35 Iowa 184 | Iowa | 1872
The facts of this casq, as disclosed by the abstract before us, are as follows : Defendant, who is an attorney at law, was employed by one Shaffer to foreclose a mortgage upon lands in Adams county, executed to him by one Biggs, to secure the payment of $125. Suit was brought by the defendant upon the mortgage in the district court of Adams county, in 1858. Before final judgment in the action, which was rendered in October, 1858, Shaffer sold the claim to one Savacool, and, by a separate instrument, assigned the mortgage to him. Of this transfer defendant was advised but continued the prosecution of the suit in Shaffer’s name for the benefit of Savacool. The judgment rendered in the case was general and not a foreclosure of the mortgage against the lands described therein. In March following, the lands involved in this suit with other property were sold upon an execution issued on the judgment, and bid in by defendant for and in the name of Savacool, and a certificate of purchase taken accordingly. After the sheriff’s sale
Defendant procured the sheriff’s deed to be made to Savacool, and deposited it for record with the proper officer. After this Savacool executed a quit-claim deed to Baker, leaving the description of the land blank, intending to insert it when ascertained. This instrument he took to Quincy, hut finding the recorder out of his office was unable to ascertain the description of the land. He thereupon called upon defendant, who advised him that the blank in the deed was not sufficient to permit the insertion of the proper description of the property. For this reason the instrument was destroyed and a new one written and acknowledged before defdndant, who was a notary. It was left with defendant to be deposited in the recorder’s office for record, after blank for the description of the land should be filled in, but no money was paid to him either for his own services in preparing and acknowledging the deed or for the fees of the recorder. This deed defendant did not deliver to the recorder. This was in 1860.
Plaintiff left the State in 1863. After this, his agent at Chariton wrote to Davis in- regard to the business, but received no reply. He also wrote to the clerk of the court who advised him that the judgment had been satisfied and receipted by defendant. He wrote again to the clerk, making inquiry about defendant, and was informed that he was absent, and that there had been a sale of lands on the judgment, -but the sale had been annulled or abandoned for want of payment of costs. Thereupon the agent made no further inquiry in regard to the business.
In 1865, the lands were sold for delinquent taxes and were purchased by defendant, and in 1868 a treasurer’s deed was executed to him. Of the sale and purchase by
Upon this state of facts plaintiff asks that he may be permitted to redeem from the tax deed, or that it be declared void, or that defendant be declared to be his trustee and to hold the land for his benefit, on the ground that the relation of client and attorney existed between plaintiff and defendant at the time of the purchase, and for the further reason that the acts of defendant in the matter were fraudulent, and through them he was prevented paying the taxes upon the lands for which they were sold.
I. We may concede that defendant was the attorney of plaintiff after he became the owner of the claim or sheriff’s certificate, and acted as such in procuring the deed. This view we find it unnecessary to discuss, but for the purpose of this case adopt it here.
The next inquiry is, when did that relation cease? Defendant’s duty, and he was employed for no other purpose, was to collect the claim secured by the mortgage. In its discharge he brought suit and recovered judgment, and, under the direction of the plaintiff or the party then holding the judgment, he bid off the land at the execution sale. The party holding the judgment directed him to take the land upon the claim. Plaintiff, upon acquiring his interest in the claim, was bound by the acts of the party of whom he purchased, directing this course. Besides he, himself, consented to take the land upon the judgment. Defendant took the sheriff’s deed and had it recorded; this vested title in Savacool; he had no directions to have the deed made to plaintiff, but, granting that it was his duty to have it so made, plaintiff has lost nothing by such omission of duty, for he has acquired title by
II. We are unable to arrive at the conclusion that any act of defendant tended to prevent plaintiff paying the taxes, or that he was misled or deceived thereby, and for that reason failed to pay the taxes. He knew that the lands had been sold upon the judgment; he knew or ought to have known their proper description for he had, during a considerable time, the certificate of sale in his
III. It is claimed by plaintiff that he was not under obligation to pay defendant’s attorney fees for the reason that he had not assumed to do so, and because they were exorbitant, and the suit in which the charges were made had been mismanaged. In the first place, the evidence is that he did, in the purchase of the claim, agree with Savacool to pay defendant’s charges ; in the second place, Savacool could not transfer the claim so as" to defeat defendant’s proper lien upon the papers in his hands pertaining to the suit, or his duties as attorney in the matter. We discover nothing in the evidence authorizing the conclusion that defendant’s charges were unreasonable, or that he had improperly managed the suit on the mortgage. Such being the facts and the law, the refusal of defendant, in the first instance, to deliver the certificate of sale, and afterward to send plaintiff the deed, is justifiable, and cannot be considered a breach of professional duty. If plaintiff has suffered from want of knowledge of the description of the land, resulting from the fact that the deed was not in his possession, his own fault has caused his misfortune. He cannot charge defendant with it. His successful attempt in avoiding the payment of defend
In our opinion, the decree of the district court dismissing plaintiff’s petition is sustained by the law and the facts of the case.
Affirmed.