Tlie Bainbridge Grocery Company brought suit against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company for the value of certain merchandise which was contained in a railroad car, and which was burned on a side-track adjacent to the grocery company’s place of business and connected with the railroad company’s line of railway. The ease was tried on an agreed statement of facts. It was agreed that the grocery company loaded the car, sealed it with a sealing apparatus furnished by the railroad company, drew up a bill of lading for the shipment, presented the same to the railroad company’s agent, and obtained his signature to it, during the afternoon of November 24, 1908. About 6.30 o’clock in the evening of that day, while the goods were in the car so loaded, they were totally destroyed by accidental lire which was not caused by the railroad company or through any negligence on its part. It was further agreed that while there was no unreasonable delay on
We affirm the judgment awarding the nonsuit. We think it clear that the effect of the agreement between the parties was to fix the time and circumstances under which delivery to and from the carrier should be consummated. It was a matter of mutual convenience. In order to cut out those questions of inference and issues of fact which so often arise as to whether delivery to the carrier has been completed, especially as applied to the case of wholesale houses doing their own loading and making frequent shipments, it seems very expedient that they (the shipper and the carrier) should have agreed on some definite act or circumstance which should evidence delivery; and where the terms are fair and reasonable, we know of nothing in the public policy of the State which prevents such contracts from being made.
It often expedites the handling of the shipment of commodities that the shipper should be enabled to get a bill of lading for the t
We can not agree with counsel for the plaintiff in error in the construction they give to the contract (with a view of having it held to be. contrary to public policy) when they assume that it is capable of being so interpreted as to relieve the carrier of liability where it sends its engine to the side-track to remove a car, and places it upon another side-track and there allows it to be burned. An engine and one car may make a train, and we think that the contract before us means that if the carrier should send its switch engine, get the car, and remove it to its own main line, or to another side-track, with a view of handling it for transportation, a delivery would be effectuated. It will be presumed, in the absence of á clear expression to the contrary,- that the parties intended to contract as to those matters as to which they could lawfully contract and were not attempting to contract in violation of public policy.
This contract, as will be noticed, does not xmdertake or attempt to limit or to affect the railroad company’s liability as a common carrier. It merely attempts to define the circumstances under
“The responsibility of the carrier commences with the delivery of the goods, either to himself or his agent, or at the place where he is accustomed or agrees to receive them.” Civil Code of 1895, § 2279. Judgment affirmed.