292 N.W. 219 | N.D. | 1940
The District Court of Williams county sustained a general demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff.has appealed from
.' The question is whether tbe certificates of tax sale issued to tbe defendant Cbamberland on December 9, 1930, were still valid in Decem,ber, 1938. At tbe time these certificates were issued tbe law applicable was § 2199, Supplement to tbe 1913 Compiled Laws. It reads as follows: “Tbe purchaser of any piece or parcel of land shall, if there be' no redemption, be entitled to tbe possession, rents and profits at tbe expiration 'of three years from tbe date of tbe certificate, and if on de-mand of sucb purchaser to the party or parties in possession, sucb party or parties refuse or neglect to render' sucb possession, sucb party or parties may be proceeded against as parties bolding over after tbe determination of bis or 'their estate, which proceedings may be instituted and prosecuted pursuant to tbe provisions of the law in sucb case made -and provided; provided, however, that all rights of tbe purchaser and
In 1933, the Legislative Assembly, as a part of a program to cushion the shock of deflation, enacted chapter 258, Laws of North Dakota 1933. It provided: “That whereas a public emergency and crisis exists throughout this state endangering the public health, welfare and morals, in that agricultural crops and products have been sold on an average below the cost of production since 1922, and all agricultural land values have virtually disappeared, due to the nation wide depression, which caused under-consumption .and produced starving millions throughout the nation; and whereas taxes have been steadily increasing in spite of the deplorable condition of agriculture, and
“Whereas agriculture is the principal industry in this state and all other industries are solely dependent for their existence upon agriculture; and whereas there is at present no bank or other institution through which one can borrow money with which to pay the taxes and such tax debtors are at the absolute mercy of the tax certificate holders; and whereas hundreds and thousands of families have already lost their homes through tax sales and tax deeds or other judicial proceedings; and whereas hundreds and thousands more will also lose their homes unless some relief is given, therefore in order to prevent the utter ruin and destruction of the 'people of this state and the collapse of civil government, and in order to maintain the integrity of the family and the home and the public health, welfare and morals of the people of this state, the period within which the holder of a tax certificate can ask
Two years later the Legislative Assembly continued the provisions of chapter 258, supra, by enacting chapter 280, Laws of North Dakota 1935. Omitting a lengthy preamble which is a statement of the legislative opinion that an economic emergency requiring the legislation existed, this statute in so far as it is applicable to the issue presented is as follows:
“Emergency declared to exist. In view of the situation hereinbefore set forth, the Legislature of the State of North Dakota hereby declares that a public economic emergency does exist in the State of North Dakota and that in order to prevent the utter ruin and destruction of the people of this state” and the collapse of civil government and in order to maintain the integrity of the family, the home and the public health, welfare and morals of the people of this state, the period in which the holder of a tax certificate of sale can ask for and obtain a tax deed, either by county, state or private person or corporation, holder of tax sale certificate, and the time in which the owner of the propérty may redeem from such tax sales be and the same is hereby extended to the first day of July, A. D. 1937; and the provisions of this act shall be in full force and effect coincident with the expiration of the provisions of Chapter 258 of the Session of 1933. Provided, however, that this act shall not be operative, except in favor and on behalf of any owner of such land, who shall have, within 90 days, after the service of the notice of expiration of redemption, filed with the county auditor in the county in which the land is situated, a notice that he desires to take advantage of this act. and the county auditor, in addition to the notice
“Sec. 2. Extension of time in which to apply for tax deeds,. The time in which the holder of a tax certificate of sale may present the same to the county auditor, with request for tax deed is hereby extended to a period of 10 years from and after the date of. such certificate, and such holder of such tax certificate of sale shall be entitled to collect interest thereon at the same rate of interest as provided in the tax sale certificate during the time of this extension.”
Plaintiff asserts that the validity of defendant Chamberland’s tax sale certificates must be determined according to the provisions of § 2199, supra. He contends that by applicable rules of statutory construction the 1933 and 1935 acts must be construed to be prospective in operation and that if such acts be construed to apply to tax sale certificates issued prior to their enactment, such construction would render the acts violative of the “contract clauses” and “due process clauses” of both the State and Federal Constitutions.
There is no need to invoke any rule of statutory construction as an aid to determine the legislative intent expressed in the 1933 and 1935 acts. The language of these acts is clear and unambiguous. The 1933 act declares that the period of redemption from tax sales “is hereby extended for two years from the date of the passage and approval of this act.” It is apparent that this statute was intended to have retrospective application only, for the regular three year period of redemption provided by § 2199, supra, would, in so far as subsequent sales are concerned, extend beyond the time limit fixed by this statute. The 1935 act declared that “the time within which the owner of property may redeem from such tax sales be and the same is hereby extended to the first day of July 1937; and the provisions of this act shall be in full force and effect coincident with the expiration of the provisions of chapter 258 of the Session Laws of 1933.” The act also extended the period within which tax sale certificates would remain valid from six years to ten years after the date of the certificate. It is retrospective in operation. It can only relate to tax sales held prior to the effective date of chapter 258, Laws of North Dakota 1933. The latter statute amended § 2199, supra. The amendment provided that the owner of a tax sale certificate might not commence proceedings to
Defendant Chamberland’s tax sale certificates were dated December 8, 1930. On March 12, 1935, tbe effective date of tbe 1935 act, they were valid certificates and by tbe terms of that act they would remain valid until December 9, 1940. Tbe question of tbe validity or invalidity of these tax sale certificates therefore rests wholly upon the force of plaintiff’s challenge to tbe statutes upon constitutional grounds.
Tbe statutes were designedly enacted for tbe benefit of landowners whose property bad been sold for taxes. In so far as this case is concerned, tbe effect of tbe statutes was to postpone tbe date upon which tbe defendant Ohamberland might commence proceedings to obtain possession of and title to tbe premises described in bis tax sale certificates from December 8, 1933, to July 1, 1937. As a corollary to this postponement tbe 1935 act also continued tbe validity of tbe certificates until after such time as Ohamberland would, by statute, be permitted to proceed under them. Whatever constitutional objections Ohamberland might have bad to tbe statutes, be waived. He acquiesced in tbe postponement. Plaintiff however, having received tbe benefit of tbe statutes, by tbe grant of additional time within which to redeem, now urges that, under tbe law as it existed when tbe defendant Chamberland purchased tbe tax sale certificates, be “bad tbe absolute right to have tbe tax sale certificates canceled and stricken from tbe records of tbe office of tbe County Auditor, unless tbe defendant secured a tax deed within six years from tbe date of tbe certificate.” He asserts that this “right” was both a vested right and one secured by contract, and that “clearly tbe legislature cannot impair that right.” As we view it, plaintiff is mistaken both as to tbe existence of a contract in which be has an interest and also as to tbe nature of bis “right.” A contract • does come into existence as a result of a tax sale, but that is a contract between tbe county and tbe purchaser. 26 R. C. L. p. 434; 12 C. J. 1002; Fisher v. Betts & Smith, 12 N. D. 197, 96 N. W. 132. Tbe landowner who has failed to pay bis taxes has no interest in that contract., Tbe entire proceeding is a remedy for bis delinquency-. In so
. Since the right which plaintiff claims has been destroyed by the 1933 and 1935 statutes was neither one secured by contract nor a vested right, his objections to such statutes upon constitutional grounds are without merit. The demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint was properly sustained.