90 Ga. App. 662 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1954
Baker sued American Oil Company in Fulton Superior Court. The suit was based upon a guarantee of American Oil Company to indemnify the plaintiff against a wrong act in breaking a contract with one Mrs. Crawford, as agent for Texas Oil Company. The defendant filed to the petition a general demurrer, which was sustained and the petition dismissed. The plaintiff excepted.
The petition as finally amended alleged: that the defendant is engaged in the wholesale gasoline and oil business and filling-station supplies in Georgia; that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $2,100; that the plaintiff owns property located at 2879 Gordon Road, S. W., and had leased this property to two named individuals during the year 1942; that Mrs. Crawford approached the plaintiff regarding the signing of a contract to have her furnish gasoline and oil for his said property, and after consulting with the said lessees and securing their agreement, the plaintiff entered into a written contract with the said Mrs. Crawford on June 23, 1945, which contract was to run for.7% years and in which the plaintiff agreed to use exclusively the products of Texaco Oil Company. The contract referred to is set forth in the petition, and it appears therefrom that Mrs. Crawford agreed thereby to install on the premises mentioned certain gasoline-station equipment; that certain other equipment already installed at the time of the contract was declared thereby to be the property of Mrs. Crawford; and it further appeared that she had caused certain improvements to be made to the premises at her own expense, which was a part of the consideration for the contract.
The petition further alleged: that thereafter the plaintiff permitted the removal of Mrs. Crawford’s pumps and service-station equipment and the installation of American Oil Company’s equipment and signed a “Landlord’s Consent” as agreed, and American Oil Company began furnishing oil, gas, and other petroleum products to be sold on the premises; that “Your petitioner shows that the said Fred J. Baker and H. C. Posey, who were operating the said station, at this time, entered into a contract with the said American Oil Company for them to furnish their products and went ahead and ignored the contract which he had signed, with the said Mrs. J. M. Crawford, and the said FI. C. Posey and Fred J. Baker, quit purchasing the Texaco products, in accordance with the contract that your petitioner had signed with Mrs. J. M. Crawford and started using the American Oil Company’s products and ignored his contract with Mrs. J. M. Crawford, and your petitioner shows that he persisted
The question for decision in this case is whether a contract by which one agrees to indemnify another against loss in order .to induce him to break a contract with a third party is enforceable under the laws of this State. The plaintiff in error’s brief is replete with a compilation of foreign authorities holding that a contract of the nature above referred to is legal and enforceable. The brief is well prepared and evinces praiseworthy genius and industry.
Whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, Georgia adheres to the wholesome doctrine that the consideration of a contract must be moral and legal. If its consideration fails to meet either of these requirements, the contract is not enforceable. “Impossible, immoral, and illegal conditions are void and are binding upon no one.” Code § 20-111. “In all cases he who m'aliciously procures an injury to be done to another, whether it is an actionable wrong or a breach of contract, is a joint wrongdoer, and may be sued either alone or jointly with the actor.” Code § 105-1207. In a well-considered and strongly worded opinion in Luke v. DuPree, 158 Ga. 590, 595-597 (124 S. E. 13), the Supreme Court said: “It is actionable maliciously or without justifiable cause to induce one to break his contract with another to the damage of the latter. . . The theory of this doctrine is that the parties to a contract have a property right therein, which a third person has no more right maliciously to deprive
“An examination of the authorities cited above will show that the term ‘malicious’ or ‘maliciously’ means any unauthorized interference, or any interference without legal justification or excuse. Personal ill will or animosity is not essential. So this court has held. . . Such examination will likewise disclose that this doctrine is not confined to contracts of employment alone, but extends to all contracts. A conspiracy is a combination to accomplish an unlawful end, or to accomplish a lawful end by unlawful means. . . The breach of a contract is unlawful. It is unlawful for others, without lawful excuse, to induce the maker of a contract to break it, or to aid him in its breach; and for the maker and others to combine to break it is a conspiracy, which entitles the other party to the contract to his action against the conspirators for any damage which he may sustain.” See also Employing Printers Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509 (50 S. E. 353, 69 L. R. A. 90, 106 Am. St. R. 137, 2 Ann. Cas. 694); Darnell v. Toney, 41 Ga. App. 673 (154 S. E. 379).
The indemnity contract upon which suit is brought has for its consideration the immoral and illegal conspiracy to wrongfully deprive Mrs. Crawford of the fruits of her contract with the plaintiff in error. It was consequently unenforceable.
The trial court did not err in sustaining the general demurrer and in dismissing the action.
Judgment affirmed.