In Jаnuary, 1908, the supply of coal in the city of Grand Rapids was limited, with prospects of great scarcity. Citizens could not readily obtain a necessary quantity for household purposes. Complainant and certain other coal dealers were acting in concert to control the price of- hard coal. Prices were fixed'by certain circulars which, from time to time, were sent around to these dealers. The price was advanced to $12 per ton, and those coal dealers not following the fixed prices fоund it difficult to obtain coal. In view of the situation, the common council of Grand Rapids, on January 5, 1903, passed a resolution transferring from the contingent fund $10,000 to a special fund for thе purpose of buying coal to sell to the citizens, and a commission was appointed for that purpose. This action was rescinded for the reason that its legality was questioned. The same amount, January 19,1903, by a unanimous vote of the council, was transferred from the contingent fund to the poor fund, to be drawn upon in the usual way by the poor commissiоners. The commissioners purchased coal and disposed of it in the following manner : Paupers were furnished coal free. Those poor people who could pay something for coal furnished were required to do so. Coal was also sold at cost to those citizens who could not get any elsewhere. The first car load of coal was purchased January 31 and the last February 5, 1903, and coal was sold to about 470 people. This work of disposing of the coal continued about one month. The board of рoor commissioners on March 30th made its report to the council. Three thousand dollars had been drawn from the treasury, and $3,054.70 was returned.
Complainant, a retail coal dealer and a taxpayer in said city, on or about February 23, 1903, filed his bill of com
It was not contended by defendant that it could enter into the business of dealing in coal commerciаlly, but that in the then existing emergency, when coal and. other fuel could not be procured, and there was a reasonable probability that a coal famine was impending, it had the right to procure fuel to furnish, not only to the needy poor, but also to other citizens who could not procure it elsewhere, and claimed that the action of the city, through its board of poor commissioners, was not illegal and void. It admitted that out of such fund coal and wood were purchased, and alleged that no loss whatever was madе to the city, and that the officers of the city had been informed by the coal and wood dealers that in a short time no hard coal or wood could be procured. To provide for an emer-. gency, to be able to furnish to the needy fuel free of charge, as had been done for years, and to supply with coal at a reasonable price other citizens who could not pay the price of $12 a ton exacted by a combination of dealers, the proceedings complained of were takеn. The answer also denied that complainant had been deprived of profits from his business, or would be subjected to any assessment upon his property by reason of the prеmises, or that it had, or would, unlawfully appropriate the property of complainant or any other person.
There is little, if any, dispute as to the facts in the case. Thе entire proofs consisted of the testimony of complainant and two officers of the city sworn in his behalf, to
The city authorities had the right, through the board of poor commissioners, to provide fuel for needy citizens, and under the then existing emergency, where a coal famine appeared imminent, were authorized to purchase such amount of fuel in any market, as, in their opinion, would be necessary for that purpose. A municipality, however, cannot enter into a commercial enterprise, such as buying and selling coal to its citizens as a business, thereby entering into competition with dealers in coal. Such use of moneys is held not to be for a public purpose. Opinion of the Justices,
“ Under a condition in which the supply of fuel would be so small, and the difficulty of obtaining it so great, that persons desiring to purchase it would be unable to supply themselves through private enterprise, it is conceivable that agencies of government might be able to obtain fuel where citizens generally could not. Under suсh circumstances we are of opinion that the government might constitute itself an agent for the relief of the community, and that money expended for the purpose would bе expended for a public use. * * *
“As to that we are of opinion that, if the supposed conditions exist in any city or town, it may* be authorized under proper legislation to sell fuеl, with the limitations above stated, so long as these conditions continue.” Opinion of the Justices,182 Mass. 610 (60 L. R. A. 592).
The first action of the city council was the transfer of $10,000 from the contingent fund to a special fund to be usеd for the purpose of selling coal to the citizens of Grand Rapids at actual cost under a commission to be appointed by the mayor. This action was rescinded, and,
If complainant has made a case which will warrant the court to exercise its еquitable jurisdiction in his behalf, and has shown that he has suffered damages by reason of such action on the part of the city, he is entitled to relief. It appears that complainant at the time in question'was in a combination with certain other coal dealers in the city of Grand Rapids, in violation of the provisions of sections 11377-11379, 3 Comp. Laws, the purpоse and intent of which was to enhance, regulate, and control the price of coal in that market, and that by reason of such unlawful combination the municipality actеd as it did relative to supplying coal to some of its citizens. Such unlawful conduct of complainant would not excuse unauthorized action by the city, but would bear upon the questiоn as to whether complainant came into a court of chancery with clean hands. It further appears that his suit is brought under an agreement that certain coal dealers are to bear the expense of litigation. Complainant testified that he was not damaged in his business to the amount of a single dollar, that he supplied all of his customers, аnd had no coal to supply others. It is shown that a few days after the bill of complaint was filed the city discontinued selling coal, and the $10,000 put into the poor fund was transferred baсk to the contingent fund. It also appears, without dispute, that by the city’s action no loss at all occurred, and no' increased burden could be imposed upon complainant’s property by reason thereof. By his case he failed to show any present or prospective injury.
Complainant commenced his suit in his own behalf to restrain the city frоm unlawfully injuring him in his business and from subjecting his property to the burden of an unlawful assessment for taxes. Neither by his bill of complaint nor by the evidence in the case does it appear
For the reasons stated, the decree of the court below is affirmed, with costs of both courts.
