26 N.W.2d 346 | Mich. | 1947
We issued an order directing the defendant election commission to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not be issued directing the defendant commission to refrain from placing the designation "common pleas judge" under the names of George T. Cartwright and Emmanuel N. Karay as candidates for said office, on the ballots to be used at the biennial spring election in Detroit, April 7, 1947. Return has been made and arguments heard in open court.
Plaintiffs are duly nominated candidates for the office of judge of the common pleas court of the city of Detroit, to be voted on at said election. They are not present incumbents in said office. George T. Cartwright and Emmanuel N. Karay are also duly nominated candidates for said office, to be voted on at said election. They are present incumbents by virtue of appointment by the governor, and now seek election by ballot for the first time, to continue in office by virtue of election.
Plaintiffs insist that Cartwright and Karay are not entitled to have the designation "common pleas *660 judge" printed on the ballots to be used at said election in connection with their names. Plaintiffs demanded of the defendant election commission that such designation be omitted, which demand was refused. The present proceeding is to compel the defendant commission to refrain from printing such designation of office on the ballot under the names of Cartwright and Karay. Imminence of the impending election and the short period of time for printing and distributing the ballots requires a prompt decision.
At the outset it is obvious that the constitutional provision for nonpartisan election of judges and judicial officers does not apply. It refers to "justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the circuit court, judges of probate courts and all county judicial officers provided for by the legislature under section 21 of article 7 of the Constitution." Mich. Const. (1908), art. 7, § 23, adopted April 3, 1939. The common pleas court is a municipal court of the city of Detroit and its judges are not county judicial officers within the inclusion of said constitutional amendment. Said common pleas court comes into being by virtue of Act No. 260, Pub. Acts 1929, and amendments thereto* which provide:
"In any city which now has a population of over 250,000 inhabitants, the several courts of the justices of the peace of such city, as established and operated under the provisions of any general statute, local or special act, or the provisions of the charter of any such city, are hereby consolidated into one court, which shall be known as the common pleas court of such city." *661
Cartwright and Karay were appointed by the governor February 1, 1945, and February 27, 1946, respectively, by virtue of a provision in section 2 of said act (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 16370, as amended by Act No. 158, Pub. Acts 1939 [Comp. Laws Supp. 1940, § 16370, Stat. Ann. 1946 Cum. Supp. § 27.3652]), as follows:
"Whenever a vacancy shall occur in the office of any judge of said court by death, resignation, removal from office or from any other cause, such vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the governor. Each judge so appointed shall assume office immediately following his appointment and shall hold the same until his successor has been elected and has qualified. Successors to any judge or judges so appointed by the governor shall be nominated and elected at the next biennial spring election held in such city following such appointment and such successors shall hold office until the expiration of the term to which such judge or judges shall have been elected."
If Cartwright and Karay have any right to the designation "common pleas judge" under their names on the ballot, it must be as the result of some provision in the above act. The only provision which can be said to apply is in section 2, which governs the appointment and election of common pleas judges, and reads as follows:
"Provided, That an incumbent who is a candidate forreelection, may, upon his request in writing have printed below his name the designation, `common pleas judge'."
Cartwright and Karay are incumbents, but are not "candidates for reelection." That each is "an incumbent who is a candidate" is beyond dispute. The legislature has put into the act "an incumbent *662 who is a candidate for reelection." It might well have said "a candidate to succeed himself," or "a candidate for election," or "a candidate at the next election," or merely "a candidate." But "for reelection," as used in said proviso, has a definite and plain meaning. There was no such provision (for any designation on the ballot) prior to the amendment of the act by Act No. 158, Pub. Acts 1939. The proviso, "That an incumbent who is a candidate for reelection, may, upon his request in writing have printed below his name the designation, `common pleas judge'," is the only change in section 2 of the act made by said amendment. Under the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the legislature meant "for election" where it said "for reelection."
"We cannot assume the legislature made a mistake and used one word when it in fact intended to use another. The language of the statute is plain as it reads and we do not feel authorized to change its meaning by substituting another word for the one the legislature used." People v. Crucible Steel Co. of America,
It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that every clause and every word in an act is presumed to have some force and meaning and no part should be rendered nugatory. UnitedInsurance Co. v. Attorney General,
Plaintiffs do not challenge the right of elected incumbents in the common pleas court, to the designation in the event they become candidates for reelection. We conclude that the question now before us is limited in application to incumbents in the office by appointment only, who have been nominated for the first time as candidates to succeed themselves, and hence are for the first time candidates to be voted on at the next ensuing city election for said office.
Counsel have referred to cases which hold that appointment, election or reelection to an office are to be considered as meaning the same thing in effect. It is true that there are circumstances under which the result is the same regardless of the word used. For example, see Kopczynski v. Schriver,
Any change in said proviso in section 2 of the common pleas court act must come from legislation and not by judicial fiat. We conclude that Cartwright and Karay are not entitled to such designation on the election ballot. The writ may issue, but without costs as a public question is involved.
BUTZEL, BUSHNELL, SHARPE, BOYLES, REID, NORTH, and DETHMERS, JJ., concurred. CARR, C.J., did not sit.