delivered the opinion of the court.
This action was commenced, October 12, 1886, before a Justice of the Peace of Greene County, Tennessee, and involves the right of property in three heifers and one steer, levied upon as the property of Frederick Scruggs, but claimed by his wife to belong to her, and not subject to seizure or sale for the debts of her husband. Judgment having- been rendered for her, the case was carried by appeal to -the Circuit Court of that county.'.
It appears that Scruggs and wife were married about eighteen years before the commencement of this action, and lived, during most of their married life, on lаnds deeded to her, as follows: one hundred and thirty acres, by deed of January 1, 1881; two hundred and seventy-four acres, by deed of April 19, 1877; one hundred and eight acres, by deed of May 8, 1886. The deeds to Mrs. Scruggs were in fee simple, but did not create a technical separate estate.' Some years prior to this litigation her husband -failed in business, after which he attended to his wife’s affairs, trading for her in stock, hogs, etc., and superintending farm work, etc., as'her agent. He., ocсasionally traded in live stock for himself. .'From 1879 to 1881 he engaged, in the name of his father, in merchandising in a house in the yard of the home dwelling lot, and from 1881. to 1884 in the nаme-of his brother William, and with their money, he receiving and keeping all the profits/ He and Mrs. Scruggs took from the store whatever each wanted, .paid hаnds on the farm partly out of it, and put back into the store . the proceeds of the farm, but without strict account being kept between them as husband and wife,, or between'them and William Scruggs, as in the case of strangers. The husband.did *489 not keep the wife’s funds strictly separate from liis own, but often commingled them.
In the spring оf 1884 he sold, some cattle belonging to the wife for about $200; and afterwards bought two head of young cattle for her with part of- this money. In' September or October following he purchased one other steer for her with the proceeds of what was raised on her farms, and while the cattle were pasturing together, another calf came from one of her cows. They were levied on as the property of the husband under an execution issued September 10, 1886, Avbich was based upon a judgment against him, in favor of one Scott, rendered September 22, 1876. At the execution sale Baker, the testator оf the plaintiffs in error, became the purchaser of the cattle, having at the time notice from Mrs. Scruggs that they belonged to her, and, if sold, would be reрlevied as her property. -
The trial court found that the cattle in question were the property of the wife, having been bought with the proceeds of her estate; that a certain act of the general-assembly of Tennessee, passed March 26, 1879, c. 141, upon which the wife relied— and which will be prеsently referred to — was not,, as claimed by the defendant, in violation either of the Constitution of the United States or of that of Tennessee, prohibiting the impairment of the obligation of contracts, and did not deprive the husband or his creditors of any vested rights; and that said act protected the cattle -from any execution sued out against the property of the husband. Judgment was accordingly rendered for Mrs. Scruggs.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, the judgment was affirmed, the court holding that the act of 1879 was not -obnoxious to the Constitution of the United States.
By the la>v -of Tennessee in forсe when the judgment of September 22,1876, was rendered against Scruggs, the interest of a husband in the real estate of his wife, acquired by her, either.before or аfter marriage, by gift, devise descent or in any other mode, could not be sold or disposed of by virtue of any judgment, decree or execution against him; nоr could the husband sell his wife’s real estate during her life without
*490
her joining in the conveyance in the manner bribed for conveyances of land by married women. Laws of Tennessee, 1849, 111, c. 86, § 1; Code of Tennessee, 1858, § 2481;
Id.
1884, § 3338. In
Lucas
v.
Rickerich,
The cattle in dispute were, within the meaning' of that act, profits of the wife’s lands.
The plaintiff in error contends that when the act of 1879 was passed the judgment creditor of Scruggs had a right of which he could not be deprived by legislation, to subject to his dеmand any property vested in the husband; and that it was not competent for. the legislature to exempt the rents and profits' of the wife’s estate from liability for the debts and contracts of the husband, existing at the time such immunity was declared.
We do not doubt the validity of the act of 1879, as applied to the judgment рreviously rendered against Scruggs. The particular profits of the wife’s estate here in dispute had not, when that act was passed, come to the hаnds of the husband. They were, not, at that-time, in existence, nor in any legal sense, vested in him. Nor were they ever vested in him. He had a mere expectancy with reference to them when the act was passed. Moreover, his right, prior to that enactment, to ■take the profits of his wife’s estate did not come from con *491 tract between him and his wife or between him and the State, bnt from a rule of law established by the legislature, and resting alone upon public сonsiderations arising out' of the marriage relation. It was entirely competent for the legislature to change that rule in respect, at-least, to the future rents and profits of the wife’s estate. Such legislation is for the protection of the property of'the wife, and neither impairs nor defeаts any vested right of the husband. Marriage is a civil institution, a status, in reference to which Mr. Bishop has well said, “public interests overshadow private—one which рublic policy holds specially in the hands of the law for the public good, and over which the law presides in a manner not known in the other departmеnts.” 1 Bishop on Marriage, Divorce and Separation, § 5. The relation of husband and wife is, therefore, formed subject to the power of the State tо control and regulate both that relation and the property rights directly connected with it, by such legislation as does not violate those fundamental principles which have' been established for the protection of private and personal rights against illegal' interference.
If the act оf 1879 did not infringe any vested right of the husband, much less did it infringe any right belonging to his creditors.
The views we have expressed are supported by the judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in
Taylor
v. Taylor,
As the judgment did not withhold or deny any right or privilege secured by the Constitution of the United States, it-must be
Affirmed.