310 Mass. 724 | Mass. | 1942
The petitioner, by this petition for habeas corpus, seeks his release from the custody of an officer of the State police who has arrested him upon a rendition warrant, issued by the Governor of the Commonwealth in compliance with the requisition of the Governor of New Hampshire, which stated that Baker had been indicted for the crime of robbery in that State and had fled into this Commonwealth. This requisition was accompanied by a duly authenticated copy of the indictment for this offence returned against Baker. There was also attached to the requisition an affidavit of one Caswell, stating that Baker was in the city where the alleged robbery occurred at the time of its commission and that he thereafter fled to this Commonwealth, and a copy of an application for extradition of Baker, made to the Governor of New Hampshire .by the county solicitor of the county where the alleged robbery was committed, which stated that he was of the opinion that the evidence was sufficient to secure a conviction of the fugitive. The petition was denied after a hearing in the Superior Court. The petitioner excepted to the order denying his petition and to the denial of his requests for rulings.
We assume in favor of the petitioner that the case may be properly brought here by exceptions. Harris, petitioner, 309 Mass. 180.
The Constitution of the United States, art. 4, § 2, provides that “A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime ”;
The effect to be given to the issuance of a rendition warrant by the Governor has been settled by our decisions. Such a warrant is prima facie evidence, “at least, that all necessary legal prerequisites have been complied with, and, if the previous proceedings appear to be regular, is conclusive evidence of the right to remove the prisoner to the state from which he fled.” Davis’s Case, 122 Mass. 324, 328. Kingsbury’s Case, 106 Mass. 223. Germain, petitioner, 258 Mass. 289. Harris, petitioner, 309 Mass. 180. The only oral evidence introduced at the hearing of the petition in the Superior Court was the testimony of one Caswell, who had made the affidavit which was attached to the requisition. His testimony was to the effect that he was unable to find any witness who identified the petitioner at the time of the robbery. There was nothing in this testimony which affected his statements in the affidavit that Baker was in the city where the robbery was committed at the time of its occurrence and that he afterwards fled to this Commonwealth. Duddy’s Case, 219 Mass. 548. Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U. S. 63. The only other evidence before the Superior Court was to the effect that the victim of the robbery had stated at a hearing before an assistant attorney general that he was robbed by two men; that he closely observed one of the men but did not have “a good look at the other”; and that Baker was not the man whom he had closely observed. There was no error if the judge refused to find that this evidence outweighed the effect that ought to be given to the rendition warrant and refused to find that Baker was not a fugitive from justice. Germain, petitioner, 258 Mass. 289. Wallace, petitioner, 265 Mass. 101. South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U. S. 412. What has been said disposes of the first, second, third, fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, eleventh and thirteenth exceptions attacking the sufficiency of the requisition and the indictment and the sufficiency of the evidence that Baker was a fugitive from justice.
We prefer to deal with this contention upon a broader ground and assume, in favor of the petitioner, that the point that he intended to raise by the tenth request was that the burden of proving that the petitioner was the person charged with the crime and was the one intended to be extradited to New Hampshire for the trial of the offence of which he was accused is upon the respondent. The identity of the petitioner with the person named in the rendition warrant is open upon a petition for habeas corpus. United States v. Williams, 12 Fed. (2d) 66. Taylor v. Smith, 213 Ind. 640. State v. Bates, 101 Minn. 303. People v. Conlin, 15 Misc. (N. Y.) 303. People v. Enright, 117 Misc. (N. Y.) 448. See G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 276, § 20H, inserted by St.
It has been generally held that the respondent must show that the petitioner was the person named or described in the rendition warrant. Ex parte Chung Kin Tow, 218 Fed. 185. Raftery v. Bligh, 55 Fed. (2d) 189. People v. Meyering, 358 Ill. 589. People v. Byrnes, 33 Hun, 98. People v. Mulrooney, 139 Misc. (N. Y.) 525. Barnes v. Nelson, 23 S. D. 181. Ex parte Glisson, 93 Tex. Cr. 338. See State v. McGreary, 123 Fla. 9.
The petitioner, however, was not indicted under a fictitious name or under any name other than his true name, as was the case in some of the decisions that we have cited. The petition, we assume, was brought in his correct name, and that is the name by which he was described in the requisition, in the indictment, the accompanying affidavit, and the rendition warrant. He apparently did not raise any question of identity at the hearing upon the granting of the requisition, when he offered the testimony of a witness that he was in Boston on the afternoon of the day upon which the robbery occurred. Moreover, in his petition he alleges that the rendition warrant “purports to be a warrant of rendition for the arrest and deportation of your petitioner,” and it was not until during the hearing in the Superior Court that he sought, and was granted permission, to amend the petition by alleging that he was not the Henry D. Baker named in the warrant. In his petition he describes himself as a resident of Boston. He is so described
The judge in granting the petitioner’s ninth and sixteenth requests ruled, in substance, that the petitioner could not be held unless it was shown that he was the person named in the extradition warrant and this, in effect, was the equivalent of a ruling that the burden of proof on this issue was upon the respondent, which the judge would undoubtedly have given if he had been ásked to do so by an appropriate request in unambiguous terms. It follows that the refusal to grant the tenth request cannot, in these circumstances, be held to constitute reversible error. Rathgeber v. Kelley, 299 Mass. 444. Timmins v. F. N. Joslin Co. 303 Mass. 540. Leonard v. Woodward, 305 Mass. 332, 338. Old Colony Railroad v. Assessors of Quincy, 305 Mass. 509.
There was no error in refusing to give the twelfth request, that the petitioner was not the person demanded by the requisition, because there was no evidence that he was not the person named in the demand and, in so far as the question was one of fact, the judge by his action upon the ninth and sixteenth requests showed that he considered all the evidence and properly found that the petitioner was the person sought to be extradited. The judge properly refused to rule in accordance with the fourteenth request that, upon all the evidence, a finding was warranted that the petitioner did not commit the robbery in New Hampshire. The request was immaterial, because the guilt or innocence of the petitioner was not open in these proceedings. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 276, § 20H, as inserted by St.
It having appeared at the oral argument before this court that the petitioner is at liberty upon bail, the entry will be that the petitioner be remanded to custody under the warrant of the Governor for rendition to the agent of the Governor of the State of New Hampshire. Graves’s Case, 236 Mass. 493.
, , So ordered.