre- The association sent did any any evidence that one of them was dis- exercising right suaded from his First Amendment any or even that of them considered MESA 29(8)(a)(ii) disqualification impinging § financial as upon rights. Therefore, their First Amendment upon there is no factual basis could which the Court grant any relief. finding plaintiffs’ neither of the First arguments ap-

Amendment freedom of association plicable presently exists, to this case as it we find no violation First Amendment rights. freedom of association

V properly The Board of Review held that disqualified receiving unem- 29(8)(a)(ii). ployment plaintiffs § benefits MESA financed the labor which caused their and there was a plaintiffs’ connection between the and unemploy- the labor 29(8)(a)(ii), applied, ment. MESA as written is constitutional. It violates neither the federal Supremacy constitution’s nor Clause First Amendment to the federal constitution.

The decision of the Board of Review is affirmed. Mich Opinion Williams, C.J. JJ.,

Brickley Cavanagh, with concurred of rationale most the I concur with C.J. Williams, necessarily opinion, Ryan’s my but not brother of however, dissent, from that I the conclusion. with 11(C)(2)(b), opinion part in Part of found his accounting establishing principle for "Third,” an 'emergency’ considering upon dues "the effect sup- of allocated the the union to resources accounting p disputes” porting ante, 504. The p disagree 505, ante, as with I is stated principle follows: composed applied SIF, of which is to the UAW’s "As regular

payments payments composed emergency sources, from both from the to fund be considered be should regular percentage dues and of of the same larger the fund.” dues as Ryan writes, an surface, such as Justice On logical. approach However, the fact seems fair applied, that, the matter if this formula is of percentage always of will remain a there "emergency” commingled fund that relates to drops until the end of time unless fund to dues nor, in the I am zero interim. This is neither fair Legislature. sure, intended consequence, adopt I a As would Last-In-First- (LIFO) First, formula for three Out reasons. voting LIFO formula would relate the and contri- proximately "emergency” bution more equivalent to the distribution an amount money subject distributed strike benefits triggering disqualification Ryan compensation for- than either the Justice (FIFO) Sec- mula or the formula. First-In-First-Out ond, the dura- LIFO formula would not inflate Baker v General Opinion by Williams, C.J. "emergency” payments subject tion of disqualification by totally irrelevant factor of prior properly the size of the constituted strike Ryan the Justice formula fund as does. For exam- ple, under the Justice Ryan formula if there were prior equal fund to the size of the strike dues "emer- disqualification gency” payments, would long (during payment as last twice twice as dollars) many strike benefit as it would if there had no fund. been strike This has the curious increasing exposure disqualification effect of comparative inverse order to the amount of "emer- gency” Third, dues. the LIFO formula does not perpetually taint the strike fund as the formula adopted Ryan Justice has would do. When the last spent, "emergency” cent of dues is there would no longer possibility financing disqualifica- be the of a tion. passing,

In formula, the other discussed FIFO formula is not To fair as as the formula. LIFO

begin requires payment with, it of strike deposited moneys benefits first out of in the fund prior commingling "emergency” to the dues. payment This means the of strike funds would be proximately out made of the least concerned mon- eys. large enough, Second, if the strike fund were emergency might pass without the "emer- gency” being touched. This could also mean "emergency” paid that the later date when dues would be out at a they disqualify would unreason- ably "emergency” or relieve the dues from ever disqualifying. Neither alternative would seem to Legislature be what the had mind.

In conclusion, I would remand this matter to the using Board of Review to whether, determine any "emergency” formula, LIFO amount of funds beyond actually a de amount, minimis financed striking strike benefits for the workers in the GM 420 Mich 463 Boyle, J. plants. supplying plaintiffs’ no plants If there were paid. If there were funds, should be benefits such pursu- disqualification funds, there would be such Ryan’s opinion. to Justice ant Williams, C.J. Levin, J., with concurred as Justice Williams I with Chief J. concur Boyle, applied accounting be formula that should to the properly plaintiffs were whether to determine disqualified receiving unemployment benefits "financing” the labor adop has Because Court their "temporal proximity” consid factor to be as a ted "meaning determining there was a whether ered in ful between connection” payments that caused and the labor agree unemployment, Chief Justice I with provides the faire that the LIFO formula

Williams evaluating the issue. st1 means part J., in the decision took no Kavanagh, this case._

formulae. As opposed to either the FIFO or Justice Ryan’s "proportionality”

Case Details

Case Name: Baker v. General Motors Corp.

Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court

Date Published: Jan 17, 1985

Citation: 363 N.W.2d 602

Docket Number: Docket Nos. 59861-59863. (Calendar No. 3)

Court Abbreviation: Mich.