72 Iowa 318 | Iowa | 1887
The plaintiff was a witness in her own behalf, and she testified that prior to July, 1882, she became acquainted with the defendant, and that he had visited her frequently at her home, and paid her considerable attention. At the time above stated he took her in a ■ buggy to Glen-wood, several miles distant from her home, and there had sexual intercourse with her. Thereupon the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations, and, as this action was not commenced until November, 1884, it is not claimed that if plaintiff was seduced at the time above stated she can recover damages therefor. The plaintiff at the time above stated was about twenty-five years old, and she testified that the defendant frequently had sexual intercourse with her between July, 1882, and the last of August following. During that time the plaintiff testifies she determined to reform, and for this purpose, at least in part, she went to Kansas, in September, 1882, and remained there until April, 1883, when she returned to her home in Iowa, and she testified that no one had sexual intercourse with her during the time she was absent in Kansas. The court submitted to the jury the question whether the plaintiff had reformed and was of chaste character at the time she claims the second seduction took place, which was in June, 1883. Within a day or two after plaintiff's return from Kansas, defendant called on her, and they took a buggy ride, and in relation thereto, and the subsequent acts and conduct of the parties, the plaintiff testified as follows: “ Boehner came Sunday afternoon about 2 o’clock.
"We-have set out all the evidence of the plaintiff on her examination in chief, as to the acts, conduct and what the defendant said after the plaintiff’s return from Kansas, and up to the time what is claimed as the second seduction took place. After this last period there were frequent acts’of sexual intercourse between these parties. And the plaintiff further testifies: “ I felt I had done wrong again. I told him my school commenced in September, and I felt I was imposing on the people to go and teach. I could not look my scholars in tlie face. It seemed as though I could see it everywhere; on the wall and all around. He would take me out to my school, and come and take me home. I told him I -was going to commence with the new year; and he promised if I would just once more, that was the 23d day of December, that he would never come to our house any more; he would not bother me any more; I co.uld commence with the new year; and I did; but he kept coming all the
Counsel for the appellant insists there is no evidence tending to show that the plaintiff was seduced in June, 1883. “ It is not sufficient to establish the sexual intercourse, but the plaintiff must show that defendant accomplished his purpose by some promise or artifice, or that she was induced to-yield to liis embrace by flattery or deception. If without being deceived, and without any false pretense, deceit or artifice, she voluntarily submitted to the connection, the law affords her no remedy.” Smith v. Milburn, 17 Iowa, 30. For the purpose of this opinion, it-will be conceded that there was evidence tending to show that the plaintiff had reformed, and was of chaste character in June, 1883. The first time the defendant was in company with the plaintiff after her return from Kansas he made an improper proposal to her, and took indecent liberties with her person, that should have shocked a matured woman of chaste character. -He proposed sexual intercourse, which she refused, and she objected to the liberties taken with her person. There was, however, no show of indignation on her part at either the proposal or liberties taken. He kept coming to see her, and told her that he loved her, and she thought that if she did “not give up he would marry her;” and he told her, “ If you don’t do as I want you to 1 will go with some other girl.” She then was clearly and explicitly advised that his object in. visiting her was to obtain sexual intercourse. This was before the claimed seduction took place. Knowing his object, she permitted him to visit her frequently, and he finally “ accomplished his purpose by telling her he would abandon her, and go with
The conduct of the defendant is indefensible, when viewed from the plaintiff’s standpoint, or from the standpoint of morality and decency; but, as we have seen, the plaintiff cannot recover simply because she indiscreetly permitted the intercourse to take place; and, as there is no evidence tending to show a false promise or any deceit or artifice, she is not entitled to recover, and therefore the court should have sustained the motion for a new trial.
REVERSED.