Bakaturski v. DirectorBakaturski v. Director
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
SISON, Magistrate Judge:
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Doc. 84, 87).1 Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he failed to exhaust any grievances related to the allegations contained in the amended complaint against them. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion. (Doc. 86). The Court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. Plaintiff, John Houseman, and Margaret Madole testified, and the Court took the
On November 7, 2023, Plaintiff Patrick Bakaturski, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), filed his complaint pursuant to
The Court conducted an analysis of the complaint under
Count 1 – Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Galloway, Hughes, and the Director of the Office of Health for implementing policies that resulted in repeated and excessive lockdowns and limited yard and out of cell time.
Count 5 - Americans with Disabilities Act/Rehabilitation Act2 claim against Hughes for failing to accommodate Plaintiff‘s mental disability.
(Doc. 10, p. 13).
On September 3, 2024, Plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended complaint.
FACTS
The following facts are taken from the record and presented in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in his favor. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009).
Grievance #2022-8-62
On August 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed grievance #2022-8-62. As to the nature of this grievance, Plaintiff checked medical treatment and the “other” box and specified no gym or yard and quarantine. Plaintiff requested that he to go to the yard and gym and that the Covid medical quarantine be lifted. On August 10, 2024, the grievance counselor responded: “[p]er the yard schedule all yard times are subject to change and cancellation at any time.” The Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) received this grievance on September 22, 2022, and on November 2, 2022, the ARB denied it finding the facility appropriately addressed the issue. (Doc. 84-1, p. 13-16). Plaintiff does not name any of the individual Defendants in this grievance.
Grievance #2022-8-286
On August 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed grievance #2022-8-286, complaining about his yard and gym being canceled due to Covid and about his cell conditions. He requested to be tested for Covid 19 every time he is “locked down,” to receive cleaning supplies, and to receive his one hour out of the cell. On August 31, 2022, the grievance counselor responded: “IDOC follows the guidelines of OHS and IDPH. Shawnee has a cleaning
Grievance #2022-11-22
Thereafter, on November 28, 2022, Plaintiff submitted grievance #2022-11-22. As to the nature of the grievance, Plaintiff checked the “other” box and specified Covid lockdown and phone access. The grievance counselor responded to the grievance on December 5, 2022, stating: “[p]er Covid Protocol ‘All individuals on medical quarantine wing are allowed 1 30 minute dayroom period to access the phone. Individual in custody is currently housed in receiving which is under medical quarantine . . .’” The grievance officer, on March 1, 2023, recommended that the grievance was moot, and the CAO concurred on March 3, 2023. Plaintiff appealed to the ARB on March 7, 2023. The ARB received the grievance on March 13, 2023, and denied it on May 31, 2023, finding the facility appropriately addressed the issue. (Doc. 84-1, p. 2-5). Plaintiff does not name any of the individual Defendants in this grievance.
Plaintiff filed grievance #K19-0524-0815 on April 27, 2024. As to the nature of this grievance, Plaintiff checked the “ADA” box and the “other” box and noted no yard. In toto, the summary of the grievance stated:
The second shift night yard on 4-26-2024 was cancelled. The first shift yard on 4-27-2024 1 pm, was cancelled. Of the 11 yards approved for April close to 50% of the yards were cancelled. This is a violation of the Mental Health Settlement which say each S.M.I. inmate is supposed to get 10 hour of yard per week and 20 hour out-of-cell time. I am only getting less the 17 hours. Shawnee reports to be a 18 and 6, but it is a 22.5 and 2.5.
Plaintiff requested equal access to yard. On May 6, 2025, the grievance counselor responded: “[p]er monthly yard schedule approved by AWP Walker, ‘All times are subject to change or cancellation.’” The grievance officer recommended that this grievance be denied on May 13, 2024, and the CAO concurred on May 17, 2024. Plaintiff appealed to the ARB on May 29, 2024. The ARB received the grievance on June 3, 2024, and denied it on July 10, 2024, finding the facility appropriately addressed the issue. (Doc. 84-2, p. 2-5). Plaintiff does not name any of the individual Defendants in this grievance.
Grievance #K19-0524-0947
On May 20, 2024, Plaintiff submitted grievance #K19-0524-0947. As to the nature of this grievance, Plaintiff marked the “ADA” box and the “other” box and noted mental health. In the summary of the grievance, Plaintiff stated:
I filed a federal Civil Suet [sic] Against Shawnees for no Yard and Mental health programs. Bakaturski v. Director et al 3-23-03609-SPM. . . . Since Coming to Shawnee I have only filed three types of Grievances. NO Yard, No
Right to Work or take part in Programs and issues over my elbow which is broke. Mental Health is refusing to reply to my request. [sic] and address the fact that more than half of my Mental Health care file was lost. My 1983 cited this issue, which is why I am filing this. The Court said that my 8th Amendment rights maybe being violated due to the endless restrictions. But that I needed to file another motion outlining who from Mental Health has refused me programs. And who is the Director of mental Health. FORWARD to GRIEVANCE OFFICE.
Grievance office 6-1-2024
I am not requesting educational classes. I am requesting access to mental Health programs. Please contact mental Health.
On May 30, 2024, the grievance counselor responded, and on June 4, 2024, the grievance officer recommended the grievance be denied finding: “Mr. Bakaturski is not on the mental health caseload; therefore, he would not meet the criteria for the current group sessions and the yard gets canceled due to institutional needs.” The CAO concurred on June 6, 2024. Plaintiff appealed to the ARB on June 12, 2024. The ARB received the grievance on June 17, 2024, and on June 28, 2024, the ARB returned Plaintiff‘s grievance for not meeting DR504.810, which requires dates to be provided. Plaintiff did not include the names of the individual Defendants in this grievance. (Doc. 84-2, p. 6-9).
Grievance #K19-0824-1460
On August 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed grievance #K19-0824-1460 complaining about staff conduct, out-of-cell time, work and yard restrictions, and ADA issues. He requested that he be allowed out of his cell for 6 hours a day. On August 9, 2024, the grievance counselor responded: “[p]er DR 504 all dayroom and Rec time are subject to change.” There is nothing in the record to show that this grievance was sent to the ARB or that it
Grievance #K19-1224-2467
Plaintiff filed grievance #K19-1224-2467 on December 29, 2024, complaining about not being able to work as a porter from December 1, 2024, to December 29, 2024. As to the nature of the grievance, Plaintiff marked “other” and noted “work restriction.” On January 3, 2025, the grievance counselor responded: “[p]er AD 420.30: All job assignments are subject to review and approval by the CAO.” On January 24, 2025, the grievance officer recommended mixed action on this grievance: “Bakaturski got an assignment change to the Dietary but out of cell time can be canceled or changed at any time do [sic] to operational needs. No individual is guaranteed the same amount of time everyday.” The grievance officer noted this was also the response to grievance K19-0125-0015. The CAO concurred on January 24, 2025. (Doc. 84-3, p. 3-5). There is nothing in the record to indicate that this grievance was appealed to the ARB or that it was fully exhausted. Plaintiff does not name any of the individual Defendants in this grievance. This grievance was filed after Plaintiff submitted his amended complaint.
Grievance #K19-0125-0015
Plaintiff filed grievance K19-0125-0015 on January 1, 2025, complaining of staff conduct and out-of-cell time. He again requested to be out of his cell 6 hours a day. A week later, the grievance counselor responded: “[a]ll times are subject to cancellation for
Plaintiff filed suit on November 7, 2023. (Doc. 1), and he submitted his amended complaint on September 3, 2024. (Doc. 43).
LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary Judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Gupta v. Melloh, 19 F.4th 990, 997 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986));
Moreover, “[t]o satisfy the exhaustion requirement, an inmate must take each of the steps prescribed by the state‘s administrative rules governing prison grievances.” Chambers, 956 F.3d at 983; Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th 948, 956 (7th Cir. 2024). Consequently, if a prisoner fails to use a prison‘s grievance process, “the prison administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and the prisoner‘s claim can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 721 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). The purpose of exhaustion is to give prison officials an opportunity to address the inmate‘s claims internally, prior to federal litigation. See Hacker v. Dart, 62 F.4th 1073, 1084 (7th Cir. 2023).
Under Pavey, the Seventh Circuit held that “debatable factual issues relating to the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies” are not required to be decided by a jury but are to be determined by the judge. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740-741 (7th Cir. 2008); Jones v. Lamb, 124 F.4th 463, 469 (7th Cir. 2024). Thus, where failure to exhaust
The sequence to be followed in a case in which exhaustion is contested is therefore as follows: (1) The district judge conducts a hearing on exhaustion and permits whatever discovery relating to exhaustion he deems appropriate. (2) If the judge determines that the prisoner did not exhaust his administrative remedies, the judge will then determine whether (a) the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and so he must go back and exhaust; (b) or, although he has no unexhausted administrative remedies, the failure to exhaust was innocent (as where prison officials prevent a prisoner from exhausting his remedies), and so he must be given another chance to exhaust (provided that there exist remedies that he will be permitted by the prison authorities to exhaust, so that he‘s not just being given a runaround); or (c) the failure to exhaust was the prisoner‘s fault, in which event the case is over. (3) If and when the judge determines that the prisoner has properly exhausted his administrative remedies, the case will proceed to pretrial discovery, and if necessary a trial, on the merits; and if there is a jury trial, the jury will make all necessary findings of fact without being bound by (or even informed of) any of the findings made by the district judge in determining that the prisoner had exhausted his administrative remedies.
Pavey, 544 F.3d at 742 (7th Cir. 2008); Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 2015).
As an inmate confined within the Illinois Department of Corrections, Plaintiff was required to follow the regulations contained in the Illinois Department of Correction‘s Grievance Procedures for Offenders (“grievance procedures”) to exhaust his claims. See
contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender‘s complaint, including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint. This provision
does not preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the names of individuals are not known, but the offender must include as much descriptive information about the individual as possible.
If the inmate is not satisfied with the Chief Administrative Officer‘s response, he or she can file an appeal with the Director through the ARB. The grievance procedures specifically state, “[i]f, after receiving the response of the Chief Administrative Officer, the offender still believes that the problem, complaint[,] or grievance has not been resolved to his or her satisfaction, he or she may appeal in writing to the Director. The appeal must be received by the Administrative Review Board within 30 days after the date of the decision.”
The grievance procedures allow for an inmate to file an emergency grievance. To file an emergency grievance, the inmate must forward the grievance directly to the CAO who may “[determine] that there is a substantial risk of imminent personal injury or other serious or irreparable harm to the offender” and thus the grievance should be handled on an emergency basis.
A prisoner can amend the complaint to add a new claim or defendant, if he fully exhausts his administrative remedies before seeking leave to amend. See, e.g., Cannon v. Washington, 418 F.3d 714, 719-720 (7th Cir. 2005); Barnes v. Briley, 420 F.3d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2005); Getty v. Santos, Case No. 3:18-CV-1134-MAB, 2020 WL 2832465, at *4-6 (S.D. Ill. May 31, 2020). This exception does not allow a plaintiff to file an amended complaint to replead previously unexhausted claims and thereby circumvent the PLRA‘s exhaustion requirement. Rather, it allows a plaintiff to raise one or more new, properly exhausted claims against new defendants, if he has fully exhausted all available remedies before hailing the new defendants into court. See Barnes, 420 F.3d at 678. In this respect, an amended complaint serves as the functional equivalent of a new complaint, marking the point in time when exhaustion as to those new claims and/or new defendants must be complete. Id. at 678 (citation omitted). Under this exception, Plaintiff‘s deadline for exhausting his administrative remedies as to all new claims and defendants was September 3, 2024, the date he submitted the amended complaint.
DISCUSSION
Defendants contend that none of the grievances submitted by Plaintiff properly exhaust any of the three claims asserted in the amended complaint. Plaintiff opposes the motion, maintaining that he did, in fact, exhaust his administrative remedies. The Court addresses each claim in turn, along with the corresponding exhaustion issues.
At the outset, the Court addresses Plaintiff‘s argument that Defendants’ earlier withdrawal of their affirmative defense regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies bars them from seeking summary judgment. The Court disagrees. As previously
Eighth Amendment Claim – Count 1
As to the Eighth Amendment claims, Defendants maintain none of the grievances mention confinement by administrative policies; confinement that aggravated his mental health; confinement based on security or behavior, or contain any description of Defendants Gallway, Smith or Hinton.4 Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff‘s grievances only mention Covid lockdowns, yard cancellations, or general lack of exercise. The Court does not agree with Defendants and finds that grievances K19-0524-0815, 2022-8-286, 2022-08-62 and 2022-11-22 all serve to exhaust administrative remedies to this claim.
Grievance K19-0524-0815 complains about the yard being cancelled 50% of the time, references mental-health settlement requirements, and complains about out-of-cell time. This grievance squarely matches the contents of Plaintiff‘s claims in Count 1. Likewise, grievances 2022-8-286, 2022-08-62, and 2022-11-22 all complain about yard cancellations which relate to Plaintiff‘s conditions of confinement claims. While these
These grievances repeatedly served to alert the prison to the nature of the wrong for which Plaintiff was seeking redress, i.e., prolonged confinement with lack of yard time, lack of out-of-cell time, and mental health restrictions. The prison had notice, had the opportunity to investigate, and had the opportunity to correct the problem. Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies against Defendants on this claim.
First Amendment Retaliation claim, Count 3
As to the First Amendment retaliation claim, Defendants argue that none of Plaintiff‘s grievances allege retaliation, none identify Defendant Galloway in any
ADA/Rehabilitation Act claim
Defendants argue that the ADA/Rehabilitation Act claim fails because none of Plaintiff‘s grievances assert that he was denied out-of-cell time due to a disability, none allege that he was removed from the mental-health caseload for discriminatory reasons, and none identify Defendant Hughes or describe disability-based mistreatment. The Court rejects these arguments.
The Court concludes that grievance K19-0524-0815 adequately notified the prison of a disability-related denial of out-of-cell time. In that grievance, Plaintiff reported that yard time had been canceled “close to 50%” of the time in April 2024 and specifically cited the “mental health settlement,” which requires 10 hours of yard time and 20 hours of out-of-cell time for SMI inmates. Plaintiff further stated he was receiving fewer than 17 hours. This grievance therefore connects the lack of out-of-cell time to
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies filed by Defendants (Doc. 84). The Court DENIES that motion as to Count 1, Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement claim and as to Count 5, the ADA/Rehabilitation claim. The Court GRANTS the motion as to Count 3, the First Amended Retaliation claim. The Court DISMISSES without prejudice Plaintiff‘s Count 3. Lastly, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment reflecting the same at the end of the case.
This matter will proceed on Count 1 and Count 5 of the Amended Complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 1, 2026.
GILBERT C. SISON
United States Magistrate Judge