116 Mo. 419 | Mo. | 1893
This was an action of ejectment commenced in 1875, to recover a parcel of land in the southern part of block 80 in the city of St. Louis. The record discloses the following facts:
Samuel Solomon by his deed, dated the seventeenth of July, 1804, conveyed to John Coons the following property in the town of St. Louis; that is'to say, “a lot of ground one hundred and twenty feet of front upon three hundred feet in depth situate in the Third street of this town, bounded on the southern side by a lot of Louis Baury, on the north by the land of a free ,
On the eighteenth of March, 1811, John Coons conveyed the lot to James Baird, describing the premises as “a certain town lot situate in the town of St. Louis, consisting of one hundred and twenty feet in front by three hundred feet in depth,, bounded easterly by Third street * * * westerly by the vacant land, northerly by Louis Baury and southerly by a cross-street which separates it from the free mulatto woman, Esther.” This deed sets forth by way of recitals that the lot thereby conveyed is the same lot which was conveyed on the eleventh of October, 1795, and on the fifteenth of November, 1798, giving the names of the grantor and grantee in each case, and by a deed from one Yien to Solomon, dated seventeenth of December, 1802, and it also recites the deed from Solomon to Coons, before mentioned, dated seventeenth of July, 1804.
On the tenth of June, 1811, the old board of commissioners granted to Coons the following certificate numbered 938:
“We the undersigned commissioners for ascertaining and adjusting the titles and claims to lands in the Territory of Louisiana, have decided that John Coons, claiming under Samuel Solomon, original claimant, is entitled to a patent under the provisions of the second section of an act of the congress of the United States, entitled ‘An act for ascertaining and adjusting the titles and claims to land within the territory of Orleans and the District of Louisiana,
It may be stated here, as part of the history of this case, that the defendant put in evidence two surveys made by the deputy surveyor in 1835, and designated as surveys 305 and 306. Survey 305 covers 128 feet on Third street, extending west toward Fourth street 160 feet, and does not include all of the ground mentioned in certificate 938 before mentioned, issued by the old board of commissioners on the tenth of June, 1811. This survey was approved by the surveyor general on the eleventh of December, 1861; but on the sixteenth of May, 1862, he. made a note thereon to the effect that the survey was erroneous in this, that it should extend west to Fourth street. Survey 306. covers 95 feet by 300 feet, and purports to be a survey of a lot or parcel of land confirmed to Samuel Solomon’s legal representatives by the act of congress of thirteenth of June, 1812, “the extent and boundaries of which» were proven before Recorder Hunt on the twenty-sixth of November, 1825, pursuant to the act of twenty-sixth of May, 1824.” Besides these two surveys put in evidence by the defendants, the plaintiffs put in evidence a survey made in 1874, which was approved by the surveyor general. This survey was made at the request of the plaintiffs for the purpose of correcting survey 305 and of making it correspond with certificate 938 issued by the old board of commissioners. It covers a strip of land 128 feet 4 inches wide, extending '
The plaintiffs in this suit are the heirs and grantees of the heirs of James Baird to whom Coons conveyed the property by the deed before mentioned. The defendant put in evidence a sheriff’s deed dated the thirteenth of July, 1812, which professes to convey all the interest of James Baird to one Eeihle; also various other'deeds constituting a chain of title down to the defendant. All parties, it will be seen, claim under James Baird.
The sheriff’s deed was not acknowledged, and for that reason did not convey the interest of Baird. Though invalid as a conveyance, it is good' as color of title; and according to the abstracts of the evidence before us, it was admitted on the trial that the defendant and those under whom it claims have been in the adverse possession of the land ever since 1841, a period of thirty years1 before the commencement of this suit.
As the sheriff’s deed did not convey the title of Baird, it is evident that the defense must stand alone upon the statute of limitations. No patent was ever issued, and because of this fact, the plaintiffs insist that the legal title remained in the United States until the act of congress of sixth of June, 1874 (18 Stat. at Large, part 3, p. 62)’, and that the statute of limitations could not and did not begin to run until the date of that act. On the other hand, the defendant says the legal title passed to Coons as assignee of Solomon by the act of congress of thirteenth of June, 1812, the first section of which provides, “that the rights, titles and claims to town or village lots, out-lots, common field lots and commons in, adjoining and belonging to the several towns or villages of St. Louis in the territory of Missouri, which lots have been inhabited, cultivated or possessed prior to the twentieth day of Decern
This act operated as a grant. In other words it, by its own terms, vested the legal title in those claimants coming within its terms, and this, too, without any conditions of survey or patent; and it is also well settled that the individual .confirmees under this act did not forfeit their titles thereby acquired by a failure to prove up their claims before the recorder of land titles under the act of 1824. Glasgow v. Baker, 85 Mo. 559 and cases cited. But it is insisted that the proviso excludes all claims from the operation of the act which had been confirmed by the board of commissioners. The proviso would have that effect, if we disregard the object of the act and give to the proviso a literal interpretation; but if We construe the proviso in the light of the object and purpose of the act, it is clear the words “affect the rights” mean that the law must not be construed so as to prejudice or injuriously affect the rights of persons whose claims had been confirmed by the board. The act is entitled “an act making further provisions for settling the claims to land in the territory of Missouri; and, as its title indicates, is supplemental to the prior acts of March 2, 1805, and March 3, 1807.
These laws were all enacted to perfect Spanish claims in obedience to our treaty obligations with France. At the date of the act of 1812, many claims to lots, out-lots and common field lots had been con
The parol evidence produced on the trial tended to show that this lot was inhabited, cultivated or possessed by Solomon prior to twentieth of December, 180.3, but it is not essential to speak of this evidence in detail; for the plaintiffs claim title under the commissioners’ certificate dated tenth of June, 1811; and that certificate, though issued under the act of second of March, 1805, is founded on possessions of Solomon, prior to twentieth of December, 1803. The requsite possession is therefore shown by the very title papers put in evidence by theüi and under which they claim.
Under the instructions given, the trial court must have found that this lot had an existence as a town lot prior to the last named date, “with a defined location and boundaries.” From the recitals in the deed from Coons to Baird it appears the lot had been conveyed by specific boundaries at least three times prior to 1803. The plaintiffs claim under this deed and the recitals therein are evidence against them. Besides this, the witness Kartiz says there was a house and tin-shop on the lot in 1799. There is therefore an abundance of evidence to support the finding of the trial court.