706 F. App'x 123
4th Cir.
2017

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Coley Terrance HOLMAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-7077

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 27, 2017 Decided: December 13, 2017

123

Coley Terrance Holman, Appellant Pro Se. Harry L. Hobgood, Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States Attorneys, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Coley Terrance Holman seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Holman has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

Todd A. BAIRD; Dana G. Baird, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-2375

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: October 27, 2017 Decided: December 14, 2017

123

Henry W. McLaughlin, III, LAW OFFICE OF HENRY MCLAUGHLIN, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Andrew B. Pittman, Maryia Jones, Kendall A. Hamilton, TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Todd and Dana Baird appeal the district court’s order granting the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation’s motion to dismiss the Bairds’ breach of contract claim. We have reviewed the record and agree with the district court that the Bairds failed to sufficiently allege the existence of a legally enforceable loan modification agreement. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. See Baird v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 3:15-cv-00041-GEC, 2016 WL 6583732 (W.D. Va. Nov. 4, 2016); see also Chang v. First Colonial Sav. Bank, 242 Va. 388, 410 S.E.2d 928, 930 (1991) (“Where the offer is clear, definite, and explicit, and leaves nothing open for negotiation, it constitutes an offer, acceptance of which will complete the contract.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); Berry v. Wortham, 96 Va. 87, 30 S.E. 443, 444 (1898) (holding that for a contract to “be complete and certain...., all the terms which the parties have adopted as portions of their contract must be finally and definitely settled, and none must be left to be determined by future negotiations; and this is true without any regard to the comparative importance or unimportance of these several terms”). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED