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Baker v. Commonwealth
677 S.W.2d 876
Ky.
1984
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*1 BAKER, Appellant, Bobby Scott

COMMONWEALTH of

Appellee.

Supreme Kentucky. Court 4, 1984.

Oct. *2 Martin, Louisville, Jr., appellant.

Joe for Gen., Armstrong, Atty. David L. David Martin, Gen., Atty. Frankfort, K. Asst. for appellee.

VANCE, Justice. question is whether (K.R.S. 507.050) given in a in case which the defendant person believing kills another force used was him- self unlawful force deceased, but under circumstances a where such belief was unreasonable. K.R.S. 503.120.

Appellant, Bobby Baker, Scott was con- victed jury the Jefferson Circuit wife, Court for the murder of his former Vivian Ann Baker. He was sentenced to years prison.

Baker stormy marriage, and Vivian had a They which ended divorce. had alterca- during marriage. tions both their after they At times threatened kill one anoth- 2, 1981, er. On November Baker and his drinking brother went out to a local bar. evening working That his former was wife at Club a Louisville bar. Vivian fight employee had a with another female night, girl appel- who was friend of evening appellant lant. visited Later that house, enraged this woman at her became her, had way at the his former wife treated looking and went the Club 68 handgun along. He took a Baker wife. the bar around 3:00 a.m. After arrived at night’s he confronted Vivian with events, began running she to the bar. She bar, kept generally was purse at the purse. keep handgun known her Appellant back shot Vivian six times bar, continuing she to shoot ran lying until she was the floor. One shot gun provides fired with the in full contact with K.R.S. 503.120 that an unrea- shooting body. After Baker belief that the use nec- Vivian’s sonable of force is placed gun essary protection on the bar and called for an for self which es- justification police. and the He confessed to tablish for an intentional act ambulance police pursuant arrived. No 503.050 *3 crime when K.R.S. cannot be used gun premises. prosecution as in a justification other was found on the where wan- tonness or suffices to estab- recklessness gave jury The the trial court instructions culpability. commentary points The lish murder, degree man- on first and second out that while an unreasonable but actual slaughter, Appellant con- and self-defense. necessity physical use belief the to force failing tends that the trial court erred to protection justify for self will an intention- give Ap- a homicide instruction. reckless act, justify a al it cannot used to wanton be 503.120(1) authority pellant as cites K.R.S. or reckless act. giving for a reckless homicide instruction reasoning, Following line of we held this case, present relying on the Blake v. Commonwealth, supra, that in Blake v. Commonwealth, Ky., 422 607 S.W.2d jury might from cases which a conclude (1980). genuinely the evidence that a defendant was neces- believed that the use of force penal to adoption Prior the of the might sary protection, for his self but also code, justification self defense was a for belief was required conclude that the defendant’s the It show crime of murder. a unreasonable, entirely an instruction ing of that the defendant believed use given. reckless homicide should be physical necessary to force was himself, reasonable, that his was and belief holding in We have re-examined our necessary that force used was believed Blake, supra, and it to erroneous. find danger. protect against to imminent If the An offenses specific instruction as to is of force was neces belief that only is required when there some evidence protection for was unreason sary self an reasonably support to the instruction. belief, protection self not avail able is de- The offense of reckless homicide Hargis as v. Common able a defense. fined statute as follows: (1909). wealth, 239 Ky. S.W. person guilty “A is of when, subjec a recklessness causes

K.R.S. 503.050 substitutes with person.” 507.- objective death of another K.R.S. tive rather than an test as that the use of 050. reasonableness of belief protection. for Un is self force mental K.R.S. 501.020 defines three statute, physical

der the use of force this culpability penal under the code. states for death, protection for serious self are, wanton, (3) (1) intentional, (2) They and or inter physical injury, kidnapping, sexual reckless. compelled by justi force or threat is course with The intentional mental state if is that force is it believed such fiable of or conduct consists respect to a result to regardless of necessary, and is true this objective a cause that result conscious to necessity as is reason whether the belief engage in that conduct. unreasonable. able or an aware penal ex- Wantonness consists of commentary to the code of a sub previous disregard of conscious plains departure this from ness and that partic unjustifiable risk that a brought feeling stantial and practice was about must be of result will occur. risk person ought to be convicted for ular that a disregard degree that has a nature and where he labored such a crime intention that, from gross deviation had the facts thereof constitutes a mistake such a reasonable of conduct that been the standard supposed, as he he would have person observe situation. guilt. free appellant Recklessness consists of the failure In this case the does not perceive even contend that he unjustifiable perceive substantial and failed to firing risk particular body six shots into risk that a result will occur. The the deceased would cause her degree risk death. Since must be such a nature and the risk result would occur is so perceive failure it constitutes a appellant obvious since the does not gross deviation from the standard care perceive risk, contend that failed to person that a reasonable would observe in there was no basis the situation. homicide, give failure concurring In separate opinion the view such an instruction was not erroneous. expressed that recklessness as used in Commonwealth, supra, Blake v. insofar K.R.S. 507.050 refers conduct as distin- otherwise, it holds is overruled. *4 guished from recklessness as defined in There seems to be little doubt that the perceive as K.R.S. 501.020 the failure to the commentary drafters of in had mind the to authority risk as result. No is cited that a defendant who kills another believ- interpretation. for this ing, believe, but without to reason so that his necessary protect use of force was to provides K.R.S. 501.020 that the himself should not be convicted murder of apply definitions contained therein subject but that he nevertheless should be criminal code. When specifically words are prosecution to for the lesser offenses of defined statute courts must use the manslaughter in the degree second reck- or prescribed by definition the in statute the less homicide. interpretation of the Kentucky statute. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. general assembly provide, did not Mason, Ky.App., (1980); 600 S.W.2d 483 however, the inclusion of an intentional Atkins, Ky., Schroader v. 657 S.W.2d 945 offense within definition of reckless (1983). Thus, pursuant to the definition of escape homicide. We cannot that fact as it recklessness is defined in K.R.S. 501.- act in an claimed to be done self defense is applicable and made to the criminal an act. intentional It is not a “reckless” code, recklessness it is as used in K.R.S. act as term that is defined statute. 507.050refers to the failure of the actor to sought To by appellant, reach the result perceive conduct, the risk incident to his we have to redefine the of crime not the fact that may his conduct be con by adding reckless homicide another sec- sidered negligent or reckless in the ordi tion to provide K.R.S. 507.050 so as to that nary meaning of those words. person guilty (1) of is when, with recklessness causes the homicide is a lesser of Reckless (2) person, death of or another when he fense than murder manslaughter person by causes the of death another second degree the perpetrator because use force which he to believes is homicide unaware that conduct his death, phys- himself serious unjustifiable entails a substantial and risk ical injury, kidnapping, or inter- sexual of death. The reckless homicide statute compelled by course force or threat deals both with conduct and result. It which circumstances would render such a deals unjust with conduct which creates an belief unreasonable. particular result, ifiable of a risk and the The enactment of a statute defin punishment imposed is less than that im ing the of a is legislative elements crime posed for intentional or wanton conduct matter, authority and this court is without perpetrator because consciously did not provisions to add additional substantive result, intend the but nevertheless he statute enacted. as grossly deviated from standard of a failing person perceive reasonable in which create criminal Statutes express risk. do so in terms and offenses should question upon impli- explanation and the liability not utes criminal rest Blake, reject. or inference as to what the General followed and now cation we expressly did not Assembly intended but Law Banks-Bald- Criminal sought an appellant Ed.). While the here win, (1982 state. p. 589 homicide, our inter- 507.050(1) “a specifies person KRS apply pretation of will with the statute when, guilty of reckless homicide with is equal in similar cir- force to defendant the death of anoth- recklessness causes of reck- may be convicted cumstances who added.) (Emphasis person.” Reckless- er objection no over less homicide used define conduct. ness here is homicide should instruction on reckless is true that the term “reckless- While it which given have because statute 501.030(4), ly” as defined KRS General expressly include that crime did created Principles Liability, is stated terms having an unreasonable belief result,” appar- “the necessity perceive for self-defense as failure force crime. this statute and KRS element of the ent conflict between by recognizing that resolved 507.050 is Judgment is affirmed. 507.050 addresses KRS “recklessness” conduct, This not result. common STEPHENS, C.J., GANT, STE- An meaning of the statute. accused sense PHENSON, VANCE, WINTER- *5 instruction on reckless SHEIMER, entitled to an JJ., concur. evidence sufficient if he offers homicide AKER, JJ., in the concur LEIBSON belief, subjective however unrea- indicate by separate opinion. result sonable, necessary. that self-defense was LEIBSON, Justice, concurring opinion. subjective express that a be- The statutes stated, I concur For reasons that will be held, lief, recklessly qualifies as self-de- However, v. result. Blake Com- homicide. fense but constitutes (1980), monwealth, 422 Ky., S.W.2d 607 at no enact 503.120 There was need to KRS legislative will as correctly analyzes the up did not mean set legislature all if 503.120(1); KRS and Blake expressed by situ- crime this overruled. ation. meaning is that plain The statute had sufficient here evidence If of a when an accused offers evidence self-defense, the justify an instruction subjective in the need for “reckless” belief to an entitled have been accused would “justification self-protection KRS offense the lesser included (self-defense),” may he then be con- 503.050 Lockett, People 82 v. reckless homicide. “for for which ... reck- victed an offense 900, 413 N.E.2d 546, Ill.Dec. Ill.2d culpabili- lessness ... suffices establish justi- (1980). no evidence to But there was 503.120(1). ty.” KRS went The accused instruction. fy such an majority opinion states that there out gun, sought bar with loaded of the “seems little doubt that drafters repeatedly her victim and shot commentary” considered that a reckless be- one as a whole When considered back. reduces lief in the need for self-defense not infer his evidence from could homicide, to reckless but concludes murder shooting victim rather believed that statutory of reckless definition necessary at that leaving the bar was than enough to include homicide is not broad anything, If self-protection. for his time self-protection. Re- reckless conduct delusional, self-protec- but the accused disagree. spectfully, I belief, un- depends on a reasonable tion is neces- reasonable, self-protection Commentary upon Commen- is based time, delu- appellant’s sary at the Fi- accompanying the November 1971 tary (if regard to not with any) were Kentucky Penal sions Draft Code. nal self-protection but with for immediate the stat- need people The same authored both regard self-protection. to future Therefore

the accused was not entitled under the

facts of this case to an instruction on self-

protection, nor to an instruction on reckless

homicide in the the jury event believed self-protection, recklessly.

acted in but J.,

AKER, joins concurring opin- this

ion.

COMMONWEALTH

Appellant, LITTRELL, Appellee.

Wilbur Hite

Supreme of Kentucky. Court

Oct. 1984.

Case Details

Case Name: Baker v. Commonwealth
Court Name: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date Published: Oct 4, 1984
Citation: 677 S.W.2d 876
Court Abbreviation: Ky.
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