The plaintiff, James H. Bakelaar, is a regular, paid, uniformed member of the West Haven police department. He has served in that capacity since his employment on July 15, 1966. Prior to entering service, the plaintiff underwent a physical examination which failed to disclose any evidence of hypertension or heart disease.
On August 16, 1976, while pursuing a suspect, the plaintiff suffered chest pain which was diagnosed as angina pectoris. The following day, while at work, he suffered further chest pain, collapsed and was hospitalized. The diagnosis was angina pectoris and arterioscleratic heart disease. On October 8, 1976, the plaintiff sustained an acute myocardial infarction. He has since been totally disabled.
On March 15, 1977, the plaintiff filed a notice of claim for compensation with the third congressional district compensation commissioner. In it he stated, "claim is being made under Chapter 568 Workmen's *Page 361
Compensation Act, Section
Having heard the evidence, the compensation commissioner concluded that the city of West Haven was liable and that the "claimant is entitled to the benefits provided under Section
The compensation review division affirmed the commissioner's finding and award but remanded the matter for further findings on the issue of whether the city might also be liable under the provisions of chapter 568. The defendant United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, a workers' compensation insurance carrier, has appealed from that decision. The compensation review division concluded that once a claimant initiates a proceeding under either
General Statutes, chapter 568, the Workers' Compensation Act, "provide[s] compensation for an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment regardless of fault . . . ." Klapproth v. Turner,
Compensation payments under the Workers' Compensation Act are not required for all occupational injuries, however, only those "arising out of and in the course of . . . employment. . . ." General Statutes
General Statutes
Benefits payable under the provisions of
The law does not require a plaintiff to adopt a more tortuous legal path simply to enable his claim, if proved, to fall within the provisions of insurance carried by the defendant. The plaintiff is entitled to elect his own legal remedy and may not have one chosen for him that assigns to him a more difficult level of proof.
The plaintiff made it clear that he was proceeding under the provisions of
There is error in part. The order of remand is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment in accordance with the finding and award of the compensation commissioner.
In this opinion CORRIGAN and O'DONNELL, Js., concurred.